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Large infrastructure investment decisions, especially for mega-projects defined as 
costing more than one billion U.S. dollars, are largely based on complex, unclear and 
non-transparent decision criteria. The project’s specific context and a variety of actors 
and interests add to the complexity of the decision processes. All projects deviate, to a 
certain degree from a “rational” decision-making process, are politically motivated and 
subject to multiple interests. Cost-benefit analyses are conducted in about half of the 
projects. In this work I hypothesize that the politics of project decision-making is 
comparable across countries, relative to their nature, form of involvement and impact on 
decision-making. This dissertation develops a theoretical framework to assess the 
politics of transportation megaprojects internationally, and then tests it by integrating 
quantitative and qualitative research methods. I apply the framework to a comparative 
database composed of transportation megaprojects worldwide as well as to two US based 
case studies. Using this framework the research yields the following main findings:  
1. Any infrastructure investment project is a product of its time.  
2. Transportation investment decisions most frequently are about funding. 
	  
	  




3. The dwindling role of national governments across the globe in favor of local 
decision-making shifts project and funding decisions to the local level.  
4. Creating broad pro-project coalitions is crucial. Each transportation megaproject 
is composed of different sets of support and opposition groups. Agency 
fragmentation and privatization trends further contribute to more complicated 
decision and funding schemes. 
5. National governments disproportionately fund projects that have cost overruns 
and long implementation times. 
6. The nature of transportation agencies matters. Depending on the type (line 
agencies, special purpose agencies, or single purpose agencies) transportation 
agencies either contain the inbuilt conflicts of their creators, or they already 
embody consent for a project. This yields strong impacts on project decision and 
implementation processes. On the other hand, transportation agencies may act as 
a potential shield from politics, with the ability to hold and maintain items on a 
long-term agenda.  
7. Generally, national level and grant-funded projects face weaker opposition. 
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Journalist Will Doig offers a candid assessment of the relationship between 
politics and transport decision-making: “If God himself, and Vishnu, Mohammed 
and Einstein said, ‘Build this route this way with these stops!’ politicians would 
still change it around for political reasons,” Doig quotes land-use expert Roger 
Valdez. “It only takes one politician to gum up a world-class transit plan,” he goes 
on to explain. “Voters want a subway stop on their block, so their elected officials 
fight for it, whether or not it really makes sense from an urban planning 
perspective. Or they don’t want the subway coming near them. Or they want light 
rail but not a bus. Or they want an airport link, but they want it to go around their 
neighborhood rather than through it” (Doig, 2012).  
This dissertation will analyze the politics that shape and direct decision-making for 
multi-billion dollar infrastructure investment projects (megaprojects). To keep pace with 
population growth, the need to invest in new or existing transportation systems has been 
increasing rapidly, especially in urban areas. For technical, economic and social reasons, 
selecting projects requires careful prioritization among available investment alternatives. 
But since large sums are at stake, projects are also politically contested, and a significant 
number of project decisions may be viewed as the spoils of political battles. As a result, 
from a transport-economic perspective, the “best” projects do not always win out. 
In their study on proposed New York-area transportation investment projects, 
Berechman and Paaswell find that the numerous agencies1 carry an equally large number 
of planning objectives and ideologies: “some were proposed to solve transportation 
problems, others are meant to mainly boost real-estate development and economic 
growth in specific locations.” They summarize the problem as follows: “[T]he raison 
d’être of these projects did not emerge from a comprehensive analysis of regional needs; 
rather, they have been posed by various stakeholders putting forth agency-sponsored 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 For example, in the New York metropolitan area, project decision-making involves coordinating a variety of 
different and competing transportation agencies and interests. The most important transportation agencies 
in the area are the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, the Metropolitan Transportation Authority, 
New Jersey Transit, the New York State Department of Transportation, New York Metropolitan 
Transportation Council (the metropolitan planning agency), the development corporations, etc. Each has its 
own mission and agenda, but they share overlapping transportation responsibilities in the region and have 
different abilities to call on resources and capital. 
	  
	  




projects some of which are over a decade old” (Berechman and Paaswell, 2005, p. 225). 
The authors ask the questions, who decides?, and on what basis?  
Considering the financial and technological challenges megaprojects pose, one might 
expect that experts, politicians and stakeholders apply rational and economically 
informed criteria to the decision-making process. However, political considerations 
appear to have much greater influence in determining the fate of an infrastructure 
investment project than do economic and transportation considerations. As summarized 
by Berechman (2009), transportation investments, “despite their strong technological 
and economic dimensions, [seem to] represent partial political statements regarding 
objectives, funding priorities, and targeted service recipients.” As a result, using strict 
transportation-economic criteria, a large number of implemented megaprojects are 
unworthy ex-ante or are clear failures ex-post. Thus, it may be said that actual 
megaproject decision-making is not necessarily or exclusively about economic or 
transportation efficiency, but something else – politics. 
Furthermore, it seems perplexing how megaprojects get constructed at all, especially in 
considering the thicket of public and private transport agencies in metropolitan areas, 
multiple interests over urban space, and fierce funding competition. New York’s $1.9 
billion AirTrain at John F. Kennedy International Airport, Paris’ $1.8 billion Meteor 
subway line, the bi-national $4.1 billion Oresund link, all involved endless planning and 
political struggles. Some projects are endless construction sagas, like New York’s Second 
Avenue Subway, the planning of which began about 80 years ago. Others might never be 
built, like the New York metropolitan area’s $8.7 billion “Access to the Region’s Core” 
commuter rail project that got cancelled in 2010 after $600 million had already been 
spent. Who decides when and whether these projects get realized or abandoned? 
	  
	  




Understanding infrastructure investment decisions is crucial, because infrastructure 
access organizes social, economic and political opportunities and participation in society. 
As such, it would be insufficient to base project selection on transportation-economic 
rationales only. But project selection is undocumented, muddled and nontransparent to 
begin with. So the main questions, before normative questions may be asked, are: what 
drives infrastructure investment decisions; what are the politics behind each project? 
This dissertation explores whether these questions can be answered with any cogency. 
The main argument of the dissertation is that investment choices are as much driven by 
politics (open and hidden) as by transport-economic rationales. The politics arise from 
institutional arrangements and political power struggles. Independent of place, 
infrastructure investment decisions are rooted in the larger societal context and in large-
scale ideological dynamics. Megaprojects are executed by varying types of agencies that, 
corresponding to their degree of autonomy from these larger governance systems, have 
the power to channel politics, set agendas, and build shifting coalitions to compete for 
funding. Their institutional arrangements are crucial in the process, because they 
determine who holds power over what. In the end, the choices benefit certain groups 
over others, reflecting shifting political coalitions on the national and local levels. These 
dynamics are similar to all infrastructure investment decisions across the world. 
That megaprojects should be political endeavors is not per se problematic. The politics 
“interfering” with the decision process can be good or bad. Infrastructure investment 
may carry socio-economical and political benefits beyond transport-economic 
considerations – for instance, when a project increases local or international economic 
competitiveness or addresses national security concerns. That still does not mean a 
project would stand a transport-economic test.  
	  
	  




On the other hand, infrastructure investments have been criticized as vehicles for 
interest group politics, as expressions of the neoliberalization of public space. Here, too, 
the implication is that the politics influencing project planning are a distortion of what 
should be a more rational process. Whatever the angle of criticism about the role of 
politics in project planning and development, when these political influences combine 
with a lack of transparency in the decision-making process, there is no way to discern a 
reasonable standard for project choice. Political elements seem to be blended with 
technological, transportation-economic and social requirements, and one gets the sense 
that research on the politics of transport investment decision-making, in order to 
adequately reflect reality, must be interdisciplinary. I will explain the merits of an 
interdisciplinary research approach in more detail below. To better clarify and organize 
the issues, however, I first want to explain what the exact political parameters are.  
This dissertation is not the first study to deal with this problem. Plato already 
understood the tension between expertise and rationality, on the one hand, and politics, 
on the other hand. While his advice – to form classes of experts in each generation that 
would handle all questions related to their expertise – might be one acceptable solution, 
this is not a likely outcome in the near future.  
In recent decades, transportation megaproject investments (hereinafter also referred to 
as “megaprojects”) are a subject that falls in and out of fashion periodically. It recently 
attracted renewed interest, also beyond academia, because of the prolific research 
conducted by Flyvbjerg and colleagues, most prominently with a book on 
implementation risks in 2003. The authors start by observing and establishing the 
problem of frequent cost overruns in infrastructure investment projects and ask why this 
happens. They assess several risk measures and argue that strategic misrepresentation – 
	  
	  




by planners, promoters, and politicians – is at the core of many megaproject failures (in 
terms of cost overrun). 
Priemus et al. edited a volume on megaproject decision-making (2008) where the 
contributors looked at management and planning issues, but not specifically at politics 
per se (Priemus et al., 2008). Berechman’s book on the evaluation of transportation 
megaprojects establishes a framework for thorough project evaluation – something 
missing from typical project choice. His evaluation framework encompasses economic, 
transportation and policy-analysis theoretical principles; relevant evaluation issues; 
applicability to a wide range of transportation investment projects; and predictions 
about future developments and projective alternative analyses (Berechman, 2009).  
Another large study on megaprojects was done by the OMEGA Centre in London, which 
directed a team of international researchers to conduct case studies in their countries. 
The project was centered on the themes of complexity, uncertainty and risk in 
megaproject management; politics was one among many issues feeding these themes 
(2010). A recent edited volume on urban megaprojects looks at megaprojects across the 
world as instruments of capitalist urban restructuring to fit the purposes of a globalizing 
economy. The chapter contributions encompass an impressive array of cities and their 
policies around the world (del Cerro Santamaria, ed., 2013). The contributors focus on 
megaprojects as an expression of another function without focusing specifically on the 
politics of megaproject decision-making.  
The study most closely related to the subject of this dissertation is Altshuler’s and 
Luberoff’s analysis of the changing nature of urban transportation investment decisions. 
They conduct an in-depth analysis of the politics of large infrastructure investment in the 
United States. The authors situate infrastructure investment decisions within a historical 
	  
	  




framework. They argue that the politics of urban investment have changed over time, 
influenced by changing federal funding structures and the massive opposition to inner-
city highway projects that arose in the 1960s and 1970s. The authors explain the politics 
of megaproject decision-making through several disjointed political theories, which will 
be summarized in more detail in Chapter 2 (Altshuler and Luberoff, 2003).  
By contrast, my goal is to deliver a political framework of large infrastructure investment 
decisions. Though building on the literature, the dissertation goes beyond all of the 
literature above by first building a framework that integrates quantitative and qualitative 
methods to allow the documentation, assessment and analysis of project decision politics 
internationally. Second, the comprehensive account allows for focusing on the political 
aspects of project decisions independent of the decision environment, and hence 
analyzes the decision-process. Hence it provides a way to assess and evaluate the impacts 
of politics –broadly understood as interests— on decision-making, beyond sole 
transportation efficiency. In the following, I will outline my subject matter, concepts, 
research approach and contribution in more detail.  
This analytical framework for large-scale infrastructure politics assumes the decision-
making processes for infrastructure investment projects to be comparable 
internationally, and to a certain degree also across time. While this is a daring thesis, it 
will serve to identify the main elements of decision-making. A combination of 
quantitative and qualitative elements will balance the classic research problem of 
breadth vs. depth.  
The most relevant concept of this study is the politics of decision-making on large 
infrastructure investment projects. Politics in this case refers to open and hidden 
purpose-driven negotiation, coalition and confrontation processes of actors embedded in 
	  
	  




institutionalized settings that define their scope of power and influence – both over 
funding as well as in terms of ideas. While decisions are single acts of choice, decision-
making refers to an interrelated series of decisions.  
The decision-making process of a large infrastructure investment project entails 
everything (in theory) from project idea to ex-post evaluations. For analytic purposes, I 
abstract the process into the stages of problem definition, agenda setting, alternatives 
selection, project approval and funding and project conclusion – although they do not 
have to follow this order, or take place at all. This is particularly true for the complex 
infrastructure investment decision process.  
Infrastructure investment refers to capital-intense expenditures on comprehensive, 
basic societal structures. The notion has been understood to include many different 
things, including public utilities, communications, health care and, of course, 
transportation. Here, infrastructure investment will refer to the decision-making process 
of large-scale transportation projects only. This dissertation will predominantly focus on 
decisions and decision-making prior to project construction start. Construction start, for 
the purposes of this dissertation, marks the conclusion of the infrastructure investment 
decision-making process. 
Approach:  To my knowledge, no systematic, integrative political study has been 
conducted that includes large-scale comparative elements as well as in-depth analysis 
and formulates a coherent theory of megaproject politics that is applicable independent 
of place. This dissertation attempts to do that. 
To start, I identified the elements that are common to most infrastructure investment 
projects. My projects include railways, subways, airports, highways, bridges, and tunnel 
projects of over 1 billion $US. They are comparable because they all organize or 
	  
	  




reorganize transportation, are physical expressions in contested public spaces and are 
extraordinarily capital intensive. Hence, they all are subject to political and often modal 
competition. Ideally, all transportation megaprojects would be subject to transport-
economic scrutiny; in fact, most have the lack of such studies in common. Further, more 
often than not they do not perform well and are more expensive than projected.  
Second, transportation agencies and authorities of various shapes implement 
infrastructure projects. Because transportation agencies operate within an institutional 
context, they are afforded a certain degree of either autonomy or dependence. In either 
case, decision-making involves multiple layers of government on local, regional (state), 
or national (federal) levels. Civic and business actors, organizations, neighborhood 
alliances and other interests play a role. The importance of understanding investment 
decisions is highlighted by fierce budget competitions and public controversies.  
Third, all transportation megaprojects are impacted by larger political-contextual 
arrangements like regulatory policies, transportation cultures and policy frames. The 
contextual dynamics that may be compared –provided comparable data is available- 
across countries are privatization, devolution and fragmentation (Giuliano, 2007). 
Privatization refers to the trend that public authority is being delegated into private or 
semi-private hands. Debates about private sector vs. public sector efficiency accompany 
these developments. The devolution of public services describes the re-allocation of 
decision authorities from the national (or federal) level to the local (or state) level. Both 
privatization and devolution trends increase the fragmentation of decision autonomy. 
This trend is particularly obvious in metropolitan areas. 
I integrated these elements into one model designed to explain the politics of decision-
making – the result of a literature review –, which will be described in detail in Chapter 
	  
	  




3. To apply and test the model, I collected extensive information for 60 megaprojects all 
over the world, and conducted two in-depth case studies in the United States – one on 
the Alameda Corridor, a freight rail project in the Southern Californian area, and one on 
the Second Avenue Subway, a long-term on-again/off-again subway project in New York 
City. 
The following research questions will clarify my approach to the politics of infrastructure 
investment decisions: 
1. What are the political decision-making steps for each project? In which order 
were they taken? What relevance do the individual elements have in the process? 
2. Which contextual, macro-political factors and dynamics shape megaproject 
decisions? 
3. What drives infrastructure decisions? Who decides and based on what? Which 
actors were involved, and what was their decision-making potential? What is the 
influence of competing project rationales and interests, and how can it be 
assessed?  
4. How do transportation agencies channel larger contextual dynamics and the 
interests of the specific groups involved? How can their degree of independence 
from other institutions be assessed? 
5. What is the role of funding in the decision process? 
Hypotheses  
The main hypotheses concern the elements of context, project types and range, 
transportation authority, actor interests and funding issues. They are bound together by 
the idealized decision-making process mentioned above. The identified elements of 
political decision-making are visualized in a decision-making model in Chapter 4. 
1. Macro-level government arrangements matter for transportation decision-making 
because they organize the political arenas and institutions. Infrastructure governance 
is dependent on these structures and permeated by the dynamics and values of 
fragmentation, devolution and privatization.  
	  
	  




The macro-political context matters, because it determines decision arenas and values. 
For instance, the type of electoral system determines the relative power constellations of 
social groups in society by favoring left or right-wing governments (Iversen and Soskice, 
2006). They thus impact spending priorities and distributional values. The degree of 
centralization for federalism impacts the degree of devolution, fragmentation and 
privatization in any given polity. These dynamics determine the main decision arenas 
and the values that drive project decisions. These dynamics consistently re-organize the 
distribution of power. Where the dynamics of privatization, devolution and 
fragmentation have most progressed, infrastructure investment decisions have been 
more politicized because of the increased number of decision (veto) points (Giuliano, 
2007). In that sense, project rationales shifted away from transport-economic 
considerations. 
The privatization of public services refers to different regulatory instruments, as well as 
the delegation of decision authority into private hands. Depending on the degree of 
privatization, different actors with different rationales enter the decision arena: from 
public authorities to semi-public authorities to fully private actors. Regulatory 
frameworks on national or sub-national levels have the power to influence megaproject 
decisions by setting investment incentives or disincentives (Altshuler and Luberoff, 
2003).  
2. Physical attributes like project modes, types and location determine which actors are 
involved in project decisions. 
Though transportation is organized differently across government systems, the decision 
arena is usually, at least in part, determined by modal type. In the U.S. transportation 
landscape, “picket fence” federalism prevails, which means that infrastructure 
investment decisions for highways can take place in the highway administrations on the 
federal, state or local level. However, the railroad administration, structurally mirroring 
	  
	  




the organization of the highway department, shares no decision overlap. Instead, 
highway and railroad decisions take place nearly entirely independently. Besides having 
implications for comprehensive transportation planning, the effect for the purpose of 
this dissertation is that two different sets of decision-makers with their support networks 
or opposition structures are involved, depending on the project type. 
Second, although it should be decision makers determining project types, pre-existing 
transportation situations will inform projects as well. The effect is either through 
technological path dependencies (most of the time it makes more sense to add to an 
existing network, rather than start a new one), or through power structures that are 
already in place: where there is a transportation network, there are transportation 
agencies and institutional structures that maintain it. Once in place, they have more 
power within the political landscape than less established ones would have.  
Third, project type is associated with project reach: while subway projects and bridges, 
with exceptions, are restricted to an urban center or metropolitan area, rail and highway 
projects often have regional, national or international dimensions. Depending on the 
type of the project then, a variety of decision-makers, interests and opponents influence 
the decision process (Altshuler and Luberoff, 2003). It is their physical expression in 
space that shapes what is going to be involved in decision-making. 
3. Transportation authorities serve as the hinge between the general political and 
societal context and the projects themselves, and thus channel national, regional or 
local politics. Depending on their degree of autonomy, they are often the driving force 
behind project decisions. 
The term transportation authority refers to different types of agencies established by 
government to perform specific transportation functions. According to Will Doig, over 
the course of the 20th century, hundreds of semi-independent public authorities have 
been created in the U.S. and in other countries (Doig lists Israel, Australia and Thailand) 
	  
	  




(Doig, w/o year). They are part of larger, regional governance systems where different 
responsibilities are assigned to different actors; as such they channel a variety of 
interests (see Hypothesis 4). 
Transportation authorities are central to infrastructure investment decisions because, 
typically established by majority coalitions, they are institutionalized reflections of power 
distribution in a polity (Moe, 2005). No project decision may be understood without 
considering the coalition and the political-institutional culture that created the agencies, 
as well as the attributes of actors or decision-makers within the agencies and the 
resulting power relations. Over time, often they become powerful actors themselves. 
4. A variety of political, economic and social interests drive transportation investment 
decisions, and their respective impact is dependent on institutional arrangements and 
financial means. 
Given the large sums that are at stake and the significant influence of transportation 
systems on people and goods, investment decisions should ideally be guided by clear 
decision standards: the public documentation of decisions, cost-benefit studies, etc. 
However, at least half of all investment projects seem to proceed without meeting 
conducting such studies.2 In the U.S. the documentation performance improves if federal 
funding is involved. So what guides transportation investment decisions? 
The decisions may be driven by transportation concerns like re-organization, 
improvement or new access.  They may be driven by concerns for improved economic 
competitiveness, for instance by local or national business associations. Groups that 
typically wield significant influence are “Big Oil” and construction companies. Among 
the groups with growing influence are those that focus on environmental concerns. 
Communities and their representatives have an interest in promoting or defeating 
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certain transportation projects. Another significant rationale for transportation 
investment is accompanying unions and job creation programs, which have been 
emphasized (but later not continued) by the U.S. Recovery Act of 1933; but the tradition 
is there. Finally, national security considerations play a role for transportation 
investment. The National Highway System is the most prominent example, but as the 
Alameda Corridor case study shows, it remains a legitimate project rationale, especially 
given prominent U.S. involvement in world affairs. Each project has its own combination 
of project rationales, and coalitions supporting (and opposing) projects tend to be 
unique for each project, but the motivations are often hidden.  
In Hypothesis 1, I hold that macro-institutional arrangements have the power to impact 
governing coalitions. This is true for all levels of government. Independent of two- or 
multi-party constellations, there is usually one center-right and one left-leaning party, 
with associated ideas on the relative prioritization of economic development and social 
spending. In the U.S., even transportation preferences are attributed to party affiliation 
(e.g. Republicans are assumed to prefer cars over public transport), although that 
depends on the region, too. The power distributions in government affect transportation 
decisions qua value judgment, the power to create lasting institutions and regulations, 
and spending power.  
At the level of project planning and implementation, that means that open or hidden 
politics yield infrastructure investment choices that are not a function of transport-
economic considerations, but that must be also understood as political outcomes of 
arrangements that benefit certain groups over others. 








Project funding and access to resources are a crucial aspect of project decisions. 
Decision-making politics on large infrastructure investment projects are characterized by 
power struggles first and foremost because a great deal of money is at stake. Hence 
project decisions are funding decisions, and those in a position to allocate funds, or 
effectively secure funding, have the ultimate decision power. 
Besides contributions to the field, my motivation for the dissertation, plain and simple, 
was to understand how these huge projects get off the ground to begin with. Working on 
a case study on the comparatively tiny AirTrain JFK megaproject (an on-airport 
passenger train at New York’s John F. Kennedy International Airport) and conducting 
more than 15 interviews with people involved in the decision process, I started to become 
intrigued with the question of how megaprojects in general overcome myriads of political 
and financial obstacles in difficult decision environments.  
Fortunately, the literature relevant to the subject at hand recognizes the looming 
questions of politics, power and public organizations, as well (Moe, 2005, Callahan, 
2007), but usually focuses on selected aspects of a project only, and so my project was 
born. While the political framework of transportation infrastructure investment 
decision-making will clarify infrastructure investment politics, it will also deliver a tool 
for the political analysis of power in public decision-making. It will contribute an 
organizing framework that integrates influences and findings from different disciplines – 
critical urban studies, economics, management, psychology, and public administration – 
into political science and policy studies.  
Chapter 1 will provide an overview over the relevant literature to situate the subject and 
show the different dimensions of decision-making. The chapter will be divided into four 
main parts: an overview of the decision-making process and its critiques, what the 
	  
	  




literature has to say about macro-structural policy impacts and effects, a summary of the 
literature on transportation authorities, and an overview of actor motivations in general 
and megaproject decision-makers in particular. 
Chapter 2 will subsequently integrate the findings of the literature review into a coherent 
theoretical framework of the politics of decision-making. I will first situate the subject 
within the descriptive, non-normative realm. Then I will outline the point of departure: 
the ideal decision process. The steps in that process form the main body upon which I 
collect political “evidence”: context, transportation agency as the vehicle of project 
implementation, and potential actors. The model will serve as the basic frame for the 
quantitative and qualitative analyses. 
Chapter 3 will provide an overview of the variety of different methods used to analyze the 
role of politics in transportation megaproject decision-making according to the model 
developed in the third chapter. I will restate the research questions and then show how 
they will be addressed in the multi-methods approach and provide rationales for using 
these methods as well as the case study selection. 
The quantitative tool consisting of a database of 60 megaprojects will be presented in 
Chapter 4. Hypotheses from the literature and from my own understanding of the data 
and the research field guide the investigation. The chapter is divided into six sections: a 
brief introduction describes the data, its collection and the approaches taken. The second 
section explores macro-political, economic and cultural impacts on selected project 
characteristics. The third section scrutinizes the associations between national, state, 
local, transportation agency and international decision-makers and project attributes 
and outcomes. The fourth section investigates the influence of transparency issues and 
transport-economic studies that pertain to “ideal” decision-making. The fifth section 
	  
	  




presents the results from the analysis of funding sources and types and their impact on 
project choice. Extensive appendices provide information about the data, its 
representativeness, and the statistical tests used. 
Chapters 5 and 6 will present the two case studies of U.S. megaprojects. In both case 
studies, I first provide a case study synopsis, which will give an overview of the main 
project facts. I then summarize some of the project studies that served as the bases for 
decisions and provide the general context and historical overview of relevant project 
decision steps. The remainder will be reserved for the description and analysis of the 
decision politics. In the end, I will conclude by providing a summary of the main 
decision-making steps that are part of the model (Chapter 3), and summarize the finding 
in the light of the hypotheses presented above. 
Following, I will conclude and summarize this study by synthesizing the findings from 
the statistical analysis and the case studies and discuss the hypotheses and the decision-
making model. I will finish with a discussion of methodological problems.   
	  
	  





Chapter 1: Transport Megaproject Decision Making: 
Literature Review 
I reviewed the key megaproject-specific literature, as well as corollary political science 
policy literature with the intention of developing a model of the politics of megaproject 
investment decision-making that will allow me to compare projects cross-nationally. 
Though the majority of the studies deal with U.S.-based examples, this review covers not 
only U.S. American literature relevant for explaining the politics of investment decisions. 
The following questions organize the review: 
1. How can the politics of decision-making in large infrastructure investment 
planning be operationalized? What are the political decision-making steps for 
each project? In which order were they taken? What relevance do the individual 
elements have in the process? 
2. Which contextual, macro-political factors and dynamics (actually or 
potentially) shape megaproject decisions? 
3. What drives infrastructure decisions? Who decides and on what basis? Which 
actors are involved, and what is their decision-making potential?  
4. What is the role of transportation authorities in the decision-making process? 
 
1.1. The Rational Decision-Making Model and Its Demise 
1. How can the politics of decision-making in large infrastructure investment planning be 
operationalized? What are the political decision-making steps for each project? In which 
order were they taken? What relevance do the individual elements have in the process? 
Implementing megaprojects is difficult and complex. Researchers emphasize how 
multiple political jurisdictions and institutions, market forces, interest groups and 
business actors are involved in project decisions, rendering planning and 
implementation processes politically difficult (Flyvbjerg et al., 2010, 2003, Priemus et 
al., 2008, Mackie and Preston, 1998, Morris and Hough, 1987, Hall, 1980). They show 
how the problem of sunken costs yields irreversible decisions (Hall, 1980, Collingridge, 
	  
	  




1992), and how all of this negatively impacts project selection and success measures 
(Berechman, 2009, Priemus, 2008, Flyvbjerg et al., 2003). 
This state of affairs deviates from desirable, well-planned transportation-economic 
project selection rationales, which I’ll refer to as the “rational decision model” (Stone, 
2002). I will discuss this model here at length because it seems to underlie much of the 
literature that seeks to understand why the reality of megaproject implementation 
departs so far from expectations. 
Rational models of decision-making, prevalent in economics and some strands of 
political science, are not directly concerned with the human factor. They assume that 
rational, self-interested actors take steps to maximize positive feedback and outcomes 
through efficient, incentive-guided action in a generally knowable environment. As 
summarized by Jones,  
“those models [the ’comprehensively rational’ economic and decision theory 
models of choice] assume that preferences are defined over outcomes, that those 
outcomes are known and fixed, and that decision-maker actors maximize their 
net benefits, or utilities, by choosing the alternative that yields the highest level of 
net benefits. The subjective expected-utility variant of rational choice integrates 
risk and uncertainty into the model by associating a probability distribution, 
estimated by the decision maker, with outcomes. Choices among competing goals 
are handled by indifference curves - generally postulated to be smooth (twice 
differentiable) - that specify substitutability among goals. A major implication of 
this approach is that the mix of incentives facing the decision-maker determines 
behavior. A second implication is that adjustment to these incentives is 
instantaneous; true maximizers have no learning curves.” (Jones, 1999, p. 299)  
For instance, when discussing infrastructure investment, the rational model would 
identify two types of decision-makers: potential users of the projects (e.g. trip-makers), 
who respond to transportation-economic incentives (e.g., travel-time reduction), and 
project decision makers on all levels that try to attain improved cost-benefit ratios. It is 
assumed that the maximization of the combined welfare of the first group is the main 
objective of megaproject decision-making of the second group.  
	  
	  




The rational decision-making process is based on a clear – and, in normative terms, 
‘ideal’ – model of reasoning: “Identify objectives. Identify alternative courses of action 
for achieving objectives. Predict the possible consequences of each alternative. Evaluate 
the possible consequences of each alternative. Select the alternative that maximizes the 
attainment of objectives.” A rational policy decision-making process may look like this: 
“problem identification/agenda setting, policy formulation and adoption, policy 
implementation, and policy evaluation and reformulation” (Stone, 2002, p. 8). It 
assumes that the actors and their roles are well defined, and that all steps are more or 
less consecutive (i.e. FHWA, w/o year, p. 16). With respect to the megaproject decision-
making process (or any other, really), the rational simplified decision-making process 
might be organized in clean, distinct stages: Problem Definition, Alternatives Selection, 
Agenda Setting, Project Approval, Project Funding and Project Success.  
After a rationalist phase in the 1940s and 1950s, policy theorists and political scientists 
started to criticize the stages concept by recognizing complicated webs of chance that 
might interfere with it (Lindblom, 1959), ambiguity (Zahariadis, 2003), or paradox 
(Stone, 2002). Lindblom was one of the first to suggest that decision-making is more like 
a “muddling through” rather than an organized process. The process unfolds in 
complicated, quasi-accidental, non-transparent, and disorganized ways (Lindblom, 
1959). Subsequently, different policy making theories evolved: the Multiple Streams 
framework, Punctuated Disequilibrium, the Advocacy Coalition framework, and 
Bounded Rationality. They will be summarized in the following. 
Kingdon’s (1984) Multiple Streams framework analyzes policy decision-making in the 
United States.3 The theory, originally referring to agenda setting, has at this point 
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extended to include the entire policy formation process, and is thus applicable to a 
broader range of political systems (Zahariadis, 2003). The framework assumes that any 
policy environment is a challenging and chaotic one, and decisions happen during brief 
moments when three aspects (here envisioned as streams floating through the policy 
realm) fall in place: problems, policies, and politics. 
Citizens or policy makers may bring in more or less concrete problems. Which problems 
to pay attention to, or get put on the agenda, depend upon attention spans and power 
relations (see also Rochefort and Cobb, 1994). Policies are the various ideas competing 
for acceptance and implementation. Their selection criteria include “technical feasibility 
and value acceptability” (Zahariadis, 2007, p. 72). The stream of politics captures the 
national mood, interest group influence, and administrative and legislative turnover. In 
order to get policies or projects on the agenda, these three streams, which are not 
typically connected or related, come together through particular “windows of 
opportunity” that may be engineered or opened by “policy entrepreneurs” or politicians 
(Kingdon, 1984).  
Another framework explaining how policies come about is the Punctuated Equilibrium 
approach. Despite stagnation, incrementalism or the conservative nature of national 
political systems and institutions, major policy change does occur. While most theories 
try to explain either stasis or change in policy-making, Punctuated Disequilibrium tries 
to explain both, and thus holds some markers for megaproject implementation 
(Baumgartner and Jones, 1993; Krasner, 1993). Though it has been developed to fit the 
United States, subsequent empirical studies have shown that it is applicable in other 
democracies as well (True, Jones and Baumgartner, 1999).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
but are often distinct. Similarly, solutions may even be defined sooner than the respective problems. 
Furthermore, in this model, agenda-setting and policy formation are processes informed by history, chance 
and specific constellations. The selection of solutions is rather unpredictable and affected by decision-
makers’ degree of knowledge, biases, and temporary constellations (Cohen, March and Olsen, 1972). 
	  
	  




The theory integrates different levels of analysis. Stagnation happens in policy 
subsystems, while those issues that reach the macro political level bring major changes 
(Baumgartner and Jones, 1993). The theory posits that small changes at the sub-policy 
level may lead to macro-economic changes, and the main underlying dynamic is the 
attention paid to an issue. The trick to inducing policy change is to create or attract 
attention to a problem, or what is perceived as a problem. With respect to megaprojects, 
this means that they may be manipulated by strategically-placed information (see also 
Flyvbjerg, 2003) or emotive appeals.  
The strength of the theory is that it addresses the multiplicity of “separated institutions, 
overlapping institutions and relatively open access to mobilizations in the United States” 
(True, Jones and Baumgartner, 2007, p. 157). Many transportation megaproject 
environments are thus described – in the United States, and elsewhere as well. Because 
of their size and complexity, megaprojects often require interaction between policy sub-
systems and the politics between the executive and legislative branches of the national 
government.  
Further, the projects are so expensive that the macro-political environment and its 
policies affect them. For example, megaproject decisions proliferated in the wake of 
German reunification. The combination of a new-found optimism and the symbolism of 
unifying projects created new and “decisive” actor coalitions and project implementation 
(Peters, 2010). 
The Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) emphasizes the role of specific advocacy 
coalitions in policy decision-making. Advocacy coalitions, which are made up of 
proponents such as special interest groups or local business associations – or some 
combination thereof – act in concert or share resources in order to place items on the 
	  
	  




agenda or implement policies (Sabatier and Weible, 2007, p. 196). The framework also 
accounts for psychological and ideological affinities driving political ambitions and 
decisions, like individual deep core beliefs and policy core beliefs (channeled through 
institutions and agencies). They may vary from polity to polity and by political level.  
Individual deep core beliefs involve assumptions about human nature, assessments of 
relative values like liberty and equality, prioritizations of certain groups over others, the 
role of government vs. market, etc., and all of these may be summed up as ideological 
components. Policy core beliefs include the priority of different policy-related values. 
Examples are the relative authority of governments and markets; as well as the proper 
roles of the general public, of elected officials, of civil servants, of experts, and of the 
relative seriousness and causes of policy problems in the sub-system as a whole 
(Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier, 1994). For instance, individual core beliefs might explain 
public transit vs. car preferences, and policy core beliefs different social spending habits 
with respect to the former. This would explain why social spending has higher priority in 
Scandinavian countries than in others (Esping-Andersen, 1990), and why there is a more 
elaborate train system than in the United States.  
Bounded rationality theories are concerned with the limits of human understanding 
(Jones, 1999, 2003). They, too, have been developed in response to the rational choice 
model, and often include two kinds of limitations: cognitive limitations (Simon, 1957) 
and institutional limitations (for the latter, see section on institutionalist theories). With 
respect to the cognitive limitations, Kahneman and Tversky argue that “people rely on a 
limited number of heuristic principles which reduce the complex tasks of assessing 
probabilities and predicting values to simple judgmental operations. In general, these 
heuristics are quite useful, but sometimes they lead to severe and systematic errors” 
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979, as cited by Berechman, 2009, p. 15).  
	  
	  




Another aspect of this is that people consciously and unconsciously make their decisions 
in response to their environments, which provide both incentives and structures for 
decision-making. Hence, decision contexts like electoral rules, resource distribution, or 
interpersonal relationships enter the decision process, removing it from its rational 
patterns. Collingridge, specifically with respect to megaprojects, puts it more bluntly: 
human cognitive abilities are too limited to make valuable and informed decisions about 
anything as complex as transportation megaprojects (Collingridge, 1992).  
In political science, bounded rationality has its greatest applications in organizational 
studies. I could not summarize it better than Jones:  
“Over and over again, students of the behavior of public organizations reported 
findings that did not comport with the demands of objective rationality (Simon, 
1985, p. 294). […] Decision makers did not need simply to choose among 
alternatives; they had to generate the alternatives in the first place (Simon, 1983, 
1996b; Chisholm, 1995). Problems were not givens; they had to be defined 
(Rochefort & Cobb, 1994). Solutions did not automatically follow problems; 
sometimes actors had set solutions ready to apply to problems that could occur 
(Cohen et al., 1972; Kingdon, 1996; Jones and Bachelor, 1994). Choice was based 
on incommensurate goals, which were ill-integrated (March, 1978; Simon, 1983, 
1995; Jones, 1994). Organizations seemed to have limited attention spans and, at 
least in major policy changes, serial processing capacity (Simon, 1983, Jones, 
1994, Cobb and Elder, 1972, Kingdon, 1996). The three most important strands of 
research stemming from behavioral organizational theory in political science 
focused on incremental budgeting, on the impacts of organizational routine on 
policy outputs, and on policy agendas.” (all authors as cited by Jones, 1999, p. 
302f) 
The different theories evoke different elements of policy formation. Their common 
background is curiosity about how things are getting done at all. In this context, the 
theories of the policy process are useful to establish a decision-making core that allows 
me to contrast across megaproject decision processes. In the remainder of the review, I 
will summarize some of the relevant political science literature outside the policy 
theories, including specific megaproject studies. 
1.2. Which Are the Political Factors Entering Decision-Making? 
When and where do politics enter project selection processes? I will provide an overview 
over the literature from four different angles: 1) macro-political influences, 2) 
	  
	  




institutions, agencies and policy frameworks, 3) actors, power and politics, and 4) other 
items impacting megaproject decisions. Figure 1 displays the structure of the literature 
review. The “Project Decision-Making” core would refer to the idealized and non-
idealized stages of decision-making above.  
Figure 1: The Political Elements of Transport Megaproject Decision-Making 
 
 
1.3. Contextual Factors 
Which contextual, macro-political factors and dynamics shape megaproject decisions? 
Macro-level arrangements are important to project decision-making, because they 
determine the decision-makers and decision-making institutions. They may directly 
impact project decisions, for instance those decided on the national level, or influence 
funding sources. Via federalist arrangements, infrastructure decisions are often 
delegated to lower level decision-makers (Altshuler and Luberoff, 2003, Giuliano, 2007). 
Two main bodies of literature are relevant. First, the literature concerned with the 
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Some studies take national structures into account (e.g. Mercado et al., 2007, Altshuler 
and Luberoff, 2003, Persson, 2002, Pierre, 1999, Eisinger 1998). For instance, a 
comparative study on transport policies in aging societies identifies influential 
institutions on three levels: overall government structures and systems (e.g. monarchies, 
parliamentary systems, federal systems); national transport institutions (ministries and 
departments), which direct and determine transportation plans; and sub-national 
entities (regional planning agencies and authorities) (Mercado et al., 2007).  
Others identify dynamics that organize and re-organize decision-making. Literature on 
the dynamics of devolution (the delegation of decision authority from higher to lower 
levels) investigates the impact on urban and regional decision-making (Eisinger, 1998, 
Pierre, 1999). “Fragmentation literature” researches decision-making constraints arising 
from the “proliferation of governmental units and the dispersion of public funds” 
(Giuliano, 2007, p. 6). In a nutshell, in a tradition that goes back to the Anti-Federalists, 
decentralization proponents argue that the proliferation of government units benefits 
competitiveness and thus efficiency, while at the same time government is put closer to 
the people. Opponents of fragmentation hold that it complicates decisions that go 
beyond local issues (Giuliano, 2007).  
The privatization dynamic refers to the role of government in infrastructure investments 
and deregulation trends (Derthick, 1985), or the delegation of decision, funding or 
contractual responsibilities to the private sector. The private sector is assumed to be 
more creative and flexible, thus better capable of adapting to increasingly competitive 
national and international markets (Giuliano, 2007, Flyvbjerg, 2003). Privatization is 
motivated by the assumption that the private sector performs better, either by delivering 
more efficient services (Donahue, 2002), or, in this case, more efficient projects (Hall, 
1980, p. 188). 
	  
	  




A related concept is the deregulation of certain industries over time. In the United States, 
proponents of deregulation bemoan the regulatory excess of “big government” that 
distorts or impairs market efficiency. Regulatory regimes affect elements of the 
construction and delivery of megaprojects – for instance, by framing contractual and 
financing schemes (Flyvbjerg et al., 2003). In the U.S. – although their regulation had 
been deeply entrenched – the deregulation of transport structures started in the late 
1970s and included airlines, railroads and trucking industries. Derthick and Quirk 
explain that this was not a result of interest group pressures, but of experts successfully 
garnering Congressional attention by predicting increased efficiency and reduced costs 
to consumers. This appealed to Democrats, because it promised increased consumer 
rights, and to Republicans, because it promised greater economic freedom (Derthick and 
Quirk, 1985).  
Some internationally comparative studies examine the influence of electoral institutions 
on economic and policy questions (e.g. Persson, 2002, Grossman and Helpman, 2001). 
For instance, Persson (an economist) studies the “systematic effects of electoral rules 
and policy regimes on the size and composition of government spending” (Persson, 
2002, p. 883). He analyzes electoral rules (district sizes and electoral formula) and 
regime types internationally and finds that electoral rules and political regimes exercise 
systematic influence on economic policy choices:  
“Empirically, presidential regimes are associated with smaller governments than 
parliamentary regimes, a smaller and less persistent response of spending to 
income shocks, a stronger post-election cycle in aggregate spending and revenue, 
but a weaker cycle in social transfers. Majoritarian elections are associated with 
smaller broad spending programs than proportional elections and with less 
corruption; they also have smaller (and perhaps less persistent) spending 
responses to income shocks, and a weaker election cycle in social transfers.” 
(Persson, 2002, pp. 902f).  
	  
	  




Looking further he argues it is difficult and time-consuming to measure political 
institutions. Other researchers find that far-right and far-left controlled governments 
will have different investment patterns (Hibbs, 1977, Schmidt, 1982). 
Political researchers are divided on how to categorize electoral systems, and what exactly 
their effects are (Norris, 1997). But all theories concern the distribution of power qua 
institutional effects, and their (potential) influence; for instance, how electoral systems 
are related to parties (Lijphart, 1994; Morelli, 2004), to voters (Taagepera, 1989), or to 
interest groups and clientelism (LeDuc, Niemi and Norris, 1996). As an example, the 
prevalence of the majority system in the U.S. facilitates the two-party system and thus 
polarization, which might lead to heightened ideological conflict at all levels and affect 
public spending (e.g. Lindquist and Oestling, 2010). Relative to this literature, one of the 
most relevant sources for analyzing the politics of megaproject decision-making is 
literature on interest groups, outlined below. 
Altshuler and Luberoff describe how cities adjust to economic pressures. First, federal 
funding dried up, after an era of unprecedented infusions of federal aid for local and 
state infrastructure investment projects. At the same time, there was growing popular 
opposition to large-scale investment. As a result, cities needed to find different ways to 
deal with their infrastructure needs. Instead of relying on public funding, cities began 
shifting their investment strategies from direct public investments toward monetary and 
regulatory inducements in an effort to attract investments. Newly-established public 
authorities and local and state development corporations began to coordinate incentive 
and regulatory systems for public and private investment. Popular protests led 
governments to adopt rules that greatly constrained disruptive public investment, 
meaning that certain forms of large-scale public investment became more difficult, more 
expensive, and time-consuming than others (Altshuler and Luberoff, 2003).  
	  
	  




Specifically with respect to megaproject investments, Priemus argues “[…] the frequent 
changes that occur in the political composition of the respective government may 
complicate the decision-making process. As the entire process, from proposal to 
handover, takes decades rather than years, every megaproject will be confronted with 
government elections and – more often than not – shifts in the balance of political power 
at national, regional and local levels. Some megaprojects are so emotionally charged and 
so bound up with differences in political ideologies that they are used as part of the 
stakes during elections and the formation of coalitions (e.g. for the effects of 
infrastructure decisions on incumbents see MacManus, 2004). This happens not only at 
national level (parliament, cabinet), but also at regional and local level and – most 
crucially – around the political consensus or dispute between different tiers of 
governments (national and local)” (Priemus, 2010, p. 6).  
The complexities increase because of the long-term nature and geographic extent of 
transportation investment projects: the longer the planning and implementation time of 
a project, and the more jurisdictions it touches, the more political hurdles there are to 
overcome. Priemus describes this as “political discontinuity”4 (Priemus, 2010). First, 
since most megaproject decision-making processes span many years, they are subject to 
changes in governing coalitions on various levels, budget cycles, a variety of political 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Priemus also describes the effect of “market discontinuities:” “Megaprojects figure in different decision-
making phases in some markets and affect many other markets in the process. In some markets empirical 
facts have only limited validity. Generally speaking, prognoses and estimates – implicit and explicit – are 
based on assumptions about trends in supply and demand, and hence the price developments in relevant 
markets. A whole host of factors comes into play, such as the availability of engineers and other experts for 
the preparation phase; the supply of tradesmen, building materials, installations and raw materials for the 
execution phase; developments in energy prices; the overall economic situation; the capital market 
(including trends in long-term interest rates); inflation and the land market (important in the programming 
phase and the preparation and execution phase). Sometimes these market conditions are taken as read, but 
it is no exception for a megaproject to create its own endogenous market dynamics. These uncertainties can 
be ‘put into cold storage’ until a later date, but there is no guarantee that crucial factors will follow the 
anticipated pattern. Moreover, deviations can have a profound impact on the final cost-benefit analysis. 
Mobility patterns can change within the course of a single decade as a result of, say, competition from other 
modes of transport than those envisioned in the project. Inland shipping, for example, is competing strongly 
with rail and road for the transport of goods to and from major ports like Rotterdam and Antwerp. And one 
can safely assume that the advent of budget airlines such as Easy Jet is undermining the demand for high-
speed rail transport in Europe.” (Priemus 2010, p. 25) 
	  
	  




influences, and even system changes (e.g., German reunification or European 
integration). In those cases, large-scale political changes and market discontinuities (i.e. 
economic crises) potentially affect decision-making by promoting or inhibiting certain 
types of projects. 
The process of European integration poses new challenges on cross-border and supra-
national levels. “In Europe megaprojects often cross national borders and thus involve 
international negotiations and treaties, and sometimes, international conflicts. In some 
cases the European Commission also participates in the decision-making, especially if 
subsidies are involved or specific EU themes such as the Trans European Networks. Lack 
of political continuity and public consensus […] can exert an adverse influence on the 
decision-making. When this happens the parties are assailed by tensions, which have 
spilled over from other domains. Fortunately, this can also work in the other direction: if 
government units collaborate well in other spheres and if they share similar views, there 
may be more consensus” (Priemus, 2010, p. 6, see also: Sartori, 2008).  
Examples are the French high-speed train networks reaching into Germany, or the 
Channel Tunnel between France and Great Britain. In these cases, as opposed to 
situations where megaproject complexity renders decision-making more difficult, 
sometimes there are advantages – like the pressure for consensus in transnational 
projects.  
1.4. Rationales of Investment Decision-Making 
What drives infrastructure decisions? Who decides and on what basis? Which actors are 
involved, and what is their decision-making potential?  
Urban Studies tend to be concerned with the spatial matters in the public realm, how 
access to public goods and urban space are distributed, and who holds the power. Part of 
that literature addresses ideologies and values. Urban Studies literature has long 
theorized about the question of who governs a city (Brash 2010, Berg, 2007, Dahl, 1961). 
	  
	  




American explanations include urban “political machines” (Scott, 1969), “regime 
coalitions” (Stone, 1989), with “pro-growth coalitions”5 (Altshuler and Luberoff, 2003; 
Mollenkopf, 1983) and “policy entrepreneurs” as active drivers of change (Kingdon, 
1984, Altshuler and Luberoff, 2003, Flyvbjerg et al., 2003, Dye 2001). In the frame of 
this dissertation the important question is what motivates decision-makers.  
Mollenkopf has maintained that long-term urban development and financial support has 
always been grounded in party coalitions (particularly Democrats) wanting to hold on to 
power. Parties will assure that housing/public works programs are implemented (and 
provide both jobs and services) in order to keep the rule of that party in place. Pro-
growth coalitions are of interest here because, in megaprojects, there is so much money 
at stake that profit (and non-profit) actors and coalitions may get behind projects and 
push them. These coalitions started out as the expression of national-level involvement 
in local politics through development efforts and became lodged on the local level. Policy 
entrepreneurs compose pro-growth coalitions of various disparate – and, at times, even 
oppositional – groups to rally behind certain issues and policies; in this case, for 
megaproject investment (Mollenkopf, 1983; also: Altshuler and Luberoff, 2003). 
Most authors argue that transport investment decisions are not about the projects per se 
but serve other motives beyond that. In his study of Los Angeles, Erie situates 
metropolitan developments within a debate on the influence of technological and 
governance systems on policy and performance measures.  
One side of that debate argues it is market and technological pressures that bring about 
modernizing infrastructure investment (Denning, 1985 – as summarized by Erie, 2004, 
p. 32). The other side of the debate argues that governance structures matter (Olson, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 “Pro-growth coalitions” may include a variety of political actors and interests, even conflicting ones, to 
implement certain agendas, and may originate from both the public and private sectors. They were crucial 
for the development of urban agendas and metropolitan development patterns (Mollenkopf 1983). 
	  
	  




1988). This perspective will be illuminated in the next section below. The debate with 
respect to megaprojects or public infrastructure investment usually concerns economic 
development (Kennedy et al. 2011, Samiolo, 2006, Altshuler and Luberoff, 2003, Pierre, 
1999, or Mollenkopf, 1983), symbolic reasons (Haeussermann and Siebel, 1993), or equal 
access motives (Gregory, 1999). According to Erie, for instance, the Alameda Corridor 
freight-rail project (see Chapter 6), is to a certain degree the result of a particular 
political constellation rather than technological progress (Erie, 2004). 
The critical urban and metropolitan perspective points out how megaprojects have been 
used by elites for the neoliberal restructuring of cities (Swyngedouw, Moulaert and 
Rodriguez, 2002, Harvey, 2007, Brash, 2010). As such, megaprojects would reflect 
global pressures and incorporate changing systems regulation and governance on all 
levels (Erie, 2004, Swyngedouw, Moulaert and Rodriguez, 2002). Because of 
privatization dynamics, the literature overlaps with critiques of public-private 
partnerships (“PPPs”). PPPs are seen as political vehicles of neo-liberal politics, poorly 
justified by assumptions of market efficiency and budget constraints, which would 
promote business and market interests rather than social interests.  
The concerns raised are the commodification of public goods, the outsourcing of 
government responsibilities (and therefore democratic accountability), and the 
detrimental effects on social needs and the environment (Brenner, Marcuse and Mayer, 
2009, Isin, 1998, Erie, Kogan and MacKenzie, 2010) at the expense of urban 
communities (i.e. Gregory, 1998). In this view, megaproject selection is the result of 
specific actor coalitions promoting profit-oriented interests: strong lobbies, interest 
groups, and the politicians who would serve them. Siemiatycki suggests that involving 
private capital in the investment has an impact on the types of projects chosen, and that 
PPPs might distort regional planning priorities (Siemiatycki, 2010). 
	  
	  




A particular strand of German literature, where megaprojects were a hot topic in the 
1990s, argues that megaprojects are part of a culture of a “festivalization of city politics” 
(Haeussermann and Siebel, 1993, Peters and Huning, 2003). The argument is that city 
politics increasingly relies on megaprojects and mega-events to promote urban-
economic and reputational growth. Infrastructure investment projects here serve as large 
flagship and urban-renaissance projects, e.g. in Berlin (Peters and Huning, 2003) or 
Hong Kong (Lui, 2007), drawing lots of attention and creating controversy. New York, 
through Robert Moses’ highway projects, provides another example. According to Caro, 
Moses’ objective was the transformation of the city structure by building highways: the 
transformation from a “neighborhood city” to a metropolitan area. But underneath were 
at least two additional purposes. The first was to increase the living standard in certain 
areas by developing better transportation flows (at the expense of lots of other, mainly 
poor neighborhoods). The second was to improve the economic competitiveness of New 
York vis-à-vis other metropolitan areas (Caro, 1975). 
Interest groups are another way to conceptualize incentives and rationales, although the 
relative influence of these groups is inconclusive and controversial. The defining range 
includes voters with specific incentives (“groups in society [that] gain favorable 
treatment from the government based only on their voting behavior”), and proactive, 
organized groups with the potential to influence decision outcomes for various reasons 
(Grossman and Helpman, 2001, p. 1). Business interest groups have the strongest 
influence, seeking economic benefits for their members. Often they have international 
influence as well. Small interest groups, representing minorities or special interests, are 
also active. Because there is a lot of secrecy involved, the actual degree of influence is 
hard to gauge and likely differs by local and issue. In federal systems there are additional 
levels of government, making it even more difficult to assess. In the United States, for 
	  
	  




instance, interest groups are structurally different on a federal and urban level, and the 
research field is dominated by research on the national level (Berry, 1984).  
On a national level, interest groups seek to influence politicians, either before or after 
elections. Authors argue that the fewer interest groups there are to weigh on a politician, 
the stronger their actual respective influence (Grossman and Helpman, 2001). Lobbying 
may facilitate the interaction and information flow between the legislature (Congress) 
and bureaucracies, and (moderate) interest groups affect bureaucracies in such a way 
that they present more moderate proposals (Epstein and O’Halloran, 1995). Sometimes, 
interest groups simply gain influence over politicians by providing one of the few sources 
of clear and concise information on a given issue to politicians. Strong private sector 
firms, e.g. the construction industry, bring their own motives into the political process, 
and deliver with profit-oriented behavior (Kenny, 2008). An example of this kind of 
interest group dominance is Washington’s Silverline Extension to Dulles Airport, the 
“prototype of where politics come in” (Winston, 2012).6 
On an urban level, the influence of interest groups is more immediate. Interest groups 
have a spatial focus that extends the impact of neighborhood associations. These groups 
gain disproportionate impact in the sensitive planning processes, and thus infrastructure 
investment. As opposed to national or state-wide elections, in which voters may 
influence the ideological direction of government and policy in general by voting for the 
respective candidates and parties, citizen participation on a local level is potentially more 
specific and influential. According to Berry, there is not much research on urban interest 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 According to Clifford Winston, federal funding, in combination with interest group power, seems to be the 
way to get things done. After the Silverline Extension was defeated in Congress, and declined by the then-
Secretary of Transportation, interest group pressure continued. Eventually, the Transportation Secretary 
reversed her position, and they were successful in securing part of the money from the Department of 
Transportation. That started the construction process immediately. Winston doubts that a cost-benefit 
analysis would recommend the project (Winston, 2012).  
	  
	  




groups, but it is easy to conceive of the NIMBY (Not-In-My-Backyard) problem when 
building large infrastructure investments through dense urban spaces (Berry, 2010). 
Opposition: Altshuler and Luberoff identify local and neighborhood opposition to 
projects as an important factor for decision-making. No matter how broad the pro-
project coalition is, “proposals rarely proceeded to implementation if they imposed more 
than trivial costs on neighborhoods or the natural environment” (Altshuler and Luberoff, 
2003, p. 258). They call this the “do-no-harm-paradigm”. In other words, they detect a 
high potential for project opposition in cases where costs are imposed on local residents 
(NIMBYism). As a result, mitigation measures have become very popular for most 
projects and an important source of leverage for diverse groups (Altshuler and Luberoff, 
2003).  
A range of studies focuses on specific neighborhoods or cities where some groups are 
critically affected by projects (Peters, 2010, 2003, Gregory, 1998). In some cases, 
residents have succeeded in blocking an entire project or parts of it. One example is the 
AirTrain at John F. Kennedy International Airport (AirTrain JFK), an airport circulator 
that should have originally extended all the way to Manhattan. The train was reduced to 
its current size by NIMBY-neighborhood opposition along the way, especially in 
Manhattan, as well, of course, as by the enormous price tag (AirTrain JFK, see Brecher 
and Nobbe, 2009). Environmental groups are another potential source of project 
opposition and mitigation costs, and their condemnation of a project’s environmental 
impacts extends beyond the specific location of the project. In many cases, expensive 
litigation drives up a project’s costs (Panero and Botha, 2011, Flyvbjerg et al., 2003, 
Altshuler and Luberoff, 2003). 
	  
	  




In the end, on every level, within all electoral systems, there are decision points which 
translate the electoral or representative will and determine whether a policy or project 
makes its way onto the agenda (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1984). Veto players are those 
actors who have the potential to veto a decision, wherever decision frames allow. 
Depending on the political context and the structure of the decision-making process, 
opponents of any given agenda item exercise disproportionate influence over project 
outcome along the line by voting against it, thus keeping it from further recognition 
(Tsebelis, 1992). Transportation megaprojects, for instance, might be derailed by not 
making it onto a relevant agenda, failing to secure the necessary funding, and failing to 
be approved on a local, neighborhood level, etc., simply because such complexities 
increase the number of veto players (Giuliano, 2007). 
In sum, influence is unequally distributed. Stakeholder coalitions and special interest 
groups are influential in determining politics in general and megaproject decisions 
specifically. Their degree of influence varies according to the coalitions they are able to 
form.  
1.5. Transport Agencies 
What is the Role of Transportation Authorities in the Decision-Making Process? 
Many political science approaches to decision-making are indebted to institutionalism, 
an approach that holds that the (political) environment or context explains the range of 
possible decision outcomes (Scharpf 1997, Cobb and Elder, 1971, de Jong, 1999, Pierson 
2000, 2004). It is a big field, and it is difficult to summarize basic similarities (Ostrom, 
2003).7 The concept of “path dependency” seems particularly relevant for decision-
making. It describes how former choices cumulatively restrict the range of choices that 
follow. “Once established, patterns of political mobilization, the institutional ‘rules of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 There is no one agreed upon definition of “institutions.” The most used definition is that of norms, rules 
and procedures. Here I use the term to describe existing political organizations, like Congress, 
transportation agencies – or like above – electoral rules. 
	  
	  




game,’ and even citizens’ basic ways of thinking about the political world will often 
generate self-reinforcing dynamics. Once actors have ventured far down a particular 
path, they may find it very difficult or even impossible to reverse course. Political 
alternatives that were once quite plausible may become irretrievably lost” (Pierson, p. 
31). Certain paths and actions increase the relative attractiveness of choosing a similar 
action another time, thus generating a powerful, positive feedback cycle.  
In recent years, more and more theories combine institutions and actors.8 One of the 
major proponents of actor-centered institutionalism writes that actors are “characterized 
by specific capabilities, specific perceptions, and specific preferences. […] What matters 
most in the context of policy research, however, are the action resources that are created 
by institutional rules defining competencies and granting or limiting rights of 
participation, of veto, or of autonomous decisions in certain aspects of given policy 
processes” (Scharpf, 1997, p. 43). An updated version of that is the field of governance 
studies. In this section I will summarize the literature on why governance matters, with a 
particular focus on (transportation) authorities. 
Terry Moe offers a unique perspective on bureaucratic institutions, and allocates 
restricted, but more active, powers to them. His work, integral to this study, provides 
insight into institutions, cooperation and power. Moe holds that political institutions in 
the political process are not only vehicles to facilitate cooperative transaction, but also 
vehicles of power. Power relations, to a certain degree, are inscribed in the set-up of any 
institution or agency. Thus, there are certain limits to its range of decisions, its agenda-
setting powers, or the number and range of actors that must be consulted with respect to 
certain decisions. In the New York State transportation world, for instance, any big 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Other examples are Burns et al., 1985: “actor-systems dynamics;” Ostrom et al., 1994: “institutional 
analysis and development framework;” Zuern, 1992: “situational-structural” (Scharpf, 1997). 	  
	  
	  




capital decisions taken by the Metropolitan Transportation Authority need to be 
confirmed by specifically defined state actors with their own set of interests.  
All institutions are subject to internal and external pressures that complicate their ability 
to implement effective policy. With respect to the design of public authorities, Moe 
distinguishes five distinct political features. First, public authority is “up for grabs”: it is 
essentially coercive and competitive in nature. Second, politics are uncertain, and power 
is transitory; this uncertainty affects the contours of institutions as “winners” design 
them, according to both some programmatic ideas and a desire to maintain power.  
Third, agencies involve compromise, particularly under majority rules that necessitate 
appealing to those who oppose their design, which results in undermining agency 
performance. Fourth, the exercise of public authority creates counter-structures of 
groups trying to lobby, influence elections, or otherwise gain control. Five, public 
authorities are by nature imperfect, and not truly designed for efficiency. They are vastly 
different from economic models of organization (Moe, 1991, pp. 123-126). Therefore, the 
influence of a legislative principal shapes the range of possible legislative decisions.  
Another aspect of this is that the principal has vested the agency with certain rules and 
structures to “keep [it] from doing what it would otherwise want to do, such as pursuing 
policies more to its own liking” (p. 228). In sum, bureaucracies and institutions start 
developing and promoting their own agendas. These mechanisms might play out as 
agenda control or have budget implications (Moe, 2005). 
Jameson Doig’s work on the Port Authority, an important transportation agency of the 
New York metropolitan area, focuses on the role and power of the agency itself. He 
argues that, besides the specifics of the metropolitan polity, the agency’s politics and 
power are shaped by the stability of leadership, its leading characters, and the tension 
	  
	  




between agency autonomy and democratic accountability. Doig categorizes the Port 
Authority as a “special purpose” agency, a structure that results from the desire or need 
to construct infrastructure unaffected by the rhythms and motives of politics. He 
explores the changing patterns and character of the Port Authority over time, and 
explains how the increasing encapsulation of decision-making within the agency has 
resulted in impressive projects, but has also negatively impacted its public accountability 
(Doig, 2001).  
Both Doig’s and Moe’s accounts provide the tools for analyzing one of the most 
important tensions of infrastructure decision-making in democratic countries: the 
tension between normative decision standards informed by democratic requirements, 
and the requirements of getting infrastructure projects done. Moe’s work is helpful in 
understanding the external and internal decision-making dynamics of a government 
agency that is entwined within a dense network of metropolitan power struggles. Doig’s 
work reminds of the importance of both decision-making mechanisms, and the need for 
transparency in that process.  
Generally, critics argue that decisions made by public authorities and their appointed, 
not elected, officials lack democratic legitimacy. By channeling decisions through public 
agencies, the efficiency and output of decisions may be improved, while democratic 
control vanishes (Bourdeaux, 2008, Swyngedouw, Moulaert and Rodriguez, 2002, 
Siemiatycki, 2010, Flyvbjerg et al., 2003). No matter how many calls there are for 
community participation, decision-making processes on megaprojects are criticized for 
their exclusion of community actors, and those most affected by infrastructure projects 
have insufficient political power to influence the decisions (Swyngedouw, Moulaert and 
Rodriguez, 2002; Flyvbjerg, 2003).  
	  
	  




1.6. Other Factors 
Political scientists, psychologists and economists try to account for “human nature” or 
psychological factors in decision-making and politics. I mentioned “bounded rationality” 
factors above, including the cognitive limitations of humans when it comes to 
understanding complex problems like megaprojects (Collingridge, 1992), and an innate 
optimism bias when making project decisions (Kahneman and Lovallo, 1974, as quoted 
by Berechman, 2009).  
Authors also identify a personal, strategic dimension as a motivation of politics, namely 
the use of political power to advance a personal agenda, including manipulation and 
deceit. This is also called “Machiavellianism”  (Flyvbjerg, 2003, Zahariadis, 2003, 
Wachs, 1989). Martin Wachs argued that megaproject decisions would often be based on 
deliberately distorted projections, depending on what experts and consultants would 
stand to gain or lose (Wachs, 1989). Flyvbjerg argues that data is strategically 
misrepresented –by politicians or experts— in order to approve otherwise questionable 
projects (Flyvbjerg et al., 2003, 2010). 
Reelection concerns are one of the motivations. Altshuler and Luberoff hold that the 
structure of Congress itself is influential for decision-making. Congressional action, they 
contend, is motivated by the pursuit of district benefits and thus the prospect of 
reelection. Large infrastructure investment in any given district would establish a record 
of action and potentially present a Congress member as job creator in his district. On the 
other hand, Congress is an ideal platform to avoid blame and local controversies around 
projects because large majorities are doing decisions (Altshuler and Luberoff, 2003, 
Chapter 8).  
Knowledge transfer issues as conceptualized by Principal-Agent Theory further muddle 
decision-making rationales. Principal-agent theory deals with the problem of delegation, 
	  
	  




and information transfer between individuals or agencies (i.e. Osland and Strand, 2010, 
Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier, 1994 on the relationship between the bureaucracy and 
Congress). Key problems include the asymmetrical information between the agent and 
the principal. Asymmetric information makes it possible for an agent to take strategic 
advantage in order to see their projects realized (Flyvbjerg, 2010, p. 15). Asymmetrical 
information is one of the key reasons for Flyvbjerg, as to why transportation projects that 
are not in the public interest are chosen (Flyvbjerg et al., 2003). 
Now, all these considerations have the potential to undermine a rational decision process 
for transport-economic requirements of decision-making. In the next chapter (Chapter 
2), I synthesize relevant literature into one model that will then guide through the 
remainder of the dissertation. 
	  
	  




Chapter 2: The Politics of Transport Investment Decision-
Making - Theoretical Framework 
 
I will synthesize the literature on megaprojects, institutions and actors that shape project 
decisions into a main model that explains where and how politics enter transportation 
megaproject investment decisions. Each section will be guided by one of the hypotheses 
provided in the introduction. But first I will clarify the scope and general ontology of the 
research project.  
2.1. Scope 
In megaproject decision-making, political pressures and incentives compete for 
influence with transport-economic or efficiency criteria. Political pressure may not be the 
best selection criteria for a multi-billion dollar project. Indeed, much of the literature 
shares this concern when attributing implementation problems to politics (Cantarelli et 
al., 2010). I argue that in democracies transport-economic criteria alone do not and 
should not suffice, but that the politics involved in megaproject decisions are ambiguous.  
Transport-economic considerations do not suffice to meet larger societal ends. The 
equal-opportunity aspirations promoted in the United States have the potential to clash 
with economic (in this case, transport-economic) decision-making criteria, as the 
support of disadvantaged groups (e.g. improved transit access) may be morally and 
politically desirable, but not always efficient. The same is true for newer environmental 
concerns, which might lead to investments that are less efficient by economic criteria but 
promote long-term environmental sustainability effects. 
The problem is that the democratic influence over project decisions most of the time 
happens post-factum, and is muddled at best: politicians that supported unwanted 
projects might not get re-elected (and are not often electorally punished pre-facto for 
	  
	  




their intention to support a certain megaproject—it they declare one). However, 
sometimes projects get bumped up to higher-level decision platforms (e.g. Congress), 
precisely because local decision-makers do not want to get their hands dirty. So 
politicians are clearly not the best project decision-makers because they are under lobby 
and re-election pressure.  
This suggests that transportation agencies with a certain degree of decision-making 
autonomy are desirable in order to assert transportation efficiency criteria in the face of 
the NIMBY (“Not-In-My-Backyard”) concerns of constituents.  
The question here is not which decision-making criteria should be employed; the 
questions are where politics and political interests actually do play a role in the process, 
what is the particular role of transport agencies in directing that process, and whether it 
is possible to gauge trade-offs with other decision-making criteria. I assume that the 
combination of contextual factors, transportation authority, and access to funding 
(=power) determine the perceptions of transportation problems and potential project 
agendas – and, hence, project decisions. 
Decisions are made continuously. As indicated in the introduction, decisions are single 
acts of choice, while decision-making refers to interrelated series of decisions. The 
decision-making process of a large infrastructure investment project describes 
everything (in theory) from project idea to ex-post evaluations. I will draw it out in more 
detail below. In politics, which is concerned with the formulation and implementation of 
(public) resources, single decisions are rare. Because public decisions are concerned with 
something as complex as public welfare, the politics and decision-making processes are 
also complex. They might involve different layers of government, individual actors like 
planners and heads of authorities, and the political negotiations required to solve an 
	  
	  




investment problem. Often, a variety of issues is decided-upon at once. Political parties 
integrate literally thousands of issues and decision options and present them as a few 
sets of ideological choice. Decision outputs are typically laws, regulations or policies. In 
this study, the decision output is a project, specifically a transportation megaproject.  
According to the standard definitions, politics may refer to the art of influencing 
government, the creation of policies, the direction of funding streams and of governance. 
The political process then describes the rule-guided interplay of institutions and actors. 
Politics here refers to open and hidden purpose-driven negotiations, coalitions and 
confrontations between actors embedded in institutionalized settings that define their 
scope of power and influence – both with respect to funding as well as in terms of ideas. 
I will use an approach similar to the actor-centered historical-institutionalist framework 
to evaluate how project decisions are made, because this allows for the integration of 
contextual and interest-driven elements. One of the major proponents of actor-centered 
institutionalism writes that actors are “characterized by specific capabilities, specific 
perceptions, and specific preferences. […] What matters most in the context of policy 
research, however, are the action resources that are created by institutional rules are 
defining competencies and granting or limiting rights of participation, of veto, or of 
autonomous decisions in certain aspects of given policy processes” (Scharpf, 1997, p. 43). 
I added elements of historical institutionalism, which insists on path-dependent 
influences over time. 
This dissertation will predominantly focus on decisions and decision-making preceding 
the start of construction of large-scale transportation projects. Construction start, for the 
purposes of this dissertation, thus marks the conclusion of the infrastructure investment 
decision-making process. During construction, I do not expect politics to have too much 
	  
	  




influence, largely because of the issue of “sunk costs”: once project planning – and, more 
importantly, construction – has begun, it becomes increasingly unfeasible to stop the 
project, because too much money and political credibility have already been spent (Hall, 
1980). At this point, relevant changes only come in through mitigation measures. 
In the following, I will outline the political process of transportation infrastructure 
investment decisions and provide the research questions. The next sections will discuss 
various elements of the political process. Finally, I will summarize the main points and 
introduces some hypotheses. 
2.2. Transportation Infrastructure Investment Decision-Making: Making 
Sense 
Infrastructure investment decisions, for better or worse, are politically charged – and 
very messy. Open and hidden project politics yield infrastructure investment choices that 
cannot be measured in transport-economic terms and must be understood as political 
outcomes that benefit certain groups over others.  
The project decision-making process is politically contested (Hall, 1980, Flyvbjerg et al., 
2003, 2010, Altshuler and Luberoff, 2003) and subject to political disruption (van Wee, 
2008). More often than not, it is unstructured, uninformed, misleading or deceptive 
(Wachs, 1989), inflexible (Hall, 1980), or barely manageable – cognitively speaking 
(Collingridge, 1992). Because of the long planning and decision process, there is also 
significant uncertainty – for example, about the economy, the weather, or the complexity 
of the enormous management tasks. And each megaproject decision process is 
embedded in governance structures and regulatory frameworks that are unique (but 
almost always complicated) and involve different institutions and actor coalitions. 
Despite all differences, there are sets of decisions common to all projects. I organized 
them to correspond to the main decision clusters in the policy literature:  
	  
	  









Project Implementation/Project Success 
Regardless of different project contexts and agency types, common to most megaproject 
decision processes is the characteristic that these decision clusters rarely occur in this 
particular order. Often, the decision stages are overlapping, reversed, or simultaneous; at 
times, some are skipped altogether. Nonetheless, I use them as approximations of 
“where” and “how” the politics enter the process. Additionally, they are impacted by the 
structure of the implementing agency and embedded in context. The entire megaproject 
decision model will be visualized in Figure 2 below. 
Problem definition: Simply put, someone needs to feel there is a transportation 
problem or gap. The perception of what that gap is may vary drastically. Projects are 
built to enhance traffic flow (highway extensions), to replace older means of 
transportation with newer ones (bridges and tunnels instead of ferries; airports), or to 
offer transportation alternatives (subway systems). Sometimes the primary goal of a 
transportation investment project is not directly improved transportation services, but 
something else. The number “7” subway extension west leads into a future development 
area. But there are a number of subway gaps that might be closed in New York. Currently 
under construction is the Second Avenue Subway in Manhattan, rather than one out in 
the boroughs. Boston’s “Big Dig” (a complex tunneling project that submerged a surface 
highway and created a new tunnel) is in large parts a beautification project, and less a 
project driven by strict transport-economic necessity. Also in that category are 
infrastructure investments in developing countries, as touched upon in the literature 
review. Consequently, different sources – from the public to the private sector, 
transportation agencies, or developers – stimulate and promote projects everywhere, 
	  
	  




making projects difficult to compare. Yet this stage in the decision-making process is 
present in every project.  
Agenda-setting: If someone perceives of a transportation gap, they must get a proposal 
on some relevant agenda. Depending on the regional infrastructure implementation 
landscape or funding availabilities, this might either be an influential transportation 
agency or a legislative sub-committee at the appropriate political levels. At least in the 
U.S., projects are more likely to get on agendas if they have powerful political or 
economic proponents, like favorable party platforms, lobby or business groups (Altshuler 
and Luberoff, 2003), or otherwise charismatic proponents (Caro, 1975).  
Alternatives selection: If considered, there are a variety of routes or even 
transportation modes that might be chosen to address the transportation gap. 
Transportation authorities, planning agencies or independent consultants conduct 
studies based on a variety of criteria that are deemed relevant (transportation-economic, 
costs, projections). They then deliver the results to the platform responsible for the main 
project decision.  
Project approval: Depending on the institution – for example, a transportation agency 
– problem definition might already constitute project approval. Or certain actors may 
also perceive a project as desirable first, and successfully put it on some agenda, and 
then go looking for a problem the project may be able to solve. However, a project is 
usually sponsored by some implementing agency that needs to then gain approval. In 
some cases approval is required from agencies at a higher level, and often from 
overseeing funding institutions, which may be legislative actors. Some political 
environments encourage the creation of single-purpose agencies to implement projects, 
the creation of which implies project approval. 
	  
	  




Funding: The competition over project funding is where the politics play out: when 
project decisions are made on a parliamentary level, funding approval often means 
general project approval. Even when mainly channeled through independent 
transportation agencies, internal agency is often coupled to the approval of various 
outside funders. 
Project Implementation and Success: This stage refers to whether the project is 
actually being implemented or not, and then later, whether actual user number 
correspond to projected ones. 
Figure 2 presents the general model of the political decision-making process and hence 
also illustrates the main theoretical framework of the dissertation. The model includes 
additional elements, because it needs to be applicable across projects and countries, to 
allow for comparisons. Again, the order of decision steps may vary.  








The model contains five main elements. The first element is the vertical block of decision 
clusters. These are the individual decisions or sets of decisions, described above, which 
are relevant to most projects. The second element, the smaller circle, represents the 
implementing agency. Depending on the type of agency, different political factors may 
potentially impact the decision-making process at various points, represented by the left 
box and respective arrows.  
The fourth element is the large circle, representing how context may shape all political 
factors, as well as potentially determine the degree of agency autonomy. Decision 
contexts vary by country or region, as do political factors like electoral systems, planning 
and decision environments, transportation cultures, politicians, stakeholders (funding 
sources), and interest or opposition groups. Dependent on these factors are the three 
dynamics of fragmentation, devolution and privatization. They will be discussed below. 
The fifth element is transport-economic factors, represented by the box on the right. It 
symbolizes those impacts on decision-making that may come from project studies, 
prognoses, and environmental impact assessments.  
The model renders infrastructure investment politics comparable across countries. 
Project or decision politics, embedded within historical and present context, cluster 
around problem definition, agenda setting, alternatives selection, funding decisions, and 
final choice. The context also informs the possible ranges of political institutions, actors 
and capacities, and hence the political activity (negotiations, compromises, votes, power 
relations, etc.). I will turn to each of the layers in the remainder of the chapter.  
2.3. Transportation Agencies 
Transportation authorities serve as the hinge between the general political and societal 
context and the projects themselves, and thus channel national, regional or local 
politics. Depending on their degree of autonomy, they are often the driving force 
behind project decisions. 
	  
	  




Usually, project decisions are channeled through implementing transportation agencies. 
Transportation agencies are central to infrastructure investment decisions because they 
are the hinge between the general political and societal context and the projects 
themselves. No project decision may be understood without considering the political-
institutional culture that created its implementing agencies, and the attributes of actors 
or decision-makers within the agencies and the resulting power relations.  
Agencies are not independent actors. Usually the institutions that created them also 
exercise varying degrees of control over them; their degree of autonomy varies across 
agencies and some agencies have more independent decision authority than others. 
However, that does not mean that they are not powerful actors in their own right. For 
example the Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA) that is responsible for transit 
in the New York region needs to get state approval for capital investment projects, 
whereas the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey (PANYNJ), as a bi-state agency, 
can only make large investment decisions when the governors of New York and New 
Jersey agree on a course of action. Yet both agencies successfully pursue own agendas. I 
will show more about the MTA in Chapter 5.  
Transportation agencies are difficult to classify because each is created within a unique 
environment and for a particular purpose. They may have different degrees of power, 
budget levels, and scopes, and they may deal with either one or several modes of 
transportation. There are three main types of agencies. First, “line agencies” are 
government or public agencies with a hierarchical structure, like the U.S. Department of 
Transportation and its sub-departments at the state and local level. The second type is a 
semi-autonomous “public authority,” created for a special purpose. Usually 
transportation authorities integrate a particular region. Examples are the PANYNJ and 
the MTA, both of which are responsible for different portions of transportation in the 
	  
	  




New York area, which includes parts of the neighboring state of New Jersey, as well. The 
third type of agency is one that is specifically created to implement a particular 
investment project. These are founded in the absence of other eligible implementation 
agencies and either dissolve after project implementation, or settle and expand (for 
example, the Alameda Corridor transportation authority in Southern California). 
‘Line agencies’ have a specific place within government hierarchies. In the United States, 
the federal Department of Transportation (DOT) ranges on the same level with other 
executive government agencies and has lower-ranking counterparts at the state and local 
levels. As such, the DOT’s decisions are dependent on its allocated budget (which is 
administered by Congress) and the (mostly indirect) approval of the president. The 
president also appoints the head of the DOT. The state DOTs answer to the federal DOT 
concerning how they distribute their funds, which are mostly allocated by the federal 
DOT. The local DOTs are similarly dependent on their relevant state DOTs. Within their 
agencies, the DOTs possess relative decision-making autonomy. In politically centralized 
countries, which are often smaller in size, decision-making is more centralized, as well: 
large investment decisions typically take place on a national level. In these cases national 
parliaments tend to be more immediately involved in project choice, like in Sweden. 
Semi-public authorities answer to the institutions that created them. The investment 
capital project decisions of the MTA, as I will discuss at length in Chapter 5, are subject 
to the budget approval of New York’s governor and the state legislature. So, their 
decisions rely upon approval that is subject to political compromise, which may impede 
the sensibility of project selection.  
On the other hand, authorities or public agencies – if they have their own long-term 
planning framework – may have grown so independent that they become powerful 
	  
	  




conduits of project implementation, as evidenced by the history of the PANYNJ (Doig, 
2001). They are also more independent of, or sheltered from, the prevalent political 
climate than line agencies. But, like line agencies, these types of authorities might 
become more inflexible over time, because of the general bureaucratic resistance to 
organizational innovation, and they may shelter project decision-making from useful 
political considerations. 
Special purpose agencies have the lowest degree of dependency, because project 
proponents usually create them. So the agency and its creators are, in a sense, one. And 
once created, these agencies then may act as autonomous, goal-oriented actors. One of 
the side effects of this is that the special purpose agency shields the projects from outside 
concerns and democratic input. Private projects, or projects with a larger share of private 
funding, often use this type of single-purpose agency. 
The degree of agency dependency impacts the project decision-making process in various 
ways. If they are in any way dependent on electoral politics, project choices and 
implementation are also subject – however indirectly – to election cycles. While 
megaproject decision-making processes may stretch over a number of decades, election 
cycles are usually between two and six years – whether for local, state or national 
legislators, mayors, or other party or executive appointees. Election cycles may disrupt or 
halt project planning or even the implementation and construction process, as power 
gets redistributed – or, in some cases, when agencies are reorganized (van Wee, 2008). 
The implementation of Boston’s Big Dig, for instance, was repeatedly halted whenever 
the state governing coalition changed. On the other hand, shifting political constellations 
and coalitions create “windows of opportunity” (Kingdon, 1984), which may be used to 
introduce new project ideas. Projects already started might get changed, reversed or 
halted, until power constellations change again. So if agencies are less dependent on 
	  
	  




outside factors – giving them greater ability to enact long-term planning, they may 
provide more stability. 
However, independent agencies may also become less flexible, and the result is a trend 
toward “path dependency” of decision-making. The concept of path dependency 
proposes that prior decisions inform current ones because over time they manifest in 
institutions and rules that perpetuate status quo arrangements. Here, I use “path 
dependency” to mean that most decision-makers are influenced by built trajectories and 
existing institutions, e.g. the highway bias in the United States. That does not mean that 
prior decisions wholly determine future decision-making; instead, the term merely 
acknowledges the important influence of past legacies. A lack of political control may 
also facilitate socially insensitive transportation decisions, like the tendency to place 
megaprojects in poorer neighborhoods. Thus, transportation and planning agencies can 
provide stability for the decision-making process, but they also introduce inflexibility.  
Returning to the decision model, that means that the type of agency involved in the 
decision-making process influences how political project decisions may get at any given 
decision cluster.  
2.4. Political Context and Project Decisions 
Macro-level government arrangements matter for transportation decision-making 
because they organize the political arenas and institutions. Infrastructure governance 
is dependent on these structures and is permeated by the dynamics and values of 
fragmentation, devolution and privatization.  
Project decisions are informed by the political environment, context, or culture of a given 
polity. Besides historical, geographic, and economic factors, institutions, politics and 
ideologies shape infrastructure decisions (Kaur Brar, 2005, p. 736 – for the U.S.). In 
Figure 2 context is represented by the large circle and has three specifications.  
	  
	  




First, political context contains all political, structural and regulatory issues influencing a 
project. This includes macro-level factors such as the types of political systems, the 
structure of decision-making institutions (who gets to vote, and why), and the number of 
political levels a project is embedded in (e.g. federal systems have more political layers 
than centralized systems).  
The political context informs project decisions in two main ways.  First, political culture 
affects project selection by setting incentives or disincentives for certain types of projects 
(cars vs. public transit), or in favor of certain types of regions (urban vs. rural areas).  
Second, the concept of context assumes institutionalized histories and determines which 
problems will be perceived and addressed and into which institutional “track” they might 
be sorted (public vs. private concerns).  
Transport history and the transport systems in place impact planning decisions for two 
reasons: First, existing transport options suggest the range of feasible transportation 
solutions: certain transportation decisions make more sense than others. For example, 
metropolitan areas with existing subway networks have a variety of intermodal options. 
They can add transport capacity by adding new subway lines, renovating old lines, or by 
investing in road and highway structures. In cities without a preexisting subway network, 
building one or multiple subway lines will come with a much lower short-term cost-
benefit ratio.  
The second reason is that where there is an industry-specific history, there are also 
established power networks –in this case mode-specific power networks— that make 
changes or alternative choices difficult. One example is the extraordinarily politically 
powerful truck and automobile lobby in the United States with their highway bias. Since 
World War II, the federal government in the United States has distributed ten times 
	  
	  




more money to highways than to the railway sector, which was subjected to a more 
pronounced deregulation starting in the 1970s (Kaur Brar, 2005). Compared to Europe, 
this is very low transit investment, highlighting how different European governmental 
structures are more fiscally supportive of mass transit investment.9 Put simply, context 
makes some choices more likely than others.  
Second, the large “context circle” in the model also accounts for contextual dynamics 
that determine governance or regulatory regimes, which include privatization, 
devolution and fragmentation trends. Where these dynamics have most progressed, 
infrastructure investment decisions have become more politicized because of the 
increased number of decision (veto) points (Giuliano, 2007). In that sense, project 
rationales shifted away from transport-economic considerations. 
As outlined in the literature review, the privatization of public services over the past 
decades affected infrastructure investment, traditionally a public service, through shifts 
in decision-making structures – e.g. outsourcing of transportation responsibilities to 
semi-public authorities or project management and delivery by entirely private 
contractors. The M6 Toll Road in Britain is an example of an entirely privatized road. 
Debates about private sector vs. public sector efficiency accompany these developments.  
Along the dynamics of fragmentation, devolution and privatization, instruments like 
privatization rules, property regulations, rights-of-way, taxation, levels and types of 
public subsidy, or environmental requirements all affect the realm of respective project 
selection and governance (Aarhaug et al., 2011). European countries – particularly in 
Northern Europe – have long traditions of public ownership, as compared to the U.S. 
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history of privatized services. Therefore, European transportation policies are expected 
to be different from other countries, like the United States. Within this realm, different 
countries set up particular institutionalized structures for investment decision-making.  
The devolution of public services, more of an American trend, describes the re-allocation 
of decision authorities from the federal or national level to the local (or state) levels. Both 
privatization and devolution trends increase the fragmentation of decision autonomy. 
The effects are particularly strong in metropolitan areas and urban centers, where there 
is a synchronicity of old and new power structures, overlapping jurisdictions, 
cooperation and competition – and a myriad of veto points and opposition.  
Transportation decisions are further a function of geographic reach and project type. 
One of the significant factors worth noting is where the projects are actually being 
implemented – whether in dense urban spaces or sparsely-populated rural areas: in the 
former case, there are more potentially affected people than in the latter case, and hence 
more potential opposition (Altshuler and Luberoff, 2003). Political protests over 
spending priorities and the use of urban space are a quite steady hurdle that megaproject 
decision-makers face, especially in dense urban and metropolitan areas.  
Furthermore, the general lack of intermodal infrastructure coordination means that 
decision-makers, project proponents and opponents vary by transport mode. As between 
railway and highway projects, for example, different funding pots, promoters, and 
project oppositions come into play, and very different sets of political support coalitions 
need to be established. In the model, project context is symbolized by the outer ring, 
which encompasses all.  
2.5. Actors in the Political Process: Coalitions, Interests, Power and Money 
A variety of political, economic and social interests drive transportation investment 
decisions, and their respective impacts are dependent on institutional arrangements 
and financial means. 
	  
	  




The model also contains “political actors,” which are also representative for different 
motivations. The actors involved vary by project, as described in the previous section.  
First, most megaprojects originate somewhere in the public sector, in transportation 
departments or planning agencies. Some have been in drawers for decades; others start 
on restaurant napkins (Alameda Corridor), as new ideas. Political representatives might 
feel the need for infrastructure improvement in their districts, or respond to citizen 
concerns. Sometimes it takes insistent transportation visionaries. Either way, transport 
decision-making by nature has a heavy public component, because transportation, by 
and large, is a public good (Altshuler and Luberoff, 2003), the projects are necessary and 
hyper-visible.  
Infrastructure investment projects have a wide range of potential proponents and 
opponents outside of the regular political process. Proponents may include business or 
real estate interests, environmentalists (for transit projects), planners, neighborhood 
groups, unions and lobby groups like construction, oil or manufacturing industries. 
Opposition groups may include neighborhood associations, environmental groups, or 
perhaps anti-transit lobbies. Some groups may combine their efforts into growth 
coalitions that push for certain projects. These actors have direct and indirect ways to 
influence decision-making and may be vaguely lumped together as interest groups.  
The central idea of interest groups is to bend politics and policy-making in their favor by 
organizing like-minded individuals and providing information to elected representatives. 
Politically effective groups with a possible bearing on infrastructure investment decisions 
range from national to neighborhood level actors and coalitions. On national and 
regional levels, there are transportation investment, trucking, automobile, oil, and real 
estate lobbies that lobby to gain very specific benefits. The impact of project opposition 
	  
	  




on project decision-making, as in the case of the lobby groups is often indirect, diffuse, 
and underreported. In general, the influence of special interests is controversial: the 
actual influence of lobbyists on politicians not measurable or even visible. The influence 
of interest groups in the European Union might be even more diffuse than in the United 
States because of the multiplicity and complexity of multi-level institutions.  
Improving transportation networks is one of the strategies to further economic 
development. Hence pro-growth coalitions and businesses may have strong 
infrastructure investment interests. Proponents of large investment projects (in the U.S.) 
now routinely cite projected job numbers and training programs to establish project 
need. One example is the $1.9 billion AirTrain JFK in New York: only after residents of 
Jamaica, Queens were promised economic benefits for their area did they support the 
rebuilding of Jamaica Station – a key component of the project. The Alameda Corridor 
Transportation Authority that sponsored the Alameda Corridor in Southern California 
also secured crucial local support through a jobs program. 
Project opponents are another set of interest-driven actors. Project opposition might be 
directed at the proposed routes, the type of project, the project’s social or environmental 
impacts – or at the project itself. The motivations to oppose a project range from private 
interests, like NIMBY concerns, to public interests, such as environmental concerns and 
“ideological conflicts” (e.g., opposition to projects that are perceived as unnecessary). 
“Ideological conflicts” suggest different ways to judge and prioritize the necessity of 
certain “prestige projects” – whether to select projects according to economic benefits or 
to help diminish social inequalities by providing transportation access to those with few 
transportation alternatives. One key example was the opposition to the construction of 
elevated trains in the wake of the Olympic games, such as Skytrain in Vancouver, 
Canada. Another example is the prioritization of the construction of high-speed rail 
	  
	  




projects over the restoration of local train lines in Germany, which has been criticized by 
both local populations and train advocates. And then, not all opposition involves 
chaining oneself to train tracks or similar types of dramatic protest (e.g., Stuttgart 21 in 
Germany).  
Because proper political-institutional access points (and, thus, power) may be lacking, 
proponents and opponents may convince their political representatives to vote a certain 
way, raise their concerns in response to environmental impact drafts, or hope that their 
ability to protest is taken into account by project planners, who may adjust the projects 
accordingly. And not every meeting between businesses and politicians means that 
influence has been exercised: most of the time, blocked proposals go unnoticed if they 
are not high-visibility projects (like high-speed rail plans in California, or public transit 
tunnels in New Jersey).  
2.6. Transport-Economic Considerations 
By transport-economic considerations I mean economic, cost-benefit analyses (CBA) and 
other investment studies that form the foundation of project decisions. Their value and 
public availability (or their absence) implies the degree of politics in the decision-
process: if there are no publicly available project studies, it is probable the project may 
not be the most transportation-economically –or even socially— beneficial project, 
compared to available alternatives (including the no-build option).  
However, critics usually point to the limited extent to which project characteristics and 
outcomes can be measured,10 and hence the accuracy and explanatory reach of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 For instance, they are being criticized for their limited reach (Beukers et al, 2012). CBAs aim to facilitate 
investment decisions by comparing various factors of investment alternatives. They do so by assigning 
numeric values to costs and benefits. Thus the project with best cost-benefit ratio may be determined 
through rigorous measurement. Among the most commonly measured items are construction, maintenance 
and fleet costs (where appropriate), and transportation benefits –possibly including network benefits, 
environmental impacts, etc.  
CBAs are contested on content- and on process-related grounds. With respect to the first, Beukers et al. 
states a general uncertainty about what is actually being done during a CBA process, and how to apply it. 
	  
	  




analyses. Numbers may be projected and ratios compared for technical, construction and 
cost aspects, but further transportation net effects, and social, societal or even 
environmental or security impacts to a limited degree only. 
In democracies, political costs will be present in any event, but they cannot truly be 
measured either. Of course, CBAs are usually being conducted to provide decision-
makers with facts about the costs and impacts of potential project selection and to 
facilitate political decisions. But it is at best difficult to put a price tag on the value of 
negotiating a complex and uncertain decision environment.  
To render CBAs more relevant, critics call for more stakeholder involvement. They also 
admit this is also difficult, because each stakeholder would come with their own set of 
criteria, which are sometimes clashing (Beukers, 2012, citing Macharis in: Haezendonck, 
2007), and there are not only philosophical questions about the relative weigh of 
expertise vs. lay opinion. This makes it difficult to include everybody’s values in one 
study. 
In	  Summation	  
Returning to Model 1, project decisions may be impacted at every level – either by 
politicians or interest groups, from problem definition to agenda setting, from selection 
and stages to final approval. Politicians and interest groups alike may block ideas from 
getting on the agenda, replace them with alternative suggestions, or actually halt projects 
at the final approval or budget stages. Transportation agencies have some power to 
channel some of the impacts. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Further they list “disputable calculation methods,” “missing information about winners and losers,” the 
ignorance of equity issues, “missing information about expected synergy and agglomeration effects,” “poorly 
constructed reference cases,” and the poor incorporation of uncertainties” among the main contentions of 
the literature (Beukers, 2012, p. 69). The referenced authors proceed to address process-related issues with 
CBAs, among them for non-transparency, late application and its use as a final decision criteria –  “the 
‘sword of Damocles’ without the possibility of improving the underlying plan or vision” (ebd. p. 69). 
	  
	  




Finally, three additional factors not shown in the model are important to keep in mind 
when analyzing project politics. 
First, politicians or elected officials, because of the specific nature of representative 
politics, are influenced by their reelection motives. Their chances of reelection increase if 
they have something to show for their time in office: either by bringing big projects in, or 
keeping them out, no matter the transportation benefits accruing outside their narrow 
constituencies. The problem of strategic misrepresentation (providing false information 
to achieve a certain decision) is related to this (Wachs, 1989, Flyvbjerg, 2010). 
Second, to the extent that politicians and decision-makers base their decisions on expert 
advice, delegation problems arise. In political-economic terminology, this is known as 
the “principal-agent” problem: politicians and other decision-makers make choices 
based on partial or incomplete information collected by others; in some cases, no 
information is available at all to make certain decisions. The delegation of decision 
authority – and the separation of decision-making and expertise – introduces the 
possibility of reporting error when relying upon others.  
Additionally, administrators, experts and advisors might face pressures through their 
public or private employers and their related agendas. How do voters know that their 
elected representatives decide in accordance with their interests, and not that of some 
lobby groups? How do politicians and decision-makers know whether the information 
they have been given is trustworthy?  
Third, human decision-making skills are limited in their processing capacities by 
optimism biases (the expectation or hope for better results when faced with uncertainty) 
and complex information (Collingridge, 1992). Resulting limitations of managerial 
oversight, varying policy expertise, and technical skills, coupled with the constraints of 
	  
	  




politics in the broader sense – and all under conditions of complexity and uncertainty – 
render unbiased or even sufficiently informed decision-making difficult, at best. 








Chapter 3: Research Design: Quantitative Methods and Case 
Study Selection 
	  
As described in the literature review, there are a few books and a number of case studies, 
but there is no all-encompassing model on the politics of infrastructure investments 
(except for Hall (1980), and Altshuler and Luberoff (2003) in the U.S.). Building on 
various elements of the literature, I developed a theoretical model that organizes and 
illustrates the decision-making process. It is both specific in its political dimensions and 
sufficiently abstract to allow for contextual and project-specific variation. The previous 
chapter presented the assumptions and the model. This chapter explains the methods I 
use to obtain the information to populate the model.  
A two-part research design will allow me to address my research questions in two ways: 
quantitatively and through case studies. Figure 3 displays the general research design of 
the study.  








The first part, the quantitative study that will be described in more detail below, tests 
hypotheses from the literature, and my own, with a particular focus on setting the 
descriptive and analytic frame for the two case studies. The quantitative study lends itself 
to comparative analyses of contextual factors (macro-political and economic ones, the 
participation of decision-makers, transparency indicators, the prevalence and interaction 
of funding sources and project location, funding types, and opposition). 
Second, I selected two case studies and used the theoretical model to organize the 
understanding of investment politics. The case study research complements the 
statistical results by examining the impact of transportation agencies on project 
decisions, the impact of their degree of autonomy from context factors, how they channel 
politics, how this impacts the balance between transport-economic considerations and 
alternative decision rationales, and other possible political factors that come up during 
an in-depth case study. Further, the case study research has the potential to go deeper 
into the impact of funding decisions than the quantitative analysis is able to do.  
This research design will allow me to verify some descriptive characteristics and 
statistical causations and complement the quantitative research by focusing on those 
political questions in the case-study research where statistical methods fall short. In 
sum, while the statistical part illustrates the internationally comparative what and who, 
the case study part complements the model with information about the how and why. 
The details of each part are described below. 
3.1. Justification of the Research Design  
1. Two research methods are advantageous compared to one method, because they allow 
for triangulation – the cross- and double-checking, and the mutual complementation of 
research findings. I will be able to complement and verify certain statistical findings with 
case-study findings and vice versa. The quantitative analysis aims at specific parts of the 
	  
	  




model –the macro-aspects— and relies on data collection and theory-based 
quantification and categorization methods that will provide a clear picture of statistical 
associations relevant to the research questions.  
At the same time, because the quantitative part is internationally comparative, the focus 
is directed at the megaproject as a species onto itself. It thus becomes possible to elicit 
the main characteristics and associations of megaprojects per se. The case study research 
is better suited to deal with more detail-oriented questions, involving historical analysis, 
path dependency, and project tracing. However, both methods are integral to the overall 
study. This approach has further been justified: 
“Hence as elsewhere, the sharp separation often seen in the literature between 
qualitative and quantitative methods is a spurious one. The separation is an unfortunate 
artifact of power relations and time constraints in graduate training; it is not a logical 
consequence of what graduates and scholars need to know to do their studies and do 
them well. […] Good social science is problem driven and not methodology driven in the 
sense that it employs those methods that for a given problematic, best help answer the 
research questions at hand. More often than not, a combination of qualitative and 
quantitative methods will do the task best.” (Flvybjerg, 2006, p. 242) 
2. The two methods rely on different methods of data collection: the statistical part 
draws information from public sources like books, online pages and newspaper articles; 
the case study research adds in-depth interviews with decision-makers. “The use of 
multiple sources addresses Yin’s suggestion on the comparative advantage of using 
multiple sources of information to develop ‘converging lines of inquiry.’” (Yin, 1994, 92)  
	  
	  




3. No one has yet done a statistical analysis of the political elements of international 
infrastructure investment decisions (or written up a case study on the politics of the 
Second Avenue Subway). 
I will lay out the details of both research steps. 
3.2. Dataset, Quantitative Analysis, Statistical Results 
To answer the research questions and test hypotheses contained in the model and the 
literature review, I created a database containing 60 projects (railways, highways and 
bridges, subways, etc.) in 22 countries, with about 60 variables, designed to illuminate 
the politics of project decision-making. The variables are both contextual and project-
specific. A list of projects is attached as Appendix A, a list of variables as Appendix B. The 
distribution of projects and variables is described in Appendix C. In the following, I am 
going to describe data selection, randomness, representativeness, tests and applications 
in more detail. 
Randomness	  
I selected projects to achieve proportionality along some major dimensions: 1) regional 
proportionality (I aimed to have at about five projects on each continent, at minimum); 
2) at least five projects in each of the assigned project ranges (inner-city, metropolitan, 
regional, national, international); and 3) at least five observations for project types like 
highways, bridges, tunnels or other. Any projects were I could not find any data were 
discarded. One of the issues of the selection is that I do not (or cannot) know, in each 
case, what the project alternatives were. This affects the analysis because I only take into 
account projects that proceeded to completion (except in the five cases of canceled 
projects). The analysis thus has a “positive” bent, in the sense that it does not tell what 
would not work. 
	  
	  





The projects make up a significant portion of the total investment volume of a given time 
period in their respective countries. I compiled a list of percentages of the aggregated 
investment volume of the projects per country, measured against the respective national 
transportation infrastructure investment volume (Appendix D). By average, the projects 
constitute anything between 1 and 44 percent of gross national transportation 
investment volumes, with an average of 13.5 percent. So the data is very representative.  
Because there is so much money at stake, decision-making transparency is an issue and 
sufficient and reliable information in the public domain may be hard to come by. If not 
indicated otherwise, I systematically drew on three major sources of publicly available 
information: 1) The project websites, 2) the project reports available online from the 
OMEGA Centre at the Bartlett School of the University College London. OMEGA Centre 
researchers, between 2007 and 2010, have conducted thirty case studies of megaprojects 
across the world,11 and 3) extensive newspaper search via the “LexisNexis” database. 
Whatever data I found I tried to verify by finding at least one other source reporting the 
same data point. However, data was not always available in comparable ways. In general, 
any lack of data indicates a lack of decision-making transparency, which is one of the 
research themes of this study. 
Statistical	  Tests	  
I used binomial tests to assess data representativeness, different theory-led correlation 
tests and non-parametric (Mann-Whitney U Test) tests to display significant 
associations, model fit tests for multivariate linear, and binary and multinomial 
regressions for more complex models. Appendix F describes these tests in more detail. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 They are available online at http://www.omegacentre.bartlett.ucl.ac.uk/. 
	  
	  




Significant results of all mentioned tests are discussed and displayed in tables 
throughout Chapter 5. The main findings will be summarized at the end. 
Application	  
With the data I will test macro-level influences on various decision-making 
characteristics, and analyze relationships between actors, institutions and decision-tools, 
and some outcome measures. The macro-context variables, including continent and 
countries, GDP measures, a range of government types (e.g. federal or centralized 
systems, proportional or majority decision-making, or some basic distinctions of party 
systems), and the transportation range of the projects, deliver further information.  
Measurable project-specific characteristics include project types, schedules, cost overrun 
and utilization ratios, whether there was public or private funding involved and where 
the funding came from, a rough measure of participating decision-making levels, and 
project opposition. The broad range of data allows analyzing and separating the decision 
contexts of projects and possible intervening factors that influence decision-making. It 
also allows testing specific hypotheses that deal with project costs, funding sources, 
decision-makers and opposition. 
The data collection, quantification and categorization process of international 
transportation megaprojects showed that breadth comes at the expense of depth. In 
order to test a variety of hypotheses, the data had to be quantified into categories that do 
not always reflect the complexity of the real world, but the categories allow testing for 
broad patterns, and less for subtle tendencies. Through the case studies I will be able to 
use finer pointers to make further sense of the results from the statistical analysis.  
The quantitative results provide statistical “feedback” of particular aspects of the model 
– particularly context-specific aspects. Since decisions always take place within rule-
	  
	  




bound spaces (macro), the provisions to resolve funding competition and democratic 
input differ. Hence the statistical results complement the case study research, which will 
deliver a more aggregate picture of the entire process. 
3.3. Case Selection and Case Study Research 
I selected two U.S. cases for closer study: the Second Avenue Subway in New York, and 
the Alameda Corridor freight rail project in Southern California, to zoom in on the 
history, institutions and actors as bases of infrastructure selection.  
Case	  Synopsis	  
The Second Avenue Subway project is an 8.5-mile inner-city project of $3.4 billion for 
the first segment and $17 billion in total. The first section is scheduled to open in 2015. 
The Alameda Corridor is a $2.4 billion project and also the first part of a larger network 
that has yet to be built. While the Second Avenue Subway has been selected on a long-
standing transportation plan in New York City (since 1929), the idea for the Alameda 
Corridor arose in the 1980s and was speedily implemented. At the time of this writing, 
the Second Avenue Subway is under construction, while the Alameda Corridor has been 
completed.  
The Second Avenue Subway is under local jurisdiction and sponsored by an independent 
(but state-controlled) public authority. Alameda Corridor’s sponsor is a special-purpose 
agency created for the sole purpose of implementing the project (but it has subsequently 
been used to sponsor other projects). While one project had to establish consensus on a 
crucial decision-board, the other project was able to use the decision-board to keep 
politics away. Though the multiplicity of actors and of transportation needs makes it 
difficult to predict any decisions and funding streams at all, with these two case studies I 
will be able to understand megaproject decision dynamics in a complex political 
environment. Understanding the political dynamics of megaprojects as they play out in 
	  
	  




the New York metropolitan area and the L.A. harbor region is a good start for the 
generalization of megaproject politics for both the contrast to the data distribution in the 
database, and the evaluation of the theoretical framework.  
Selection	  Criteria	  	  
1. Both projects are transportation megaprojects of more than one billion dollars. 
2. Similar context: Both projects are built within the same country and are thus subject 
to a similar historical institutional development, macro-political organization, and a 
cultural framework, with similar attitudes towards privatization and similar devolution 
dynamics. Both metropolitan areas score high on a fragmentation score devised by 
Hamilton (cited Giuliano, 2007). Seeing that I have an international database, an 
international comparison would have been appropriate, too. However, I believe that the 
differences between the states of California and New York are sufficient to contrast 
political landscapes, while controlling for the historical-institutional logic of a place. An 
international comparison of two projects would not have left a sufficient number of 
similarities to judge, whether differences in the decision-making process are rooted in 
the nature of megaprojects, or owed to national differences. 
3. Different types of agencies: The project-sponsoring agencies were created for different 
reasons and play a different role within their polities and channel transportation politics 
differently. One is a special purpose agency with a broader transportation purpose (the 
MTA) and one is a single-purpose agency with the sole purpose (originally) of creating 
the Alameda Corridor. 
4. Different project types: Subway and freight rail implementation is different because 
the different project types elicit and trigger different constituencies, interest groups, 
proponents and opponents, while being focused on transportation as a public good. 
	  
	  




5. Lastly, in both cases I was familiar with some of the involved institutions and actors, 
making project information more easily accessible.12  
Two case studies should be a sufficient number because: 
1. The general research design includes both quantitative and case study research. The 
statistical results test for the larger contextual impacts as described in the model, and 
thus cover a significant part of it. Complementing it with two in-depth case studies will 
allow me to draw a sufficient number of conclusions and pointers from two projects to 
attain well-rounded results. 
2. The context-dependent knowledge of two projects provides ample information to 
generalize about the broader category of transportation megaprojects. In that sense, 
already one case study suffices to both test and generate hypotheses (Flyvbjerg, 2006). 
Case	  Study	  Methods	  
In the two case studies, I studied the literature, newspapers, and project-related 
documents, and I conducted interviews with decision-makers. Additionally, for Alameda 
Corridor I used the information and research material a non-published research study 
(Nobbe and Brecher, 2011). Process tracing is the main method to uncover the processes 
and variables through which causal or explanatory variables produce causal effects. The 
case study approach, and particularly the interviews with project stakeholders, will 
illuminate those parts of project decision-making that were previously. A sample of the 
IRB-approved interview questionnaire is provided in Attachment G. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 I considered, but did not select, a number of U.S. transportation megaprojects: AirTrain JFK was not 
selected because the political landscape would have been too similar, and the agency type as well. The same 
is true for the 7-Train extension in New York – which also is not yet finished, and I did not want to study two 
incomplete projects. Completed projects add the additional layer of post-facto evaluation. Also under 









Answering the case studies through the research questions will supply context-
dependent knowledge for this study. The case studies serve as valuable examples out of a 
pool of 60 in this study and out of the entire megaproject population. In combination, 
the quantitative and qualitative methods will enable the verification or falsification of the 
hypotheses, while drawing conclusions about the model itself. The methodological issues 
that remain concern problems of breadth vs. depth, which will be attenuated by the 
combined methods.  One particular concern is the inherent affirmation bias towards the 
projects that have been built (as opposed to project failures). I will discuss the 
implications in more detail in the Conclusion. I turn now to the statistical analysis. 
	  
	  




Chapter 4: The Politics of Infrastructure Investment 
Decision-Making: A Quantitative Analysis 
The objective of a statistical analysis of the politics of megaproject decision-making is to 
examine political and other project indicators and compare their impact on project 
decisions and performance. To my knowledge, no statistical analysis that establishes 
systematic political patterns across international, multi-type transportation 
megaprojects exists.13  Hence I developed an extensive database with relevant variables.  
4.1. About the Data and Data Analysis 
The database comprises 60 projects in 22 countries, including railways, highways and 
bridges, subways, tunnels and intermodal projects. The investment volume is typically at 
least $1 billion ($2010) per project. More than 60 variables for each project allow 
insights into the politics and economics of project decision-making. I included political 
contextual and project-specific variables, and will introduce relevant variables in each 
section below, as noted in Chapter 3 above. Appendix B provides a complete list of 
variables, including categories, coding and a few notes about the data. Appendix C 
describes the project and variable distribution and frequencies in detail.	    
Project selection criteria were described in Chapter 3 above as well. The selected projects 
constitute a significant portion of the total investment volume of a given time period in 
their respective countries. By average, the projects constitute between 1 and 44 percent 
of the national transportation investment volumes, with an average of 13.5 percent, 
which makes the data very representative. In Appendix D, I compiled a list of 
percentages of the aggregated investment volume of the database projects per country 
and the respective national transportation infrastructure investment volume. The list 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Parts of this chapter are also being used as the final report for a University Transportation Research Center 
grant received in 2011. PI: Joseph Berechman. 
	  
	  




establishes the proportions of the dataset vis-à-vis the real world, and thus the 
representativeness of the data.  
The chapter will be organized by five themes: 1) macro-political indicators and their 
relationship to project decision-making, 2) project decision-makers, 3) transparency 
matters and the basis of the decisions, 4) the role of opportunity and crises situations for 
megaprojects, and 5) the nature of funding as political dependent and independent 
factors. In the end, I will offer a general conclusion about the nature of project decision-
making according to the data.  
Each of the five themes starts out by introducing and evaluating the core data. I then 
present various hypotheses and models and say a few words about the chosen tests. 
While I will explain each test that I use in a footnote the first time I use it, Appendix F 
provides an overview of all these tests. After presenting the significant results in tables, I 
will explain them and assess their explanatory power. The hypotheses that guide the 
tests are partly derived from the literature, and partly guided by my own data 
exploration. For a better overview, they are all listed in Appendix E. For space reasons I 
will generally only display significant associations.  In the conclusion of each core 
section, I summarize the most important results, with notes of caution where 
appropriate.   
4.2. Macro-Political Factors and their Influence on Project Decision-Making 
First I will look at possible effects of macro-level factors on transportation infrastructure 
investment characteristics and decisions. Macro-level factors include 1) the structure of 
the political system, 2) the type of the legislative system, 3) the type of party system, 4) 
the type of voting system, 5) cultural and 6) economic factors. 
	  
	  




4.2.1.	  Notes	  about	  the	  Data	  
The political system variable (V9) records whether a country is federalist or centralized. 
Sixty-five percent (39 projects) are located in centralized states such as France. The “type 
of legislative system” variable (V10) captures whether the legislature is bi-or unicameral. 
Fifty-two percent (31) are in states with a unicameral legislature. The “party system” 
binary (V55) distinguishes between two- and multiparty systems on the national level. 
Seventy-three percent (44) are in multiparty systems. The variable “type of voting 
system” (V56) distinguishes between proportional, majority/plurality and mixed voting 
systems. Thirty-three percent (20) of the projects are in proportional systems, 40% (24) 
in the second category, and 20% (12) in the third. Four projects could not be clearly 
categorized, because they were hybrids. Further, 32% of the projects (19) are located in 
Anglo-Saxon countries (the U.S., Great Britain and Australia), the majority of them in 
the U.S. The data includes macro-economic variables like GDP Purchasing Power Parity 
(V5) and GDP measures over time (V6, V7, and V8). Figure 4 shows the distribution of 
purchasing power across countries. 
Figure 4: Purchasing Power Parity per capita 2010 (in $U.S.) 
 
Because much of the megaproject literature is interested in project success factors 
(Flvybjerg et al., 2003), I examine associations between macro-political types and 















































































































utilization and project construction or implementation times. Figure 5 shows the 
percentage distribution of actual vs. projected cost in the database: 9% of the projects 
have cost overrun ratios between 0 and 0.8%, which means they cost 80% or less of the 
projected cost. About 40% of the projects come in at a price roughly estimated, and more 
than 50% come in with at least 20% above the original price estimate. Similarly, Figure 6 
shows that most projects are under-utilized (as compared to the projections): about 43% 
come in with fewer users than estimated (0-0.8= 0-80%), about 43% come in as 
projected (80%-120%), and less than 10% experience a better use than the projected one. 
In sum, consistent with the literature, more than half of the projects experience cost 
overrun. Over 40% of the projects vastly fail their projected users numbers, but at least 




Figure 5: Cost-Overrun (inflation-adjusted) 
Figure 6: Utilization Ratio 
 
Figure 7 shows the length of project phases – planning, implementation and 
construction times for those projects were all three values were available—sorted by 









































Figure 7: Planning, Implementation and Construction Time 
 
Planning time is the time-span from the beginning of project planning to the year of its 
inception, when the project got a formal approval by decision-makers. The data in Figure 
7 is based on is normally distributed but right skewed, as some megaprojects experience 
really long project phases. Construction time is the time span from beginning of 
construction to the end of construction. These two categories may overlap as some 
planning is completed after construction has begun. Implementation time is the time 
from the year of inception to the actual opening of a project (construction end). In some 
cases construction times may be longer than the implementation time, because 
construction began before official project approval.  
The relationship between macro-political categories and particular megaproject 
investment decisions, statistically, is not well explored. Persson’s work deals with the 
impact of macro-political electoral institutions on policy outcomes, and inspires the 
hypotheses in this section. Persson does not directly study megaprojects. Rather, his 
work emphasizes the importance of macro-structures on policy outputs, e.g. government 
spending or corruption indices (Persson, 2002). Others have analyzed macro-level 
impacts, too; for instance Grossman and Helpman, 2001, or Iversen and Soskice (2006), 



























who analyze the difference proportional vs. majority systems have on redistributive 
policies, and thus allow insights into the different rationales of government funding and 
which groups and projects they likely benefit. They argue that proportional 
representation systems do have predominantly center-left government coalitions. On the 
other hand, center-right governments occur more frequently in majoritarian voting 
systems. So the literature provides some pointers not specific to megaproject decisions, 
but to their context. 
4.2.2.	  Exploring	  Relationships	  between	  Variables	  
I will start by exploring relationships between variables through the Mann-Whitney U 
Tests and Kruskal-Wallis for ordinal, dichotomous variables, and Spearman rank order 
tests for continuous ordinal, but not normally distributed data, and Pearson’s 
correlations for normally distributed data.14  The relationships are guided by a list of 
hypotheses: 
H2.1: Projects built in centralized governments are more successful. 
H2.2: Macro-political factors such as the political system, the legislative structure, the 
party and the national voting system impact funding sources for projects. 
H2.3: Bond-funded investment is more prevalent in federalist than in centralized 
countries. 
H2.4: Project decision-making in federalist countries is more transparent than in 
centralized countries. 
Table 1: Macro-Political Variables (Mann-Whitney U-Tests and Kruskal-Wallis Tests) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 For a description of each test see Appendix F. 
List	  of	  Predictors	   Political	  System	  (Mann-­‐Whitney)	   Legislative	  Structure	  (Mann-­‐Whitney)	  
	   	   Test	  statistic	  U	  (df)	   	   Z	  (N)	   Test	  statistic	  U	  (df)	   	   Z	  (N)	  
Prov.	  
Funding	  
244	  (1)*	   -­‐2.209	   	   	  H2.2	  
Bond	  
Funding	  
527	  (1)**	   2.900	   538	  (1)*	   2.421	  (56)	  
H2.4	   Transpa-­‐
rency	  
271	  (1)*	   -­‐2.219	   	   	  
Reported	  in	  the	  table	  are	  only	  significant	  results:	  *sig≤.05,	  **sig≤.01,	  U=test	  statistic,	  df=degrees	  of	  freedom,	  
Z=standardized	  coefficient,	  N=number	  of	  projects	  included	  in	  the	  analysis	  
	  
	  




Summary: Table 1 displays the most important significant findings.15 I used the Mann-
Whitney U-Tests16 because I compared project characteristics between two macro-
political categories.   
Most associations are weak, except for the bond type association. Provincial funding 
sources play a larger role in federalist than in unitary political systems 
(Mann-Whitney U=244, Z=-2.209, sig≤.05). More literally, there is a probability of 1 in 
25 for this distribution to occur normally under the null hypothesis – rare enough to 
suggest there is a statistically significant difference in ranked distributions between 
groups (given sig≤.05, 2-tailed): the use of provincial funding sources varies between 
federalist and unitary countries in the real world.  
Further, significant associations between the political system and bond funding show 
that projects in centralized systems are more often bond-funded than in 
federalist systems (U=527, Z=2.900, sig≤.01), with only about a 1:100 chance for the 
distribution to occur by chance. The political system variable is also associated with 
project transparency (U=271, Z=-2.219, sig≤.05): projects in federalist countries are 
more transparent than projects in centralized countries. 
Project funding also differs by the type of legislative structure. In countries with 
bicameral legislatures project bond funding, compared to other funding 
types, is underrepresented (U=581, Z=2.421, sig≤.05). Finally, the Kruskal-Wallis 
test17 (7.869, sig≤.05) shows that cost overrun is highest in projects in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Important note: throughout the report I will only display those with significant outcomes.  
16 The non-parametric or rank order Mann-Whitney U Test ranks two independent groups by ranking them 
or comparing their means against an assumed distribution (for instance whether one population features 
larger values of a specific outcome than another). As opposed to parametric alternatives, the Mann-Whitney 
U Test is less susceptible to abnormal distribution of the data and unequal sample sizes. The output is the 
Mann-Whitney U value, the interpretation of which depends on the sample size, and the p value, which 
indicates whether there is a statistically significant difference between both groups (if so, then p<.01).  
17 The non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis test is an extension of the Mann-Whitney U Test. The test allows 
comparing more than two independent groups. Similar to the Mann-Whitney Test, the data does not need 
	  
	  




proportional voting systems, followed by mixed systems, and lastly by plurality/ 
majority systems. Now I will turn to discuss the findings in the light of the hypotheses. 
H2.1: Projects built in centralized governments are more successful. The 
hypothesis was rejected. Macro-political characteristics and project success 
measures are not correlated, at least not directly. (Again, the results are not displayed in 
the table because I only display significant associations.) 
H2.2: Macro-political factors such as the political system, the legislative structure, the 
party and the national voting system impact funding sources for projects. The political 
system and legislative structure bear on the typical types and sources of 
funding employed in megaprojects: regional/provincial funding sources 
play a larger role in federalist countries (U=244, Z=-2.209, sig≤.05) and 
private sources play a larger role in centralized countries (U=485, Z=2.015, 
sig≤.05, 2-tailed). The first association is not surprising: only projects under federally 
organized governments (21 out of 60) have sub-national (state or regional level) funding 
sources. The second association needs to be further investigated, which I will do in 
Section 5. 
H2.3: Bond-funded infrastructure investment is more prevalent in federalist than in 
centralized countries. The hypothesis was rejected: bond-based funding is more 
prevalent in centralized (U=527, Z=2.900, sig≤.01) than in federalized states. Any 
causation between macro-political arrangement and funding types appear to be driven 
by other factors. These may include overall public finance practices in each individual 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
not be in equal interval scale, the population does not need to be normally distributed, and the samples need 
not have equal variances. It assumes that the dependent variable is measured at an ordinal level, and that the 
independent variable consists of more than two independent categories. The test provides a ranking for each 
group, and the statistical significance, which allows for conclusions about the effect of the independent 
variables on the groups. 
	  
	  




country and larger political-economic policies of the type analyzed by Persson (2002) in 
general. 
H2.4: Project decision-making in federalist countries is more transparent than in 
centralized countries. The hypothesis was confirmed: decision-making is more 
transparent in federalist countries (U=271, Z=-2.219, sig≤.05). It is possible 
that the comparatively large number of U.S. projects in the database drives the 
association, because projects receiving federal funds in the U.S. (without the federal 
government being a decision-maker) face thorough documentation requirements.  
The next set of hypotheses guides the exploration of voting systems and Anglo-Saxon 
states (the U.S., Great Britain and Australia) with other variables. 
H2.5: Infrastructure projects in two-party systems are underwritten by a greater 
variety of funding sources than projects in multiple party systems. 
H2.6: Anglo-Saxon projects face more opposition than projects in centralized countries. 
H2.7: The nature of the voting system affects project success measures like cost 
overrun. 
Table 2: Macro-Political Variables (Mann-Whitney U-Tests and Kruskal-Wallis Tests) 
List	  of	  Predictors	   Voting	  System	  (Kruskal-­‐Wallis)	   Anglo-­‐Saxon	  (Mann-­‐Whitney)	  
	   Test	  Statistic	   (N)	   Test	  statistic	  U	  (df)	   	   Z	  (N)	  
H2.6	   Opposition	  
(ideol.)	  
	   	   490	  (1)	   2.460	  (58)	  
H2.7	   Cost	  
Overrun	  
7.869	   (41)	   	   	  
Reported	  in	  the	  table	  are	  only	  significant	  results:	  *sig≤.05,	  **sig≤.01,	  U=test	  statistic,	  df=degrees	  of	  freedom,	  
Z=standardized	  coefficient,	  N=number	  of	  projects	  included	  in	  the	  analysis	  
Summary: Project opposition is stronger in Anglo-Saxon countries than in 
others (490/ 2.460). Cost overrun is associated with proportional voting systems 
(7.869). Referring back to the hypotheses:  
H2.5: Infrastructure projects in two-party systems are underwritten by a greater variety 
of funding sources than projects in multiple party systems. The hypothesis was rejected. 
	  
	  




I am not surprised and conclude that lots of different factors other than macro-structural 
ones drive the funding composition of projects. 
H2.6: Anglo-Saxon projects face more opposition than projects in centralized 
countries. The dataset contains four types of project opposition: political, ideological, 
issue-oriented or no opposition. The hypothesis was confirmed for “ideological” 
opposition (490/ 2.460*).18 I will analyze the association in a regression model in 
Section 2.3 below. There seems to be less opposition to projects in centralized than in 
federalist systems (Mann-Whitney U-Test 490/ 2.460* - not displayed in table). 
H2.7: The nature of the voting system affects project success measures like cost 
overrun. The test statistic is not really telling, since the voting system variable has three 
categories (see Appendix B). The box plots associated with the Mann-Whitney U Test 
show that cost overrun is highest in proportional voting systems (like Denmark), 
followed by mixed voting systems (Germany). It is lowest in plurality voting systems like 
the United States. 
Additionally, I examined associations with Spearman’s rank order correlations19 for 
ordinal variables.  
H2.8: Macro-political organization affects choices between project types like highway 
or rail.  
H2.9: Local decision makers are more involved in project decisions in federalist 
countries than in centralized ones. 
Table 3: Macro-Political Variables (Spearman Rank Order Test) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 For distributions and categorizations, view Appendices B and C. 
19 The Spearman Rank Order Test is a non-parametric measure testing an association between two variables, 
e.g. if the value of one variable increases or decreases depending on the value of another one. The test may be 
used with discrete or ordinal data. Similar to the Pearson’s Correlation coefficient, ranges of outcomes are 
between -1 and 1, with -1 being a negative correlation, 1 being positively correlated, and a value of 0 
List	  of	  Predictors	   Political	  System	   Legislative	  Structure	   Party	  System	  
Decision-­‐Makers:	  local	   	   	   .273*	  (57)	  
	   Decision-­‐Makers:	  
regional	  
-­‐.682**	  (59)	   -­‐.428**	  (59)	   .361**	  (57)	  
Decision-­‐Makers:	  
regional	  
-­‐.682**	  (59)	   -­‐.428**	  (59)	   .361**	  (57)	  
	  
	  




Summary: The correlations between provincial and national decision-makers and the 
political system are highly significant. The association between political systems and 
regional decision-makers is strong (-.682). At a .01 probability level regional decision-
makers are more involved in decision-making in federalist governments than in 
centralized ones (-.682, sig≤.01). National decision-makers in centralized countries 
(.543, sig≤.01) are more involved in project decision-making than their pendants in 
federalist governments. International infrastructure decision-makers play a larger role in 
centralized countries (.315, sig≤.05).  
The legislative structure impacts decision-makers as well. There are more regional/ 
provincial decision-makers in bicameral legislative systems (-.428, sig≤.01) and more 
national (.423, sig≤.05) and international decision-makers (.323, sig≤.05) in unicameral 
legislative systems. In the macro-political categories only the type of party system has a 
systematic effect on the involvement of decision-makers on the local level: local decision-
makers are less involved in multiple-party systems than in two party systems (.273, 
sig≤.05); the same is true for provincial/regional decision-makers (.361, sig≤.01). There 
are more national decision-makers involved in project decision-making in two-party 
systems than in multiparty systems (-.341, sig≤.01). 
H2.8: Macro-political organization affects choices between project types like highway 
or rail. The hypothesis was not confirmed.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




.543**	  (59)	   .423*	  (54)	   -­‐.341**	  (57)	  	  
Decision-­‐Makers:	  
international	  
.315*	  (59)	   .323*	  (59)	   	  








H2.9: Macro-level political factors determine who plays a role in megaproject decision-
making. The data validates associations between macro-level factors and decision-
makers, at least on some dimensions. As expected, national decision-makers are more 
strongly involved in centralized countries. However, even though the statistical 
probability is strong, the association is not (-.341, sig≤.01). The participation of local 
decision-makers in project decisions is lower in centralized than in 
federalist countries, so one part of the hypothesis was confirmed (.273, 
sig≤.05). But the correlation is weak also. Projects located within centralized countries 
(and those with one legislative house) have more international decision-makers than 
projects in federalist countries with two houses (.315, sig≤.05). This is not surprising, as 
many of the European Union member-states are smaller and centralized, and border-
crossing supra-national infrastructure in the European Union keeps expanding.  
There are not many two-party dominated countries in the world, and 20 percent of the 
projects are located within one of them (the United States), so the significant results with 
respect to party systems should not be overstated. But the displayed tendency reinforces 
the other trends in the table, with the addition that local decision-makers are less 
involved in projects in multi-party systems (.273, sig≤.05). While pleased that the results 
show that the data is consistent, I will check for some additional intervening factors in 
the next section.  
4.2.3.	  Regression	  Models	  
In this section I examine various effects of macro-structural variables on a range of 
dependent variables. The results in Table 1 already indicated that the more pronounced 
devolution of decision authority in federalist systems impacts funding choices available 
at the state and local levels.  
	  
	  




H2.3: Bond-funded infrastructure investment is more prevalent in federalist than 
projects in centralized countries. 
I hypothesize that the political system affects funding types. Specifically, I assume that 
the structure of federalist countries supports bond-funding schemes for infrastructure 
investment. I add project types and project location as independent variables in Model 1. 
Based on the structure of the dependent variable and model fit tests, I chose a linear 
model.20  
Model 1: V36=a+Var9x+Var54x+Var11x 
Y = Funding Type: Bonds (V36)  
X = Political System (V9), Project Types (V54), Project Location (V11) 
 
Table 4: The Impact of Macro-Political Influences on Project-Related Variables: Bond 
Funding (Linear Regression) 
List	  of	  Predictors	   Model	  1	  (linear	  regression)	  
Political	  System	   29.794**	  
Project	  Type	  	   25.028*	  (highways)	  
Project	  Location	   16.123*	  (inner	  city)	  
Constant	   21.531*	  
N	   	   57	  
Model	  Fit	   .246	  
For	  linear	  regression:	  displayed:	  B	  values,	  *sig≤.05	  	  **sig≤.01;	  Model	  fit:	  Adjusted	  R	  Squared;	  n.s.	  =	  not	  significant.	  	  
Summary: The results of the models, with about 25 percent explanatory range each, are 
not insignificant for social science data. Overall, the models show that the political 
system has some influence on project funding types. 
Model 1 in Table 4 shows that bond funding is more typical in centralized than in 
federalist countries (29.794, sig≤.01). In Table 4 the parameter value of political system 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Regression analysis makes quantitative predictions about the effects of one or more variables on a 
“dependent” variable. The independent variable/s exercises a hypothesized influence on the dependent 




In the given relationships Y is the dependent variable and b represents the slopes of the functions. In these 
types of regressions, the dependent variables are continuous. Associated tests of statistical significance 
evaluate how likely it is that the predicted relationships reflect the true relationships. 
R Squared is the typical “model fit” test that assesses how well the hypothesized model fits the sample data. 
The closer the value is to 1, the better the model. For a more detailed overview over regression assumptions, 
see Appendix F. 
	  
	  




of 29.79 suggests a stronger relationship. I added project type as a control variable, 
because in most countries funding sources and types differ by project type. The results 
confirm a positive relationship between highway projects and bond funding 
(25.028, sig≤.05) and with inner city projects (16.123, sig≤.05). Bond 
funding is prevalent in centralized systems, particularly for highway and 
inner city projects.  
Quality of the Statistical Results:	   The models meet all necessary assumptions for 
linear regressions, although the Shapiro-Wilk test21 for the normality of error is low.  
H2.4: Project decision-making is more transparent in federalist than in centralized 
countries. Here I hypothesize that the political system affects project transparency. 
Again, the devolution and fragmentation of the political landscape in many federalist 
countries might account for different cultures of decision-making or documentation. A 
binary regression model22 is employed to capture a transparency trend in either 
direction. To that purpose, the transparency data, usually a scale variable (described in 
more detail in Section 3 below), into a binary, was turned into a binary.23 I included 
project types and project location in the model.   
Model 1:   
Y = Transparency (V50)	  
X = Political System (V9), Project Types (V54), Project Location (V11)	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 This test uses studentized residuals to determine whether the assumption of the “normality of error” is 
met. That means that residuals, or errors, should be random and normally distributed at the values of the 
dependent variable. Any value that is larger than p<.05 (if that it the set threshold, or “alpha value”) is good 
to go, meaning that the errors are normally distributed. For a more detailed overview over regression 
assumptions and related tests that were conducted see Appendix F. 
22 Binary logistic regressions are selected when the dependent variable is a binary variable, and the 
independent variables scale or ordinals. Non-parametric tests require for the data to meet fewer 
assumptions than parametric tests.  
23 I did test linear models, too, without a significant result. 
	  
	  




The results reject the hypothesis - there were no significant results for the influence of 
the type of political or legislative structure on project transparency when holding 
constant project types or location. The model cannot explain the association indicated by 
the non-parametric tests above.  
H2.6: There is more project opposition in Anglo-Saxon states than in others. 
I hypothesize that Anglo-Saxon political culture affects project opposition. I assume 
opposition may vary by culture because decision frameworks, implementation 
requirements and actors differ in each country. Hypothetically, states may be grouped: 
Anglo-Saxon states are a “type” with a particular culture of public spending that differs 
from spending patterns in Scandinavian or European states (Esping-Andersen, 1990). 
The different patterns of project opposition shown in Table 2  could be a 
result of less egalitarian approaches to public spending in Anglo-Saxon 
countries, which would in turn provoke stronger responses to large-scale 
investment decisions.   
Two different models to test the hypothesis are presented below, and the results in Table 
5. Because the outcome variable is binary24 I chose a binary logistic regression. Second 
order effects can be ruled out because all variables in the model are binaries. 
Model 1:  
Y = Ideological Opposition (V28)  
X = Anglo-Saxon (V59), Project Types (V12), Decision Makers (V52) 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  








Model 2:  
Y = Ideological Opposition (V28)  
X = Anglo-Saxon (V59), Project Types (V12), Project Location (V12) 
 
Table 5: Effects on Ideological Opposition (Logistic Binary Regression) 
Summary: The results for Model 1 show that ideological opposition is stronger in 
Anglo-Saxon countries (1.743/ 5.715, p>.01) than in other parts of the world. At the same 
time, project types and levels of decision-making do not impact opposition; the 
associations are insignificant. 
Model 2 shows that ideological opposition is stronger in Anglo-Saxon countries 
(1.270/ 3.559, p>.05), while the project type is not significant. Altshuler and Luberoff 
hold that inner-city transportation projects are particularly contested. Local decision-
makers were not significant in Model 1, so I tested for inner-city projects to explain 
opposition. As it turns out, ideological opposition is strongest for inner-city 
projects (1.606/ 4.984, p>.05), thus confirming Altshuler/Luberoff’s thesis. 
However, there are three caveats to the finding: first, Altshuler and Luberoff are only 
discussing U.S. cities; second, they focus primarily on opposition to highway projects; 
and third, they discuss soaring opposition in the 1960s and 1970s, after the highway 
boom that destroyed entire – especially poorer - neighborhoods. The majority of my 
List	  of	  Predictors	   Model	  1	   Model	  2	  
Anglo-­‐Saxon	   1.743/	  5.715*	   1.270/	  3.559*	  
Project	  Type:	  rail	   n.s.	   n.s.	  
Project	  Location:	  inner	  
city	  projects	  
	   1.606/	  4.984*	  
Local	  Decision-­‐Makers	   n.s.	   	  
Constant	   -­‐1.332/	  .264**	   -­‐2.370/	  .093**	  
N	   	   57	   58	  
Model	  Fit	   .134/	  .188	   .177/	  .249	  








projects started in the 1980s. These caveats do not prevent a cautious conclusion, 
though, since the majority of the Anglo-Saxon projects are in the United States. So the 
hypothesis is supported. 
Statistical Quality: Here, the quality of the results, in statistical terms, is fair, with 
ROC values in the range of 72% to 76%. Parametric tests like binary logistic regressions 
require the data to meet fewer assumptions than parametric tests. I tested the quality of 
the binary logistic regression results by looking at the ROC (Receiver Operations Graphs) 
curves of the results.25 Specific results are displayed in Appendix I, an explanation of the 
statistical tests that have been conducted is in Appendix F. 
4.2.4.	  In	  Summation	  
There are four areas where macro-political factors exercise limited influence.  
1. Macro-level factors and different levels of decision-making are associated. As 
expected, national level decision-makers exercise more influence in centralized 
countries, where transportation investments and policies are also more centrally 
organized. Regional level decision-makers, on the other hand, play a larger role in 
federalist countries. 
Further, projects located within centralized, smaller countries have more international 
decision-makers than projects in federalist countries. The explanation is that most 
European countries are centralized. In addition, European projects usually receive 
partial funding from the European Union, which are here counted as international. I will 
pick up on this in more detail in Section 3 (Table 2). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 For an explanation of ROC curves, see Appendix F. Individual ROC Curve graphs and more information 
are displayed in Appendix J. 
	  
	  




2. There are some tentative indicators that macro-political characteristics impact 
funding types. For example, bond funding plays a stronger role in centralized 
countries. I will explore this concept further in Section 5 on project decisions and the 
nature of funding (Table 1 and Model 2.3). 
3. Ideological opposition is stronger in Anglo-Saxon countries than in other countries. 
Possible caveats, however, are given in the discussion for Hypothesis 2.6. 
4. The non-parametric tests held that the political system affects project 
transparency. Since I was not able to confirm this in the regression analyses (which 
included various explanatory variables to the model), I assume the differences are driven 
by something else for which I cannot account. I will explore the issue of transparency 
further in Section 4 below. 
4.3. Project Decision-Makers 
4.3.1.	  Notes	  about	  the	  Data	  
The compositions of decision-makers per project vary by political system and project 
type. I distinguished five levels of decision-making: local actors, regional or state 
actors (mainly the subnational units in federalist systems), transportation agencies, 
national and international decision-makers involved in any major political 
decision points. Most projects involve national level decision-makers (70% of the 
projects), followed by regional (40%), Transport Agency decision-makers (23.3%), local 
(21.6%) and international ones (15%). Since I am looking at different countries with 
multiple decision-making frameworks, it is difficult to establish how representative these 
proportions are, or which thresholds apply (with the exception of national decision-
makers, which I will discuss following the presentation of the results). 
	  
	  




Binomial tests26 (below) show that none of these ratios, except for the regional decision-
makers ratio, are likely to exist by chance at a 50 percent threshold. So they might be 
true representatives of the general population. 
Local decision-makers:   prop. 0.5, test stat=46, Z=4.166, sig≤.05, two-sided 
Regional decision-makers:  prop. 0.5, test stat=35, Z=1.302, n.s., two-sided 
TA decision-makers:   prop. 0.5, test stat=45, Z=3.906, sig≤.05, two-sided 
National decision-makers: prop. 0.5, test stat=42, Z=3.125, sig≤.05, two sided 
International decision-makers:  prop. 0.5, test stat=50, Z=5.208, sig≤.05, two-sided 
Since there is no internationally comparative literature on megaprojects that would 
assess these ratios, it is difficult to gauge which proportions are truly representative. The 
tests show that at a 0.5 threshold, the proportion of national-level decision makers (70%) 
is too large to likely happen by chance. However, the literature does acknowledge strong 
national-level involvement in megaproject decision-making (Altshuler/ Luberoff, 2003). 
Thus I raised the test threshold to 60 percent. The result was insignificant (prop. 0.6, 
Test Stat=42, Z=1.621, n.s. (one-sided)), which means that the sample would be a more 
or less accurate application of reality – provided national decision-makers are routinely 
involved in multi-billion dollar project investments. Altogether, this confirms that the 
national level, statistically speaking, assumes the largest role in project decision-making. 
I already know that the ratios of national level vs. others decision-makers vary by type of 
government system (see Table 2).   
4.3.2.	  Exploring	  Relationships	  between	  Variables	  
The relationships are given by the following hypotheses: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Binomial tests test the probability that a binary sample reflects a likely distribution in the general 
population. Statistical tests operate with the default threshold of .5 (50%). With this threshold, the sample 
distribution is evaluated against the probability that the data distribution corresponds to 50/50 in the real 
world. The test value reflects the deviation from that probability. The threshold may be changed to reflect 
hypothesized proportions of the given general population based on theory or observation. 
	  
	  




H3.1: Anglo-Saxon projects involve more local and regional decision-makers in project 
decisions.  
H3.2: The types or nature of the project stimuli influence the types of project decision-
makers.  
H3.3: There is less project opposition when national decision-makers are involved than 
when decisions are made on sub-national levels. 
H3.4: National level decision-makers conduct more cost-benefit analyses than project 
decision-makers on local or regional levels. 
H3.5: Project-planning times are longer for national level projects than projects on 
other levels. 
Table 6 displays parametric test results. 
Table 6Parametric Tests (Spearman and Pearson’s27 Correlations) 




TA	  Decision-­‐Makers	   National	  Decision-­‐
Makers	  
H3.1	   Anglo-­‐Saxon	   	   .561**	  (58)	   	   -­‐.680**	  (58)	  
H3.2	   Special	  
situation	  
	   	   .338**	  (58)	   	  
Opposition:	  
ideological	  




.306*	  (58)	   	   	   	  
H3.5	  	   Planning	  
Years***	  
	   -­‐.369*	  (46)	   	   -­‐.376**	  (58)	  
Displayed:	  Pearson’s	  R,	  *sig≤.05	  	  **sig≤.01,	  ***Pearson	  Correlations,	  TA=Transportation	  Agency	  
Summary: The results indicate less project opposition when local decision-makers are 
involved (.306, sig≤.05), although the relationship it not strong. Regional decision-
makers are more involved in Anglo-Saxon countries (.561, sig≤.01). They also face more 
ideological opposition (.458, sig≤.01), while the number of planning years for projects 
decreases in their presence (-.369, sig≤.05). More transportation agency decision-
makers are involved in special-stimulus situations (.338, sig≤.05) (for a more detailed 
explanation, see Appendix B), while projects tend to face less ideological opposition (-
.394, sig≤.05). Local level decision-making is associated with more opposition28 (.306, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Pearson’s correlations are measures of linear statistical correlation or the dependence between two 
variables, e.g. if the value of one variable increases or decreases depending on the value of another one. The 
values of the outcome coefficient range between -1 and 1. The closer the coefficients are to the values 1 and -1, 
the stronger the correlation. With a coefficient of 0 the variables show no statistical association. The negative 
or positive value describes the direction of the curve. The Pearson’s test, a parametric test, works best with 
scale data. 
28 The coding is counter-intuitive. 
	  
	  




sig≤.05). Finally, national decision-makers are less involved in Anglo-Saxon countries (-
.680, sig≤.05) and in the face of ideological opposition (-.277, sig≤.05). The number of 
planning years decreases when they are involved (-.376, sig≤.05). 
H3.1: Anglo-Saxon projects involve more local and regional decision-makers 
in project decisions, than project decision processes in other regions. Pearson’s R 
indicates a strong association (.561**). Thus, the hypothesis was confirmed for regional 
and national levels of decision-making. However, the results should not be overstated, as 
they rest on the fact that most Anglo-Saxon countries are also federally organized, and 
thus it is not surprising that regional authorities are the key decision-makers there. This 
was already discussed following Table 2. 
H3.2: The types or nature of the project stimuli influence the types of project decision-
makers. Projects that were implemented in preparation for, or in the wake of, special 
scenarios like German reunification projects or special constructions for the Olympics, 
more often involve transportation agencies: often transport agencies are specifically 
being created for such special purposes – either because the historic-institutional legacy 
of decision-making was disrupted, or because established practices were not available.  
H3.3: There is less project opposition when national decision-makers are 
involved than when decisions are made on sub-national levels. In some cases 
project decisions are being moved up to the national level to avoid conflict, if there is a 
strong potential for opposition on the local level. Indeed, I found that (ideological) 
project opposition is stronger when regional level decision-makers are involved than any 
other level, and less on TA and national levels. So H3.3 was confirmed. In 
combination with the results of Table 7  it may be inferred that the national level is more 
willing to take on projects that are cost-intensive (experience more cost overrun) but that 
	  
	  




are deemed necessary and do not inspire opposition. (The findings in Table 13 that 
projects with national funding sources meet their user projections better than projects 
with other funding sources, confirm this.) 
H3.4: National level decision-makers conduct more cost-benefit analyses than project 
decision-makers on local or regional levels. Transport authority decision-makers do not 
appear to conduct more CBAs than other levels. The national level – as held by the 
hypothesis – does not influence the use of CBAs, either. So the hypothesis was rejected. 
H3.5: Project-planning times are longer for national level projects than projects on 
other levels. The association between national and regional decision-makers and 
planning years is negative. So the number of planning years is shorter when these 
decision-making levels are involved. The hypothesis is not confirmed. A lot of factors 
may play a role. The involvement of national decision-makers suggests different possible 
planning practices. Long-range planning and budgeting is more probable for national-
level projects, while the practice of one-year planning cycles is generally more prevalent 
at local levels and the planning process and related issues thus more dispersed – and 
likely longer. 
Next, I compare how levels of GDP, costs and cost overruns and some timing variables 
are affected by the presence or absence of types of decision-makers by conducting Mann-
Whitney U-Tests. These tests, because they compare groups, allow seeing whether and 
which decision-making levels affect the variables. I thus hope to gauge the possible 
effects of different decision levels.29  
H3.6: The higher the GDP PPP, the more project decisions are made at the national 
level.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 More details on the test may be found in Appendix F. 
	  
	  




H3.7: If (special-purpose) transportation agencies are involved, cost overruns are 
smaller.  
H3.8: National level decision-makers tend to take on more complex, long-term projects. 
H3.9: National level decision-makers are involved with the more expensive projects 
(costs/km). 
H3.10: Project decision-making levels changed over time, specifically from the 1980s 
onward. More projects are now decided on sub-national levels. 
Table 7  shows associations from the non-parametric tests. 
Table 7: Non-Parametric Tests: Associations between Project Decision-Makers and Selected 
Variables (Mann-Whitney U-Test) 
Summary: Local decision-makers are positively associated with a country’s wealth: the 
richer a country, the more local decision-makers are involved in project decisions (372, 
1.283 sig≤.01, .412, 2.066 sig≤.05, .443, 2.636 sig≤.01). The same is true for regional 
decision-makers (712, 4.525, sig≤.01). Also, local decision-makers have increased their 
relevance over the past few decades (.390, 2.265 sig≤.05). The change over time has been 
established through a variable that assigns an increasing value to each passing decade 
during which the main project decision was made. Higher values are associated with 
newer projects. Additionally, local decision-makers are associated with larger project 
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Displayed: U=test statistic (df=degrees of freedom), Z= standardized coefficient, N=project count, 
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agency decision-makers experience fewer cost overruns (103, -2.248, sig≤.05). National 
decision-makers are associated with larger cost overrun (.315, 2.476, sig≤.01) and longer 
construction times (.452, 3.322, sig≤.01). At the same time, their relevance has 
diminished over time – both measured by decade (188, -2.837, sig≤.01), and by 
inception year (.178, -2.920, sig≤.01). 
H3.6: The higher the GDP (PPP), the more project decisions are made at the national 
level. The hypothesis was not confirmed. Non-parametric tests show that the richer a 
country, the more decision-makers participate on a local level (372, 1.283 sig≤.01, .412, 
2.066 sig≤.05, .443, 2.636 sig≤.01). The data shows no significant association between 
wealth and the national decision level. It is possible that the correlation is driven by the 
fact that a relatively large number of projects in the data set are located in very wealthy 
federalist countries (12 out of 60 projects in the U.S.), where the devolution of decision-
making is stronger than in centralized countries (Table 2). 
H3.7: If (special-purpose) transportation agencies are involved, cost 
overruns are smaller. The hypothesis was indirectly derived from the literature (e.g. 
Doig, 1983, Bordeaux, 2008) – and confirmed. Transportation-agency led 
projects have fewer cost overruns than projects decided by other levels of decision-
making (103, -2.248, sig≤.05). The hypothesis was based on the assumption that the 
specialized organization of established transportation agencies may improve 
implementation efficiency. TAs further hold the potential to shelter decisions from 
political impacts, thus making implementation more efficient. Additionally I found that 
cost overruns are higher for national projects 
H3.8: National level decision-makers tend to take on more complex, long-
term projects. Local-level decision-makers gained influence over time (.390, 2.265 
	  
	  




sig≤.05), while national-level decision-makers lost their influence (by inception decade: 
188, -2.837, sig≤.01; by inception year: .178, -2.920, sig≤.01), which confirms 
Altshuler and Luberoff’s (2003) devolution thesis (even though they were only 
focusing on the U.S.). I did not find any significant results for international decision-
makers. 
H3.9: National level decision-makers are involved with the more expensive projects 
(costs/km). The data confirms the hypothesis in terms of cost overrun. Again, national 
decision-makers might take on complicated (and maybe less profitable) projects that are 
not pursued by lower decision-making levels. Related: longer construction times may 
drive up project costs, as well. 
H3.10: Project decision-making levels changed over time, specifically from the 1980s 
onward. More projects are now decided on sub-national levels. Interestingly, projects 
with local decision-making participation have higher costs per kilometer.  
4.3.3.	  Regression	  Models	   	  
The correlation results suggested that there is less “ideological opposition” when 
national decision-makers are involved (H.3.3.). This suggests that the national level 
takes on projects the public deems important, but that are expensive. I test this 
association in the models below. In Model 1, I added the number of years a project has 
been considered (project history) as an indicator for project opposition: projects that 
have been brought up repeatedly for a long time might be controversial and expensive. 
On the other hand they might also face less opposition, because the public has waited for 
them for a long time. The Second Avenue Subway in New York is an example. I included 
the decade of project approval, because I assume that the earlier projects are more likely 
to have encountered opposition (Altshuler and Luberoff, 2003). Special interests (as 
	  
	  




project stimulus) might not sit well with the general population, either, when selecting a 
large-scale construction project. 
H3.3: There is less opposition to projects when national decision-makers are involved, 
than lower level decision-making. 
Model 1:  
Y = Ideological Opposition (V28) 
X = National Decision Makers (V52), Years of History (V26), Decade of Inception (V58), 
Project Stimulus (V19) 
In the model, y (ideological opposition) is a binary variable, impacted by national 
decision-makers and the control variables. I selected a binary logistic model first, 
because the outcome variable is binary, and because I don’t expect strong attenuation 
affects. In the second model I treated the binary as a scale variable to test a non-linear 
model. Table 8 displays the results of the model. Model 2 will be described in more detail 
below the table.  
Table 8: The Effects of National Decision Participation on Ideological Opposition (Binary 
Logistic and Non-linear Regression) 
List of Predictors Model 1 (logistic) Model 2 (non-linear) 
National Decision-Makers -2.185/ .112* -.337* 
Years of History -.021/ .979 (n.s.)  
Decade of Inception [grouped] -609/ .544*  
Project Stimulus (special 
inter.) 
.1262/ 3.531 (n.s.)  
Funding Type Bonds   .014*   
Funding Type Bonds squared  .054 (n.s.) (squared) 
Project Type Rail   
Constant -2.397/ 10.989 * .359** 
N  50 55 
Model Fit tests: .190/ .273 .125 
Displayed in Model 1: Beta/ Exp(B); Model fit tests: Cox & Snell R Square/ Nagelkerke R Square; Displayed 
in Model 2: Beta; Model Fit: Adjusted R Squared; *sig≤.05  **sig≤.01. 
Summary: National decision-makers affect ideological opposition negatively in both 
models. That is, the stronger the national level is involved, the weaker is ideological 
opposition to a project. Model 1 lists the log-odds and regression coefficients for further 
independent variables. While the history variable has no significant effect, the time a 
	  
	  




project has been considered, however, does: the younger a project, the less likely it is that 
it faces project opposition. The time is categorized by projects before 1990, those until 
1995, until 2000, and since. I may infer that projects are less contested now than they 
were in the past. Another variable, project stimulus (projects constructed because of 
special interests), is not significant. 
Model 2 includes a quadratic interaction (bonds) to account for a potential attenuation 
of the curve. 
Model 2: V28=a+b(V52)+c(V36)+d(V36)2 +error  
Y = Ideological Opposition (V28) 
X = National Decision Makers (V52), Funding Type: Bonds (V36) + Funding Type: 
Bonds2 
The model predicts that national decision-makers have a negative impact on project 
opposition. I included bond funding because (depending on country or state specific 
policies) bonds are usually outside the typical (and often contested) funding pots. Hence, 
I expect bond-type funding to have a negative impact on “political opposition,” and a 
positive impact on “ideological opposition.” While there was no indication that “political 
opposition” is affected (not displayed in the table), bond-funded projects more often face 
“ideological opposition” (.014*). The hypothesized exponential relationship was not 
confirmed. 
Statistical Quality: The quality of the statistical results in Table 1, Model 1 is good (see 
the ROC data presented in Appendix J). Model 2: The Shapiro-Wilk test for testing the 
normality of error is problematic (.000). That means the sample population is not 








4.3.4.	  In	  Summation	  
The results reported in Section 3 suggest the following effects for decision-making levels 
and transportation megaprojects: 
1. National level decision-makers in Anglo-Saxon countries are not 
significantly involved in infrastructure investment decisions (Table 6). Anglo-
Saxon countries are mostly federally organized, so decisions are more localized. In 
centralized countries infrastructure investment decisions are handled top down.  
2. National level projects face a lesser “ideological opposition” than projects 
involving other decision levels (Table 4.3.4), a finding that is complemented by the 
fact that inner-city projects face more opposition than projects of metropolitan, regional 
or national relevance (Table 6). To connect to point 1, Anglo-Saxon countries are more 
laissez-faire, at least compared to continental Europe (Esping-Andersen, 1999). Laissez-
faire decision-making might lead to stronger economic and other types of inequality (in 
this case, transportation access), which might inspire more opposition. On the other 
hand, a culture of opposition is also strongly developed in states like France, which are 
not within the laissez-faire group. For a conclusive statement, the association should be 
explored by case studies. 
3. The importance of national decision-making diminished over time, while 
local level decisions proliferated (Table 7). The Mann-Whitney U-Tests show that 
local decision-makers are associated with younger projects and national level decision-
makers with older projects. 
4. National level projects experience more cost overruns. Projects involving TA 
decision-makers experience fewer cost overruns (Table 7.). National level projects have 
longer construction times, which are positively associated with cost overruns (Pearson’s 
	  
	  





R .328*). The costs per km, interestingly, are higher for projects involving local decision-
makers. There are two likely explanations: first, the most expensive projects, which are 
tunnels (including subways) and multi-lane highways, are built in inner cities and often 
under (at least partial) local jurisdiction. Second, the projects going beyond local 
jurisdictions are not only less expensive because they are being built through less 
developed land. Railroads are overrepresented in the categories beyond city-limits, 
because they usually are projects of supra-regional significance with less local authority. 
4.4. Megaprojects and Transparency  
In this section I will focus on two variables: transparency and cost-benefit analyses 
(CBA), and their relationship with other variables. These two variables are presented 
together because for the purposes of this study they are related – CBAs are part of my 
transparency measure: if a CBA was not conducted, or conducted but not published, I 
assume the project does not meet transport-economic standards. There may be a variety 
of reasons for this, and political motivation is one of them.  
4.4.1.	  Notes	  about	  the	  Data	  
Transparency is an important aspect in the megaproject literature and cost-benefit 
analyses are being “routinely carried out as part of megaproject preparation” (Flyvbjerg 
et al. 2003, p. 5). By project transparency, I mean the degree to which project decisions 
are documented, decision criteria are clear, and the information publicly available. The 
transparency variable is a composite variable containing information about cost-benefit 
studies, environmental analyses, risk analyses and economic studies: the more 
documents are publicly available, the higher is the assigned transparency score. On this 
scale, 26% of all projects (16 projects) are not transparent, 38% medium transparent 
(23), and 37% in the upper ranks of transparency (23).  
	  
	  





Cost-benefit studies are (ideally) an important investment decision criterion. The cost-
benefit analysis variable is dichotomous, indicating the absence or presence of such a 
study. I only counted studies as “done” if they were publicly reported, and I also counted 
less rigorous studies. I did not find published systematic numbers for the proportions of 
transparent megaprojects accompanied by CBAs. The database provides a ratio of 
cost-benefit studies done or not done is at about 50 percent (N=60, studies 
done=27 (45%), not done=33 (55%)). If 50% CBA would be normal (binomial test: 
Z=.645, n.s.), this would be within the normal range – however, a quota of 50% cost-
benefit analyses conducted is very low. Although there is no established threshold in the 
literature, the number appears to be low. If I take partial or incomplete cost-
benefit analyses into account (N=60, studies done=21 (35%), partial=11 
(18%), not done=28 (47%)), the number of CBAs increases. I assume that the sample 
comes close to being an accurate representation of project decision-making in the real 
world. 
The transparency variable is a composite variable, so I cannot conduct a similar test 
here. I will explore what potentially affects the variables “transparency” and “CBA” and 
also how they affect various other variables. 
4.4.2.	  Exploring	  Relationships	  between	  the	  Variables	  
Transparency and cost-benefit analyses will serve both as explanatory variables and as 
dependent ones. I want to gauge what drives transparency, and how it impacts other 
variables, such as cost overrun. Only statistically significant results will be reported.  
Based in parts on the literature and in part on the analyses, I built several models that 
explore the role of transparency in megaproject decision-making. I will first list a set of 
hypotheses that guide the statistical tests, then present the most significant findings in 
	  
	  





subsequent tables, and then summarize the results and discuss them in the light of the 
hypotheses. Again, I use both parametric and non-parametric tests to account for the 
different data characteristics. In Table 9, I use the non-parametric Mann-Whitney U 
Tests to compare rail projects with non-rail projects, different types of project stimuli 
and decision-makers, and project opposition.  
H4.1: Rail projects are more transparent than highway projects. 
H4.2: Projects that arise from special occasions are less transparent. 
H4.3: Project transparency increases with the rank of the decision-maker.  
Table 9: Transparency, Cost-Benefit Analyses, and other Variables (Mann-Whitney U Tests) 
 Transparency (V50) Cost-Benefit 
Analyses (V41) 
  Variables U(df) Z N U(df) Z N 
H4.1 Project Type Rail  543 (1)* 2.131 60 n.a. 
H4.2 Stimulus/ Addendum  137 1)* 2.047 59 n.s. 
Decision-Makers: Provincial  584 1)* 2.610 50 n.s. H4.3 
Decision-Makers: National  244 1)* -1.965 59 n.s. 
Displayed: U=test statistic, df=degrees of freedom, Z= standardized coefficient, N=project count.; *sig≤.05  
**sig≤.01.; *** for Stimulus 5 there are only 3 observations in one category; n.s.: not significant; n.a.: not 
applicable. 
Summary of the Results: Rail projects (543, 2.131, sig≤.05), and provincial/regional 
level (.584, 2.610, sig≤.05) as well as national level projects (.244, -1.965, sig≤.05) are 
more transparent. Transparency is also positively associated with ideological project 
opposition (573, 3.230, sig≤.01), and with network expansion projects (137, 20.47, 
sig≤.05) - although there are only few observations. Cost-benefit analyses play a larger 
role in “crisis and opportunity” projects (517, 2.112, sig≤.05) and with 
provincial/regional decision-makers (564, 2.310, sig≤.05).  
H4.1: Rail projects are more transparent than highway projects. Rail projects are 
indeed more transparent than non-rail projects (543, 2.131, sig≤.05). They are the only 
project type with a significant association to transparency. 
H4.2: Projects that arise from special occasions are less transparent. The hypothesis 
was not confirmed. Instead, when testing for other project stimuli it turns out that 
	  
	  





projects that are additions to already existing networks have better transparency 
indicators than projects being built for other reasons. 
H4.3: Project transparency increases with the rank of the decision-makers. The 
hypothesis was not confirmed. Transparency is actually higher on regional/ provincial 
levels (.584, 2.610, sig≤.05) and significantly lower when national decision-makers are 
involved (244, -1.965, sig≤.05). Project documentation on regional decision levels might 
be more public because funding applications to higher levels of decision-makers often 
require such documentation. 
Further tests are presented in Table 10, guided by the following hypotheses: 
H4.4: The wealthier a country, the more transparent are its projects.  
H4.5: Projects in centralized countries are more transparent than in federalist 
countries. 
H4.6: Entirely new projects are more likely to have CBAs than network expansion 
projects. 
H4.7: The less transparent a project, the more protest potential is there.  
H4.8: Project transparency affects project success (here, cost overruns) negatively. 
H4.9: Inner-city projects are more typically based on cost-benefit analyses. 
Table 10: Transparency, Cost-Benefit Analyses, and other Variables (Pearson’s and 
Spearman’s Correlations) 







H4.4 GDP PPP 2010  .431** 60 .261* 60 
H4.5 Political System  -.296* 60   
H4.6 Description  -.258* 60 n.s. 
Opp: political .330* 59 .267* 59 H4.7 
Opp: ideological .424** 59 .338* 59 
H4.9 Inner-City    .287* 60 
Values: Pearson’s R for H4.4, H4.5, and H4.9; Spearman’s correlations for H4.6 and H4.7; *sig≤.05  
**sig≤.01; n.s. = not significant. 
Summary: Decision-making transparency is higher in wealthier countries (.431, 
sig≤.01), and more cost-benefit analyses are being conducted there (.261, sig≤.05). The 
decision process is more transparent in federalist countries (-.296, sig≤.05) than in 
centralized ones. Transparency is lower (-.258, sig≤.05) in network expansion projects (-
	  
	  





.300, sig≤.05) than in newer projects. Interestingly, transparency and cost-benefit 
analyses are positively correlated with political opposition (.330, sig≤.05 and .267, 
sig≤.05 respectively) and with ideological opposition (.424, sig≤.01 and .338, sig≤.05). 
Finally, cost-benefit analyses are more likely in inner-city projects (.287, sig≤.05) than 
for projects with a larger range. 
H4.4: The wealthier a country, the more transparent are its projects. The hypothesis 
was confirmed: wealthy countries are associated with more transparent 
project implementation (.431, sig≤.01; more cost-benefit analyses: (.261, sig≤.05)).  
H4.5: Projects in centralized countries are more transparent than in federalist 
countries. The hypothesis was not confirmed. Projects in federalist countries are more 
transparent than projects in centralized countries (-.296, sig≤.05). The comparatively 
large number of U.S. projects (a federalist country) in the database is one possible 
reason. The U.S. has strict environmental impact analyses requirements for projects with 
federal funding. This is also consistent with the finding above that sub-national decision-
making is more transparent. 
H4.6: Entirely new projects are more likely to have CBAs than extensions to 
existing networks. The hypothesis was confirmed. There is lower project 
transparency in add-on projects to already existing networks (transparency: -.258, 
sig≤.05; the relationship refers to the “description” variable that measures whether a 
project is a new or stand-alone project, or an addition to an existing one). New projects 
are under more justification pressure because they have not been tested (at least in the 
respective area). They might also have no supporters, yet. Third, network additions 
produce network benefits that ease the justification process. (Also see Section 5.) 
	  
	  





H4.7: The less transparent a project, the more protest potential is there. Project 
transparency and opposition are clearly associated, but it is unclear what was first: (a 
lack of) project documentation, or opposition. I selected the hypothesis for further 
analysis below.  
H4.8: Project transparency affects project success (here, cost overruns) negatively. 
Cost benefit analyses are more easily available (and conducted) for inner-city projects 
than for projects that reach beyond.  
H4.9: Inner-city projects are more typically based on cost-benefit analyses. The data 
confirms the hypothesis. 
4.4.3.	  Regression	  Models	  
To assess the influence of the contextual variable GDP on transparency (as observed in 
Table 7), a linear model is used. I hypothesize that a higher GDP correlates with 
increased transparency because more funding might be available to conduct project 
studies (at least in capitalist democracies), and more planning and implementation 
practice, too. Also, wealth correlates with a degree of democratization, and policy 
requirements in richer countries may be more publicly oriented and stricter.  
The first model focuses on the effects of Gross Domestic Product/ Purchasing Power 
Parity (GDP PPP) and of funding sources on transparency. I assume a linear relationship 
because I do not expect a particular threshold of wealth to make a difference. The 
hypothesis is given as: 
Hypothesis 4.2: The wealthier a country, the more transparency in project decision-
making. 
Model 1: Y(V50)=a+b(V5)+c(V12)+error 
Y = Project Transparency (V50) 
	  
	  





X = GDP PPP (V5), Project Type (V12) 
The linear model (Model 1) includes a variety of independent variables based on the 
literature and correlation results above. The results are presented in Table 11.  
Table 11: Structural Effects on Project Transparency (Linear and Non-Linear Regressions)  
All models show that GDP PPP indeed increases transparency, although the effect is not 
strong. Model 1 explains variation in transparency best: GDP PPP (.012, sig≤.01), 
highway (.329, sig≤.05) and rail projects (.207, sig≤.05) predict transparency.  
Model 2 confirms the main causalities of Model 1.  
Model 2: Y(V50)=a+b(V5)+c(V11)+d(V52)+error 
Y = Project Transparency (V50) 
X = GDP PPP (V5), Project Description (V11), Project Type (V12) 
I added project location (whether a project is an inner-city project or ranging beyond 
that) to Model 2, but the added effect was not significant. 
Model 3 holds that a country’s wealth and the participation of local decision-makers 
increases project transparency. I chose a quadratic model because it best fit the data. 
Model 3: Y(V50)=a+b(V5)2+(V52)+error 
Y = Project Transparency (V50) 
List of 
Predictors 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
GDP PPP .012** .011**  .001** (squared) .011** 
Project Location  n.s.   
Project Type: 
highway 
.256* .284*  .255* 
Project Type: rail .148* .185*  n.s. 
Project 
Description 
   n.s. 
Decision-Makers: 
local 
  -1.085**  
Constant -.026 -.086  .180 
N  60 59 59 59 
Model Fit .255 .261 .261 .261 
Values: Beta; *sig≤.05  **sig≤.01, Model fit: Adjusted R Squared; n.s. = not significant. 
	  
	  





X = GDP PPP (V5) squared, Decision-Makers (V52) 
The rationale behind the hypothesis is that decision-makers on the local level are better 
informed about local transportation needs and need to document them better to 
convince the immediate constituencies and potential funders. However, the established 
relationship is negative: when local decision-makers are involved in project 
implementation, project transparency declines (-.243, sig≤.05). The model fit is at 23.3 
percent, which is strong for a social science association. In Table 10, I observed that 
project transparency is positively correlated with federalist countries, so transparency is 
larger there. However, the main input variables are correlated as well, rendering the 
results not very useful. 
Model 4 adds project type and the description variable as an independent variable.  
Model 4: Y(V50)=a+b(V5)+c(V12)+d(V11)+error 
Y = Project Transparency (V50) 
X = GDP PPP (V5), Project Type (V12), Project Description (V11) 
Though GDP is still significant (.011, sig≤.01), and the highway variable as well (.294, 
sig≤.05), rail projects and the description variables – while impacting the model fit – are 
not significant. 
Quality of the Statistical Results: All results are ok, except for the lack of fit test for 
Model 3, which is too low. Linear models describe the relationship better than squared 
ones.30  
H4.8: Project transparency affects project success (here, cost overruns) negatively. 
Though the bivariate tests did not show significant associations, the literature 
hypothesizes that transparency and cost overrun are related (most prominently: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 For more detail see Appendix J. 
	  
	  





Flyvbjerg et al., 2003, Berechman, 2009). Hence I continue the analysis. Adding 
additional variables to the model, I expect project success to increase (or cost overruns to 
decrease) when CBAs are conducted. Originally, I chose a logistic regression model 
(Model 1), because I assume a binary outcome: cost overrun or not. Since private funding 
serves as an indicator for improved project outcomes, I added it as independent variable. 
Because some types of projects are more prone to cost overruns than others (tunnel 
projects), I control for project types, too. If the hypothesis were correct, I would expect 
that, in the presence of CBAs, decent transparency and private funding projects 
experience fewer cost overruns. But there were no significant results.31  
Model 1a:  
Y = Project Success Variables: Cost Overrun (V33) 
X = Cost-Benefit Analysis (V41), Private Funding (V35), Project Type (V12) 
 
Model 1b:  
Y = Project Success Variables: Cost Overrun (V33) 
X = Transparency (V50), Private Funding (V35), Project Type (V12) 
There were no significant results, even when testing other model specifications. 32 The 
data do not reveal that the presence or absence of cost-benefit analyses, and the degree 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 I also tested for effects on the degree of cost overrun, but there were no significant associations. 
32 I tested the following linear and quadratic specifications. None of them produced significant results: 
 
Model 2a: Y(V33)=a+b(V41)+c(V35)+d(V12)+error 
Y = Project Success Variables: Cost Overrun (V33) 
X = Cost Benefit Analysis (V41), Private Funding (V35), Project Type (V12) 
 
Model 2b: Y(V33)=a+b(V50)+c(V35)+d(V12)+error 
Y = Project Success Variables: Cost Overrun (V33) 
X = Transparency (V50), Private Funding (V35), Project Type (V12) 
 
Model 3a: Y(V33)=a+b(V41)+c(V35)+d(V35)2+(V12)+error 
Y = Project Success Variables: Cost Overrun (V33) 
X = Cost Benefit Analysis (V41), Private Funding (V35), Project Type (V12) 
 
Model 3b: Y(V33)=a+b(V50)+c(V35)+d(V35)2+(V12)+error 
	  
	  





of transparency, significantly impacted project cost overrun. I conclude that such an 
association cannot be captured with my data. 
H4.7: Project transparency affects project opposition: the less transparent a project, 
the more protest potential there is.  
Because the dependent variable is a binary, I chose a binary logistic model to evaluate 
the effect of project transparency on project opposition. 
Model 1:  
Y = Project Opposition: Ideological Opposition (V28) 
X = Transparency (V50), Project Location (V11), Funding Types (V36)  
This produced the following results: 
Table 12: Impact of Transparency on Ideological Project Opposition (binary logistic 
regressions) 
   List of    
Predictors Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Transparency 1.644/ 5.178**  5.519/ 245**  4.732/ 113.4**  3.919/ 50.354** 
Inner City 2.023/ 7.565* 1.754/ 5.780* 1.562/ 4.768 * 1.764/ 5.833* 
Project 
Description   n.s.  
Project Type    n.s. (rail) 
Funding Type: 
grants -.025/ .975*    
Funding Type: 
Gov’t Loans -.037/ .964*    
Stakeholders: 
private  1.585/ 4.879*   
   Constant -4.267/ .014* -5.340/ .005** -4.152/.016* -3.760/ .023* 
   N  53 59 59 59 
   Model Fit .358/ .507 .295/ 412 .252/ .353 .248/ .347 
Values: Beta/ Exp(B); Model fit: Cox & Snell R Square/ Nagelkerke R Square; *sig≤.05  **sig≤.01; n.s.=not significant. 
Summary: All models confirm that transparency impacts project opposition, but not in 
the hypothesized direction. The results for Model 1 show that transparency significantly 
affects opposition (1.644 / 5.178, sig≤.01) by increasing it. The positive impact of inner-
city projects on opposition (2.023/ 7.565, sig≤.05; meaning more opposition in inner-
cities) strengthens the relationship. I added project location as a factor, because 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Y = Project Success Variables: Cost Overrun (V33) 









construction projects in dense urban areas affect more people than elsewhere and may 
thus provoke them to protest more easily, especially when some groups are 
disproportionately affected (Altshuler and Luberoff, 2003). Further, public grants (-
.025/ .975, sig≤.05) and government loans (-.037/ .964, sig≤.05) reduce project 
opposition. The model fit is a bit over 35%. I may conclude that if projects are not 
transparent and are additionally located in urban areas, they are likely to encounter 
protests. Government’s grant and loan-funded projects, on the other hand, diminish 
opposition risk. 
Model 2:  
Y = Project Opposition: Ideological Opposition (V28) 
X = Transparency (V50), Project Location (V11), Stakeholders (V51)  
Model 2 hypothesizes that in addition to transparency (squared to test for an attenuating 
effect) and inner city location, the participation of private stakeholders increases the 
odds of ideological opposition further. With 30%, the model fit is good enough to 
conclude that private sector participation plays a role in creating “ideological” project 
opposition. 
Model 3:  
Y = Project Opposition: Ideological Opposition (V28) 
X = Transparency (V50), Project Location (V11), Project Description (V18)  
Model 3 is a non-linear logistic model that includes transparency (squared), project 
location, and the status of a project within a network as independent variables. 
	  
	  





Transparency and inner-city location are significant indicators again, while V18 is not. 
The model fit is 25%. 
Model 4:  
Y = Project Opposition: Ideological Opposition (V28) 
X = Transparency (V50), Project Location (V11), Project Type (V12)  
In Model 4, I replaced the “project description” variable with project type, but here, too, 
while the transparency and project location associations remain, the project type does 
not add an additional significant element to explain project opposition. The model fit 
slightly decreases. 
The relationship between the transparency and the opposition variable is positive in all 
models, which rejects the hypothesis. I will discuss this finding in the summary of this 
section. 
Statistical Quality: The quality of the statistical result ranges between fair and good. 
In terms of statistical quality, Model 1 is the best model.33 
4.4.4.	  In	  Summation	  
There are three main findings. 
1. According to the first two sets of correlations and non-parametric tests, the 
transparency “landscape” is as follows: project decision-making is more transparent in 
wealthy than in poorer countries; rail projects are more transparent than highway, 
tunnel or other projects; and there are more cost-benefit analyses done for inner-city 
projects than for others. Further, I also found that greater project transparency is 
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associated with more project opposition (addressed in point 3, below); projects in 
centralized countries and with national decision-makers are less transparent; and 
entirely new projects (not extensions of existing networks) are also less transparent. 
2a. Transparency increases with a nation’s wealth. Based on the parametric tests 
in Table 12., the decision-making process of highway and railway projects is better 
documented in wealthier countries. Government grants and loans do not raise project 
transparency norms but appear to diminish them.  
2b. Project transparency and cost-benefit analyses do not impact project performance. 
But the more transparent a project, the more project opposition exists.  
3. That raises the question of directionality: since it is not unusual for megaproject 
planning and implementation processes to run more than ten years it is difficult to 
determine which variable is a cause, and which is effect: project opposition may occur 
either before or after a study was conducted. The data suggests allows speculating about 
opposition being the catalyst for project studies or the result of their absence. In this 
sense, the transparency results are inconclusive. 
4.5. The Nature of Funding: Funding Sources 
This section examines the nature of project funding and associations with project 
decision-making factors. The nature of funding for a project has political implications 
because funding sources determine the decision-makers. Funding sources are also 
indicative of the local or national significance of a project.  
4.5.1.	  Notes	  about	  the	  Data	  
The funding sources variable distinguishes between local, and provincial funding 
sources, transportation authority funding, and national, international and private 
	  
	  





funding sources by determining the respective percentage of the funding source of the 
total project cost.  
Local funding sources: mean 5.25 (St.D. 12.9, Min .00, Max. 73), N=55 projects (of 60). 
Provincial funding sources: 9.09 (St.D. 19.55, Min .00, Max. 100), N=55 projects. 
Transportation Authority: 12.01 (St.D. 12.01, Min. 00, Max. 98), N=55 projects. 
National funding: 37.73 (St.D. 32.79, Min. 00, Max. 100), N=56 projects. 
International funding: 4.86 (St.D. 10.73, Min. .00, Max. 50), N=55 projects. 
Private funding: 29.7 (St.D. 35.45, Min. .00, Max. 100), N=57 projects. 
The comparatively high values of the standard deviations reflect that funding sources for 
megaprojects are really diverse. For instance, there are fully privately funded projects in 
the database (like Australia’s City Link), a project that is fully funded by national sources 
(the Frejus Road Tunnel in Italy), and one nearly completely by transportation agencies 
(AirTrain JFK). On the other hand there are projects were multiple funding sources are 
evenly spread. The missing projects are results of non-transparent decision-making. The 
frequency distribution in Figure 8 provides more detail: 
 
Figure 8: Average Project Funding by Funding Source (in %) 
 
It may be seen that the darkest columns, national funding sources, dominate all but the 



























the 20-40% range, in the 60-80% range, and nearly most of the fully nationally funded 
projects, competing only with privately funded ones. 
4.5.2	  Relationships	  between	  the	  Variables	  
I tested a range of associations that contain project funding. The hypotheses below guide 
them. 
H5.1: The wealthier a country, the more resources of funding are available at the 
national level.   
H5.2: Local funding sources became more important over time. 
H5.2.1: The mix of funding sources (or funding complexity) increases over time. 
H5.3: Projects underwritten with national funding will take longer to implement. 
H5.4: Projects underwritten with national funding will experience more cost overruns. 
H5.5: The more national funding, the better the projects meet utilization goals. 
H5.6: Projects underwritten with private funding will experience fewer cost overruns 
or better utilization ratios. 
H5.7: When special interests are involved in project decision-making, the funding 
sources become more complex. 
Table 13: Funding Sources (Pearson’s Correlations) 
Summary: The table shows that a country’s wealth correlates positively with regional 
funding sources (.287, sig≤.05) and negatively with international funding sources (-.283, 
sig≤.05). This indicates that the wealthier a country the more funding sources come from 
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the regional level, and also that wealthy countries use fewer international funding 
sources. The number of locally funded projects (like local decision-makers above) 
increased over time (.245, sig≤.05), and so did the number of funding sources in general 
(.313, sig≤.05). The latter indicates the diminishing importance of national governments 
for infrastructure investment.  
Projects underwritten with national funding have longer completion (.225, sig≤.05) and 
in construction times (.402, sig≤.05). (Project construction time decreases, however, 
when private funding is involved (-.216, sig≤.05).) Nationally funded projects experience 
larger cost overruns (.232, sig≤.05), but their utilization ratio is better than for projects 
without national funding (.275, sig≤.05). Cost overrun is negatively associated with 
regional funders (-.249, sig≤.05) and positively with international funders (.382, 
sig≤.05) – meaning that projects with international funding more often run over budget. 
Finally, “special interests” as project stimuli are correlated with increased funding 
complexity (number of funding sources) (.300, sig≤.05). 
H5.1: The wealthier a country, the more funding sources are available nationally. 
There is no significant association between national funding sources and wealth, so the 
hypothesis was not confirmed. Instead, a country’s wealth correlates positively with 
regional funding sources (.287, sig≤.05) and negatively with international funding 
sources (-.283, sig≤.05). That the wealthiest country in the dataset, the U.S., is also a 
federalist country and with 12 out of 60 cases disproportionately represented, might 
explain the first association. The large number of wealthy European countries that build 
supranational infrastructure (European funding pots are counted as international here) 
possibly drive the association between “wealth” and “international funding sources.”  
	  
	  





H5.2: Local funding sources became more important over time. I determined 
a change over time by capturing in which decade the main implementation work took 
place and then using the year of inception as indicator.34 Then I correlated these two 
time indicators with the share of local funding sources. The hypothesis was 
confirmed: I find that local funding sources (like local decision-makers above) 
increased over time (.245, sig≤.05). This corresponds with Altshuler/Luberoff’s 
hypothesis of the devolution of infrastructure responsibilities (in the U.S.) (Altshuler and 
Luberoff, 2003). 
H5.2.1: The number of funding sources (or funding complexity) increases over time. 
The hypothesis was confirmed (.313, sig≤.05), further illustrating the diminishing 
importance of national funding for infrastructure investment. 
H5.3: Projects underwritten with national funding will take longer to implement. 
Projects underwritten with national funding take longer to construct (.402, sig≤.05) and 
complete (.225, sig≤.05). The hypothesis is confirmed. 
H5.4: Projects underwritten with national funding will experience more cost overruns. 
The data confirms the hypothesis (.232, sig≤.05).  
H5.5: The more national funding, the better the projects meet utilization goals. The 
utilization ratio of nationally funded projects is better than the ratio for projects without 
national funding (.275, sig≤.05). The hypothesis was confirmed. I will discuss this below. 
H5.6: Projects underwritten with private funding will experience fewer cost overruns 
or better utilization ratios. The hypothesis was not confirmed. But construction times 
decrease when private funding is involved (-.216, sig≤.05). That could either reflect 
private sector efficiency or the tendency of the private sector to select lower-risk projects. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 See Appendix B for more detail. 
	  
	  





H5.7: When special interests are involved in project decision-making, the funding 
sources become more complex. The data confirms the hypothesis. When “special 
interests” appear to be among the project stimulus sources, funding complexity (number 
of funding sources) increases (.300, sig≤.05). This may indicate that the projects are not 
the most transport-economically beneficial or seek socio-politically equal access to 
transportation. 
In the following, I conducted non-parametric tests.  
H5.9: Project funding varies by region (like continent, or culture). 
H5.10: Inner-city projects, because of their limited reach, are less likely to receive 
international funding. 
H5.11: Funding sources impact project opposition types.  
H5.12: The type of funding and the availability of a cost-benefit analysis for a given 
project determine the general degree of project support (measured by the absence of 
opposition). 
H5.13: Rail projects are less likely to be privately funded than any other project type. 
The results of the hypotheses are displayed in Table 14, and discussed below. 
	  
	  





Table 14: Funding Sources (Mann-Whitney U Tests) 




National International Private Number of 
Sources 







 512 (1)* 2.298 
(55) 










Australia   22 (1)** -2.621 
(55) 











  150 (1)* -2.577 
(54) 










































462 (1)* 2.012 
(55) 
Values: U=test statistic, df=degrees of freedom, Z= standardized coefficient, N=project count;*sig≤.05  **sig≤.01. 
	  
	  





Summary: European infrastructure projects are more nationally (.512, 2.298, sig≤.05) 
and internationally (.538, 3.658, sig≤.05) funded. There are fewer sub-national/ regional 
level investments (.265, -2082, sig≤.05). Further, the role of international funding is 
particularly low in Asia (2135, -2.298, sig≤.05). In Australian projects, national funding 
does not play a large role (22, -2.621, sig≤.01), and the number of funding sources is low 
(23, -2.657, sig≤.01). In North America, transportation agencies tend to be more 
involved (366, 2.688, sig≤.01) and international funding is low (150, -2.577, sig≤.05). 
As expected, international funding sources only play a small role in inner city project 
funding (301, -.980, sig≤.05). Further, there is more (political) opposition to projects 
that involve regional funding than to projects involving other funding sources (301, -
.642, sig≤.05). There is less (ideological) opposition where international funding is 
involved (213, -2.182, sig≤.05). (For the different types of opposition, see Appendix B.) 
Finally, I found that rail projects positively correlate with transportation agency funding 
resources (472, 2.692, sig≤.01) but negatively with private ones (226, -2.332, sig≤.05). 
Interestingly, rail projects also have a larger number of funding sources than projects of 
other types (462, 2.012, sig≤.05). 
H5.9: Project funding varies by region (like continent, or culture). Unsurprisingly, 
provincial funding sources are not as common in Europe (where states are often 
centralized and transportation often organized on a national level) (.265, -2082, 
sig≤.05). National funding sources are particularly strong in Europe (.512, 2.298, 
sig≤.05) and rare in Australia (22, -2.621, sig≤.01). Transportation agency funding is 
strong in North America (366, 2.688, sig≤.01). International funds are least used in Asia 
(2135, -2.298, sig≤.05) and North America (150, -2.577, sig≤.05) and most often in 
Europe (.538, 3.658, sig≤.05) (due to European Union funds). There are no particular 
	  
	  





findings with respect to private sources. Insofar as there are significant associations, all 
have to do with macro-political organization factors. 
H5.10: Inner-city projects, because of their limited reach, are less likely to receive 
international funding. International funding sources indeed do not play much of a role 
for inner-city projects (301, -.980, sig≤.05). One likely explanation is that inner-city 
projects are usually embedded in different layers of funding options, such as city, 
regional, or national funding pots, and a city is barely divided among two countries that 
would provide funding. Further, inner city project decision makers are less likely to be in 
international funding opportunity networks. 
H5.11: Funding sources impact project opposition types. The hypothesis was confirmed. 
There is more (political) opposition to projects that receive regional funding than to 
projects involving other funding sources (301, -.642, sig≤.05) and less (ideological) 
opposition where international funding is involved (213, -2.182, sig≤.05). 
H5.12: The type of funding and the availability of a cost-benefit analysis for a given 
project determine the general degree of project support (measured by the absence of 
opposition). The hypothesis was not confirmed.  
H5.13: Rail projects are less likely to be privately funded than any other project type. 
The hypothesis was confirmed. Unlike other project types, rail projects are often funded 
by respective transportation agencies (472, 2.692, sig≤.01) and much less by private 
sources (226, -2.332, sig≤.05). Also, rail projects appear to have, on average, a larger 
variety of funding sources than other project types (462, 2.012, sig≤.05). 
4.5.3.	  Regression	  Models	  
Since there is a lot of discussion about the impact of private vs. public sources, 
particularly with respect to efficiency, I examined possible associations in more detail 
	  
	  





(Donahue and Nye, 2002). I hypothesize that funding sources impact the degree of cost 
overrun: 
H5.4: Projects underwritten with national or private funding will experience cost 
overruns. 
In Models 1a and 1b I used a simple linear regression model to see whether the amount 
of national or private funding impacts project performance.  
Model 1a: V33=a+b(V35)+c(V12)+error  
Y = Cost Overrun (V33) 
X = National Funding (V35), Project Type (V12) 
 
Model 1b: V33=a+b(V35)+c(V12)+error 
Y = Cost Overrun (V33) 
X = Private Funding (V35), Project Type (V12) 
Although correlated (Table 13), the results from the regression models show no 
association between private funding/national funding sources and cost overruns, when 
adding project type as control variable. Again, I tried several model specifications, 
because a quadratic function is possible, none of which produced any significant 
results.35 Thus a relationship between funding sources and cost overrun could not be 
conclusively established. 
H5.3 Projects are completed faster when private funding sources are involved than 
with national funding sources. 
As indicated in Table 13, private and national funding sources are important indicators 
for project completion time. Hence, I ran the models with both private funding sources 
(Models 1a and 2a) and national funding (Models 1b and 2b). I selected a binary logistic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Model 2 is a quadratic function, to account for possible attenuated curves, followed by binary regressions. 









model36 because I was interested in the general trend. Using a scale instead of a binary 
variable would not have made a difference. 
Model 1:  
Y = Years to Completion (V24) 
X = Private funding (V35), Project Type (V12) 
Table 15. displays the results of different variations of the Logit model. 
Table 15: Funding Sources and Project Type Predict Part of the Variation in Project Years to 
Completion (Binary Logistic Regressions) 
List of Predictors Model 1a Model 2a Model 1b Model 2b 
 Private National 
Source of Funding -.026/ .974* -.303/ .971* .021/ 1.021* .021/ 1.022* 
Project Type: Rail -1.626/ .197*  n.s.  
Project Type: 
Tunnel 
 1.717/ 5.566*  n.s. 
Location: Regional   n.s.   
DM: Local     
Constant 1.570/ 4.808* .034/ 1.035 -.531/ .588 -1.098/ .043 
N  48 48 47 47 
Model Fit .124/ .166 .170/ .226 .106/ .141 .129/ .172 
Values: Beta/ Exp(B); Model fit: Cox & Snell R Square/ Nagelkerke R Square; *sig≤.05  **sig≤.01, 
DM=decision-makers. 
Summary: In Table 15 the results for Models 1a and 2a clearly show that the source of 
funding impacts project completion years. If private funding sources are involved, 
completion times goes down (-.026/ .974, sig≤.05). National funding sources are 
associated with longer completion times (.021/ 1.021, sig≤.05). The project type is only 
significant in Model 2a (-1.626/ .107, sig≤.05).  
Model 1b:  
Y = Years to Completion (V24) 
X = Private funding (V35), Project Type (V12): rail 
Model 2b:  
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Y = Years to Completion (V24) 
X = Private funding (V35), Project Type (V12): tunnel 
The results for Model 1b vary by project type. The results from Model 2a show that the 
project completion time decreases with private funding (-.303/ .971, sig≤.05) and – not 
surprisingly – increases for tunnel projects. Model 2b shows that project completion 
time goes up for nationally funded projects (.021/ 1.022, sig≤.05), but whether these are 
tunnel projects or not is insignificant.  
Additionally, I was interested in location effects on project completion time (because I 
assume the more jurisdictions are involved or people are affected, the more potential for 
complicated project implementation). The results, in all cases, were insignificant. One of 
the models (Model 2a) is displayed below, though, because including the regional 
location variable positively affected the model fit. In this case, the model explains 17 
percent of the affect on project completion (Cox & Snell R  of .170). 
Quality of Statistical Results: The quality of the statistical results ranges between 
poor (Models 1a and 1b) and fair (Models 2a and 2b). Details may be viewed in 
Appendix J.  
4.5.4.	  In	  Summation	  
With respect to funding sources, the following patterns emerge:  
1. The data reconfirms the results of Section 2: national level and international 
funding sources play a larger role in European infrastructure decisions. The 
finding also echoes the results from Section 3, which concerned the heightened role of 
national decision-makers in Europe, where the close proximity of European countries 
promotes border-crossing infrastructure projects and hence international funding.  
	  
	  





2. Provincial funding sources play less of a role in Europe. International funders do not 
contribute much in Australia and North America, probably because of wealth and 
geographical reasons in both cases. The South American projects all have international 
funders (but the association should not be overstated: I have only three South American 
projects). North American projects receive much funding from transportation agencies, 
which confirms the particular political patterns in the U.S. Projects in wealthier 
countries and inner-city projects have fewer international funding sources. Rail projects 
are negatively associated with private funding. 
3. Funding complexity and the importance of local funding sources increase over time 
and across countries. 
4. Project success measures: project correlations show that cost overruns increase with 
national and international funding (not confirmed in the regression analyses), and 
decrease when underwritten with provincial funding sources. But then, nationally 
funded projects also take longer to construct and to complete (confirmed by the 
regression models), but also better meet funding projections. Different explanations are 
possible: 
(i) National governments are more likely to take on complex and expensive projects. 
However, different projects could fall into this category: huge prestige projects like the 
Channel Tunnel Rail Link, or Øresund Bridge. Who would fund them if not national 
governments? Both projects are also utilized reasonably well. 
(ii) National governments take on disproportionately cost-inefficient projects. Nationally 
funded projects perform worse than projects funded by other sources in all measures 
except project utilization.  
	  
	  





5. I was not able to conclusively confirm whether private vs. national sector funding 
makes a difference for project efficiency. 
4.6. Nature of Funding: Funding Types 
4.6.1.	  Notes	  about	  the	  Data	  
There are five funding type categories: grants, bonds, equity, government loans, and 
other. As with funding sources, they are given as percentages of total funding: 
Grants: mean: 39.28 (St.D. 35.98, Min. .00, Max. 100), N=57 projects (of 60). 
Bonds: 36.49 (St.D. 31.69, Min. .00, Max. 100), N=56 projects. 
Equity: 8.99 (St.D. 14.46, Min. .00, Max. 67.5), N=55 projects. 
Government loans: 5.79 (St.D. 14.3, Min. .00, Max. 77), N=57 projects. 
Other: 11.17 (St.D. 21.98, Min. .00, Max. 75), N=54 projects. 
Non-transparent project documentation caused the missing projects. A more detailed 
frequency distribution was displayed in Figure 8 above. Figure 8 showed that equity, 
government loans and other funding types are providing the smaller portions of project 
funding (0-20%), while grants and bonds are those funding types that may fully fund 
projects (80-100%). 
4.6.2.	  Relationships	  between	  Variables	  
The hypotheses are given as follows. 
H5.13 GDP impacts funding types. 
H5.14 The nature of project funding impacts project-related factors like construction 
time.  
H5.15 The nature of project funding impacts project utilization ratios.  
H5.16 Projects with equity funding are more often canceled than projects with other 
types of funding. 
Table 16: Funding Types (Parametric Tests – Pearson’s Correlations) 
  Grants Equity 
H5.1
3 
GDP 2010  -.443** (55) 
 GDP 2000  -.359** (55) 





.407** (51) -.362** (51) 
	  
	  





Summary of the correlation results: The higher the GDP, the fewer projects are 
funded through equity funding, the data suggests (-.443/ -.359/ -.439, sig≤.01). Equity 
funding is also (negatively) correlated with construction time (-.362, sig≤.01) and project 
utilization (-.357, sig≤.05). In the first case, that means that equity-funded projects have 
shorter construction times, but their actual use falls systematically behind the 
projections. Equity funding is also associated with project cancellations (.279, sig≤.05).  
Also, grant funding and construction time are positively associated (.407, sig≤.01): grant 
funded projects have longer construction times. 
H5.13 GDP impacts funding types. Equity funding is strongly associated with GDP: the 
richer a country, the fewer equity financed projects (-.443/ -.359/ -.439, sig≤.01). This is 
an interesting finding, and I will explore it in a regression analysis below. 
H5.14&3.15&3.16: The nature of project funding impacts project-related factors like 
construction time and project utilization ratios. Equity funding is associated with more 
successful projects – i.e., projects with short construction times (-.362, sig≤.01), and also 
with projects that do not meet their projected user numbers (-.357, sig≤.05). It is also 
associated with project cancellations (.279, sig≤.05). Further, construction times 
increase for projects that receive government grants (.407, sig≤.01).  
H5.17 Funding types differ across the world – e.g., government grants are most 
common in Europe. 
H5.18 Funding types differ across projects – e.g., it is atypical for rail projects to be 
financed by bonds. 
H5.19 Funding types affect project opposition – i.e., private funding is more associated 










 .279* (55) 
Values: Pearson’s R (and number of projects); *sig≤.05  **sig≤.01. 
	  
	  





Table 17: Non-Parametric Tests Funding Types (Mann-Whitney U Test) 
 
 Grants Bonds Equity Government Loans Other 
 U (df) Z (N) U (df) Z (N) U (df) Z (N) U (df) Z (N) U (df) Z (N) 







  169 (1)** 3.239 (54)  
Asia   356  (1)** 2.659   
H5.17 
North America  151 (1)* -2.021 
(56) 
  325 (1)* 2.308 
(54) 
H5.18 Rail    202 (1)* -2.494 
(56) 
 407 (1)* 2.151 (54) 
Issue-oriented 
Opp. 
 532 (1)* 2.635 
(55) 
   H5.19 
No Opposition 391 (1)* 2.196 
(56) 
   178 (1)* -2.046 
(53) 
Values: U=test statistic, df=degrees of freedom, Z= standardized coefficient, N=project count;*sig≤.05  **sig≤.01. 
	  
	  





Summary of non-parametric tests in Table 17: Equity funding is a less common 
funding instrument in Europe (231, -2.723, sig≤.01) than on other continents. In 
Australia, government loans dominate over other funding types (169, 3.239, sig≤.01), 
while grant funding is less prevalent (26, -2.540, sig≤.01). Asian projects have a larger 
share of equity funding (356, 2.659, sig≤.05). North American projects use less bond 
funding (151, -2.021, sig≤.05) but “other” funding types (325, 2.308, sig≤.05). Rail 
projects are rarely funded through equity-type funding (202, -2.494, sig≤.05) and more 
through “other” types (407, 2.151, sig≤.05). Bond funding is more associated with issue-
oriented opposition (532/ 2.653, sig≤.05). Grant-funded projects (391/ 2.196, sig≤.05) 
experience less project opposition, while “other” funding types are associated with more 
(178/ -2.046, sig≤.05).  
H5.17 Government grants are most common in Europe. The non-parametric tests fail to 
confirm the specific hypothesis. But they do confirm regional differences: Australian 
projects are less likely to be funded by government grants (26, -2.540, sig≤.01) and more 
by government loans (169, 3.239, sig≤.01) than projects in other countries. North 
America has comparatively little bond funding (151, -2.021, sig≤.05). Equity funding is 
more typical in Asian countries (356, 2.659, sig≤.05), while the opposite is the case in 
Europe (231, -2.723, sig≤.01). While this is interesting, there are probably a lot of factors 
weighing on funding type decisions. 
H5.18 Funding types differ across projects – e.g., it is atypical for rail projects to be 
financed by bonds. Compared to other projects, rail projects are not typically funded by 
equity funding (202, -2.494, sig≤.05) and more by “other” funding types (407, 2.151, 
sig≤.05). Therefore the hypothesis was confirmed. One possible reason is that railroads 
	  
	  





usually need a lot of government support (e.g., in Germany) because their economic 
competitiveness is contested. 
4.6.3.	  Regression	  Models	  
H5.19 Funding types affect project opposition – i.e., private funding is more associated 
with project opposition than grant funding. The hypothesis was confirmed, and the data 
show that issue-oriented opposition hits bond-backed projects disproportionately (532, 
2.635, >.05). Grant-funded projects, on the other hand, are comparatively opposition-
free (391, 2.196, >.05). I will analyze the correlation in more detail in the following 
binary regression models. 
H5.19 Privately funded projects face more project opposition (V28) than grant funded 
ones.  
Model 1:  
Y = Project Opposition (V28) 
X = Type of Funding (V36), Transparency (V50) 
Model 1 is the main model for the hypothesis. I do not mean to suggest that the funding 
type (private or public) causes opposition, but that it might be indicative of decision 
tensions. The project opposition variable has four categories, and I tested the impact of 
funding types on each category, with varying additional control variables. Similarly, as 
with the dependent variable, I also tested all the categories of funding types. In Table 18, 
I show the best models in terms of significant associations and model fits.  
















.025/ 1.025* -- 
Bonds 
n.s.-- Bonds .041/ 1.042* “other 
types” 
.024/ 1.205* -- 
Grants 
Transparency  4.715/ 111.638** 6.897/ 989.2**  
Location: 
Inner-City 
  2.170/ 8.761*  
Location: 
National 
   n.s. 
Project 
Description 
 n.s.  -1.591/ .204* 
Constant -.903/ .406 -3.524/ .029 -6.102/ .002 -1.635/ .195* 
N  55 55 53 56 
	  
	  






Model 1a:  
Y = Project Opposition (V28): issue oriented 
X = Type of Funding (V36) 
The results show that funding types, particularly bond funding, correlate 
with “issue-oriented” opposition. The model fit of .118 is the best. To fully explain 
the association, however, in-depth case studies are necessary. 
Model 1b:  
Y = Project Opposition (V28): ideological opposition 
X = Type of Funding (V36), Transparency (V50), Project Description (V18) 
In Model 1b, “ideological opposition” is the dependent variable. I added project 
transparency because non-transparent projects may “trigger” project opposition, as 
found in Table 10 above. I hypothesize that transparency (and funding types) affect 
opposition, and not vice versa, although the causal direction might, in theory, be 
ambiguous. The results show that transparency does affect opposition (4.175/ 111.638, 
sig≤.01). The funding types (bonds) and whether a project is and old or a new one 
(“project description”) were not significant. The model fit was a little more than 20 
percent (Cox & Snell R Squared, .211).  
Model 1c:  
Y = Project Opposition (V28) 
X = Type of Funding (V36), Transparency (V50), Project Location (V11) 
Model Fit .118/ .157 .211/ .301 .366/ .518 .165/ .249 
*sig≤.05  **sig≤.01, Beta/ Exp(B); Model fit: Cox & Snell R Square/ Nagelkerke R Square 
	  
	  





Model 1c assumes that there are causal effects of funding type, transparency and project 
location on (ideological) opposition. Funding type “other” (those that did not fit any of 
the other categories) affects opposition (.041/ 1.042, sig≤.05). Transparency is still 
significant (6.897/ 989.2, sig≤.01), as are inner-city projects (2.170/ 8.761, sig≤.05).  
Model 1:  
Y = Project Opposition (V28) 
X = Type of Funding (V36), Project Location (V11), Project Description (V18) 
The fourth successful model includes the “no-opposition” category of the opposition 
variable. Projects are counted as “free” from opposition if I found no trace of it after 
intense research. As it turns out, projects financed with public grants tend to be without 
opposition (.024/ 1.205, sig≤.05) (the variable is counter-intuitively coded). While the 
location variable had no significant effects, the description variable had: newer projects 
face more opposition than projects that are additions to already existing networks (-
.1591/ .204, sig≤.05). 
Quality of Statistical Results: The quality of the results varies between good (Model 
1c) and fair (all others). The details and ROC curves are displayed in Appendix J.  
4.6.4.	  In	  Summation	  	  
1. Equity: With increasing wealth of a country, the use of equity funding decreases. 
Wealthier countries still provide more moneys for public infrastructure. Poorer countries 
need to find other sources for their infrastructure projects. The distribution of funding 
types varies by region: equity funding is less important for European than for Asian 
projects. Australian projects use more government loans than grants.  
	  
	  





Different funding types are associated with different impact measures: projects with 
equity funding have shorter construction times– but they also barely meet their 
projected user goals. Also, equity funding seems to be associated with project 
cancellations, although this finding is tentative due to the relatively small sample of 
cancelled projects. 
2. Bond funding, mainly used in North America, raises the likelihood of (issue-
oriented) opposition. 
3. Public grants are statistically associated with the absence of opposition and with 
extended construction times – both in correlations and the regression analyses. Model 4 
in Table 18 shows the odds of opposition going down with grant funding, particularly 
when the projects are additions to already existing networks and not entirely new ones.  
4.7. Conclusion 
The following results stand out in the light of the general hypotheses of the dissertation. 
4.7.1.	  Macro-­‐level	  Government	  Arrangements	  
Project decisions differ in federalist and centralized countries, but most decisions still 
involve national decision-makers and national level funding across the world.37 The data 
shows no significant association between wealth and the national decision level, or 
associations between voting and party systems and the other variables. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 There are different motivations for investment decisions made on the national level. First, it makes more 
sense for a national government to invest in transportation infrastructure, because of scale and network 
effects, as well as the advantages of experience. Second, infrastructure may contribute to international 
competitiveness by providing improved infrastructure to their businesses and industry; so most 
governments (on all levels, actually) have an interest in advancing it. An example is the Alameda Corridor 
(Chapter 7), which successfully demonstrated to members of Congress the national economic effects of the 
project for their districts. Third, national governments are, at times, more interested in providing equal 
access to transportation for socio-political reasons rather than for transport-economic efficiency. Extensive 
train networks in European countries or China, into the most rural areas, attest to that. Fourth, national 
governments may build large prestige projects that do not necessarily meet strict transport-economic 
criteria. Examples include the large European integration projects like Øresund, or German post-re-
unification projects intended to reunite the country (although they did conduct cost-benefit analyses for 
these projects). The second and the fourth motivations, in particular, may be susceptible to the ideological 
opposition indicated in the data. 
	  
	  





Generally, national decision-makers are more involved in European countries, while 
project decisions in federalist and Anglo-Saxon states – generally more laissez-faire – 
take place on sub-national levels. This suggests that fragmentation and devolution are a 
predominantly American phenomenon. As a result of the European integration process, 
most border-crossing projects are in Europe as well. European integration is also the 
reason for several European countries to decentralize, as the European Concept of the 
Regions38 provides cultural and infrastructure funding to further cross-national 
European cooperation.  
National level decision-making relates to project success – here measured as 
construction time, utilization ratios, and cost overrun: One of the most interesting 
findings is that the data indicates that national governments are more willing to take on 
risky projects.  
Projects involving national decision-makers experience both longer construction times 
and larger cost overruns. At the same time, the number of cost-benefit studies does not 
increase when national decision-makers are involved as compared to projects directed 
on sub-national levels. Compared to projects involving other levels of decision-making, 
however, national projects fare better in terms of utilization rates.  
Also projects decided on the national level, or with national funding, are associated with 
less “ideological” opposition. I discussed possible reasons for this in the conclusion to 
Section 3, above. The other side of the coin is that ideological opposition is stronger in 
Anglo-Saxon counties, which are less centralized. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 The Concept of the Regions stipulates cooperation and integration of European countries through cultural, 
economic and funding frameworks benefitting border-crossing regional projects. 
	  
	  





4.7.2.	  Location,	  Opposition,	  Transparency	  	  
Inner-City Projects: Altshuler and Luberoff argue that inner-city projects draw project 
opposition – at least since the 1970s in the U.S. Hence I would expect decision-making to 
vary between inner-city projects and outside-city projects. There are three insights.  
The data systematically confirmed stronger opposition for inner-city projects – a 
variable to be taken into account when making urban decisions.  
More cost-benefit analyses are being conducted for inner-city projects.  
The data indicates that the presence of local decision-makers diminishes project 
transparency. This is not contradictory: inner-city projects are often very costly– 
primarily because urban space is highly contested (and requires underground 
infrastructure like water pipes and electricity cables). Because of the lack of space, they 
either need to be built underground, require expensive permits or the purchase of 
expensive property. Moreover, local residents must be recruited for support. On the 
other hand, local decision-makers may not guarantee more extensive public 
documentation because of political and business-related interests that potentially 
operate behind the scenes. 
Diminished transparency and increased risk of opposition suggest that project decision-
making is much more complicated for inner-city projects than for larger-scale ones.  
Opposition: There are five main findings.  
1) Projects with national level decision-makers and government grant funding face 
weaker opposition than other projects. 2) Project opposition and cost-overrun are 
associated. 3) As noted above, opposition increases in dense inner cities. 4) Opposition 
decreases with respect to projects that are being built as additions to existing networks. 
	  
	  





5) Project opposition, bond funding, and transparency associations were repeatedly 
significant. Bond funding is associated with certain types of project opposition.  
Transparency:  
1) Project transparency (or the availability of cost benefit analyses) is not related to 
project success measures, which challenges some of the theoretical explanations about 
reasons for project efficiency (e.g. Flyvbjerg et al., 2003). 2) Although the degree of 
transparency of a project is only indirectly related to macro-political structures, the 
wealthier the countries, the more transparent the decision-making. 3) Transparency (as 
an independent variable) causes project opposition. Of course it does not directly, but 
there are issues with the directionality of the association, as discussed in the concluding 
part of Section 4. I held that it is problematic to determine whether transparency is a 
cause or an effect. For instance, project opposition may occur either before or after the 
study has been done.  
With respect to cost-benefit studies the main finding is that barely half of the project 
decisions were based on a cost-benefit study. Moreover, the data suggests that the 
availability of cost-benefit studies impacts the degree of project opposition. That 
suggests that opposition, in fact, could be either the catalyst for project studies or the 
result of their absence. In this sense, the transparency results are inconclusive.  
4.7.3.	  Project	  Funding	  
The data show that the importance of local funding sources increases over time and 
across countries, as does funding complexity (measured by the number of funding 
sources for each project). Bond funding plays a stronger role in centralized countries. 
As will become obvious in Chapters 6 and 7, most political struggles evolve around 
funding sources. I will take up a sustained discussion of the distribution of funding 
	  
	  





sources and funding types in the conclusion chapter, because some of the findings are 
best explained when adding information from the case studies. 
Other than that, project funding seems easier in Europe: European projects are grant-
funded to a larger degree than projects anywhere else, so some of the political struggles 
may be dodged. In any event, European infrastructure investment proliferated in the 
past 30 years, because the European Union, to further the ongoing European integration 
process, provided billions of Euros for integrative infrastructure development. 
With respect to the efficiency debate in the literature, the results are inconclusive. 
Privately funded projects (or projects involving private funding) are not associated with 
fewer cost overruns or more efficiency in general. However, as a funding type, equity 
funding is associated with shorter construction times – but also with cancelled projects.  
I will be able to test the hypotheses in the case studies that follow in Chapters 6 and 7, 
which will also look at the effect of devolution, fragmentation and privatization trends. 
	  
	  





Chapter 5: The Politics of Large Infrastructure Investment 
Decision-Making: The Case of the Second Avenue Subway 
 
This chapter39 presents the first case study, an analysis of the Second Avenue Subway in 
New York. The Second Avenue Subway is a “typical” megaproject in terms of its 
enormous costs (the current construction budget is $4.5 billion), its politically complex 
decision environment, and its expected major impact on New York’s transportation 
network. Consequently, some of the political experiences of the decision process may 
also be generalized. The Second Avenue Subway (occasionally herein, the “SAS”) is an 
excellent example of the challenges of infrastructure politics: from the project idea in 
1920 to construction start in 2007, it took 87 years – although the NYC subway system 
had barely kept pace with changing economic and population patterns of the metropolis.  
Despite having accompanied New Yorkers in spirit for decades and decades, there is 
barely any literature on the subject. An article by Lawrence Stelter discusses the 
justifications for tearing down most of New York’s historic Elevated Transit Lines (the 
“els”), through the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s. He cites business and real estate interests as 
the main justification for replacing the els with the underground service of a Second 
Avenue Subway (Stelter, 1990). In 1980, Grava provocatively argued that the Second 
Avenue Subway project has, from the beginning, been both over-hyped and under-
justified, lacking clear decision rationales and established evaluation procedures (Grava, 
1980). Berechman and Paaswell focus on the decision-making criteria that have 
informed various infrastructure projects in the New York region, using the Second 
Avenue Subway as one of their case studies. They find that there are – in cost-benefit 
terms – more relevant projects to be built in the New York area.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Parts of this chapter have been submitted as a Final Report for UTRC Minigrant Award 2011; by Patrizia 
Nobbe and Joseph Berechman 
	  
	  





Besides maybe Grava, the only recent sustained discussion about the project is a 26-page 
chapter in Joseph B. Raskin’s The Routes Not Taken: A Trip Through New York City's 
Unbuilt Subway System (Fordham University Press, Nov. 2013). Chapter 9 is titled 
“Building the Line that Almost Never Was.” Raskin also mentions the SAS in Chapters 10 
and 11. Raskin’s account is a good short narrative of the SAS up to 1980, based almost 
exclusively on articles in The New York Times. In Chapter 9, there are only two pages 
covering the period from 1980 to the present, and none of his chapters provides much 
detail about how the current construction of the SAS came about. He cites few 
government documents, has done no interviews, cites only a few secondary sources, and 
gives no theoretical explanation as to why it has taken so long to build the SAS.  
In this chapter I will examine the politics of decision-making of the Second Avenue 
Subway as an infrastructure investment “megaproject.” As a reminder, I will address the 
research questions laid out in Chapter 3, some directly, some indirectly. The questions 
concern the decision-making steps for the project, contextual factors and dynamics, the 
influence and relative weight of actors with competing project rationales and interests, 
the role of the MTA, and the role of funding. All elements are shown in Figure 2, 
Chapter 2. 
Because of its long history, there were many instances where one may find politics at 
work. While there never appeared to be any questioning of project selection, cultural, 
governance and funding issues had a major impact on project choice (timing). In more 
detail, I argue that during the 1940s and 1950s the project was not built because there 
was a major cultural focus on the automobile. After the automobile boom, there was a re-
organization of the transportation landscape, specifically the formation of the MTA, 
which, with its own fiscal and political aspirations, skillfully maneuvered the project onto 
a relevant agenda. Third, over the course of the project history (back to 1920), the project 
	  
	  





was repeatedly halted for lack of funding, but the lack of funding often reflected political 
choices. However, some of the funding arrangements removed competitive aspects from 
the project. Related to the funding agreement, the project was to be built in phases, 
reflecting a transport-economic compromise. Fourth, powerful project champions took a 
personal interest in advancing the project’s success. And fifth, positive federal ranking 
and 9/11 served as a “window of opportunity” that made federal funding more available 
than it had been previously. Conspicuously absent were transport-economic studies, 
which were not at the center of the decision. 
Though the Second Avenue Subway was not a very controversial project, the political 
competition of other projects was fierce. Nevertheless, the MTA appears to have 
implemented the project successfully: the ground was first broken in the 1970s, but it 
was halted then because of city bankruptcy and more pressing system maintenance 
issues; the second groundbreaking took place in 2007. Agency politics is an important 
part of how the project happened. How did the MTA, against all the odds and after heavy 
debates and political wrangling, decide to build the project, approve it internally, and 
then achieve project approval on the state board that is responsible for the oversight and 
approval of MTA capital projects – the Capital Project Review Board (CPRB)?  
I begin to build the explanation by providing a historical outline of the Second Avenue 
Subway and describe available studies that recommended project selection. This will 
help outline the logic of the project and situate it within ongoing debates, problems, and 
actors in the different agenda-setting stages of the project. A debate-centered analysis of 
the main decision platforms that affected the current construction of the project will 
illuminate the project politics and deeply entwined funding struggles. All information 
used comes from extensive historical newspaper and legal resources research and from 
in depth interviews with various decision-makers and transport experts in the area, and 
	  
	  





from secondary sources. For reasons of confidentiality I will cite my interviewees 
anonymously. 
The chapter is presented in four parts: I will briefly summarize the project's main 
features to make the case study easier to follow. In the main parts of the case study, I will 
review the long history of the project and then summarize the main politics surrounding 
the final implementation and funding debates and end with a brief conclusion.   
5.1. Project Summary 
The Second Avenue Subway was first mentioned in 1920, and more specifically proposed 
by the New York City Board of Transportation in 1929 as part of the second stage of the 
IND system (short for the “independent” system) that would replace the Second and 
Third Avenue els. In October 1929, before any construction could begin, the stock market 
crashed and the project was put on hold. In the 1940s, 1950s and 1970s, both els were 
torn down anyway, yet subway construction was not begun. Its continuing delay was due 
to a lack of funding40 and a generally deteriorating subway system, as well as a 
widespread “highway boom” and a federal lack of interest in mass transit. The first 
pieces of the Second Avenue Subway were built in the early 1970s, a few years after the 
founding of the MTA in 1968, but construction was halted when New York City nearly 
went bankrupt in a recession, and a “rebuilding” of the existing subway system became 
more urgent than capital expansion.  
At the beginning of the 1990s, the Second Avenue Subway efforts restarted for a two-
track line. The final design for the first phase, as authorized by the Federal Transit 
Administration, started in April 2006. A map of the proposed line is shown in Image 5.1 
below.  The first phase contains the segment between 96th and 63rd Streets on 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 The lack of funding is contrasted by the fact that in 1951 New York City voters approved a bond issue that 









Manhattan’s east side. It includes stations at 63rd Street, 72nd Street, 86th Street, and 96th 
Street. Service on the Second Avenue line (initially an extension of Q-service) will 
proceed across 63rd street for a connection to the Seventh Avenue subway and then 
proceed south through Times Square to Lower Manhattan. 
The first construction contract was awarded in March 2007, and groundbreaking for 
Phase 1 began on April 12, 2007. The projected ridership for the first phase was projected 
to be 213,000 riders daily. The proposed costs were $4.5 billion for the first phase, and 
$13.3 billion41 for its entire length (or $16.8 billion in year-of-expenditure dollars) (MTA, 
2004). At this point, the first phase of the line is fully funded through allocations from 
the three capital programs and the Federal New Starts program (FTA website). So far, 
the project has braved the 2008 recession and is expected to open in December 2016. 
The funding sources for the capital plans are as follows: $1.3 billion from the Federal 
New Starts program, $3 billion from state and local sources, and $450 million from a 
2005 State Transportation Bond Act. (Figure 9) 
Figure 9: Funding Sources Second Avenue Subway 
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Figure 10: Second Avenue Subway Phasing 
 
Source: MTA Second Avenue Subway website 
	  
	  





Several decisions lie ahead – first and foremost, whether there will actually be a next 
phase implemented (Interviewee 2); and second, if so, where the next phase of 
construction will occur. It could either go north to 125th Street, and over to Lexington 
Avenue with a transfer station, or it could extend south to Whitehall Street. In the 
southerly direction, there would be two segments: the first from midtown to Houston 
Street in lower Manhattan, and a subsequent piece continuing from Houston Street to 
Whitehall Street.  
5.2. Project History and Context 
The political complexity and plethora of transportation agencies in New York’s 
metropolitan area renders any completed transportation megaproject something just 
short of a miracle. The Second Avenue Subway, especially, was a semi-miraculous 
achievement, judging by the number of times the project was aborted over the past 
several decades. Since the idea’s inception, the project never entirely disappeared from 
the public radar, nor from political agendas or debate. The enormous anticipated cost 
actually did little to shatter the project’s perceived need. As Grava argues, the project was 
always more of an unquestioned political promise and lacked more specific justification, 
so changes in the city or metropolis did not shake the idea (Grava, 1980, pp. 34-35). Over 
the decades, the project branded itself into the history of New Yorkers, as New York’s 
“most famous thing that’s never been built” (Russianoff, 2005), while Manhattan’s 4/5/6 
subway lines on the East Side –because the East Side els had never been replaced – were 
consistently overcrowded.  
For a historical presentation, the long and complex evolution of the project is organized 
into four major phases, roughly sorted by the major reasons for project delay: recessions, 
the highway boom, and a deteriorating subway system. This will prepare for analysis in 
the second major part of the chapter. 
	  
	  





The First Halt: Recession 
The project was first mentioned in 1920. At this time, the subway was publicly owned 
and operated, under contract by two private operators as two separate transit systems; at 
that time, the municipal government sought to add a third, the publicly owned and 
operated IND system, to replace the els and generally improve service (Hood, 2004). The 
NYC Board of Transportation (BOT) planned the IND system in two stages, the first in 
1924, and the second in 1929. The Second Avenue Subway was included in the 1929 plan. 
In 1940, the City acquired the operating rights to the private systems, and integrated 
them with the independent system into one municipally run subway network.  
Part of the plan was to run a line along Second Avenue from Houston Street in Lower 
Manhattan to the Harlem River, with an expected opening by 1941 at a cost of $86 
million. However, by 1940, the first stage 1924 IND plan was completed with local 
funding and a small amount of federal funds (Hood, 2004). However, the second stage 
never was completed because of the stock market crash and dwindling municipal 
revenue. In 1931, the planned Second Avenue Subway opening was re-scheduled to 1948. 
By 1939, the cost estimates soared to $249 million, but construction was suspended for 
the duration of World War II (Second Avenue Sagas, 2013). 
Civic, business and real estate pressure led the Transit Authority to replace the els, which 
were being torn down beginning in 1939. In his case study of the Third Avenue el, Stelter 
shows how ridership decline and increasingly costly maintenance were used to justify its 
demolition – before the Second Avenue Subway, its replacement, was in place. But 
Stelter argues that it was the drastic service cuts that, in fact, led to declining ridership 
numbers and the increased use of alternative means of transportation, as opposed to a 
lack of demand. Since the transportation agencies were strongly fragmented, the els were 
	  
	  





well used, and their replacement with a subway expensive. The demolition plans were 
met by strong skepticism by elected officials, civic and union leaders, and businessmen, 
particularly since no reliable alternative was in place. But their demolition became more 
feasible in 1940, under the municipally run transport system (Stelter, 1990).  
Both the Second and the Third Avenue els were torn down before the first ground-
breaking for the Second Avenue Subway. The Second Avenue el closed in 1942, and the 
Manhattan portion of the Third Avenue el closed in 1955. The last section of the Third 
Avenue el, part of which is shown in Image 1, was closed in 1973. So, although the els 
were equally overcrowded during their use (NYT, Duffus, Sep. 22, 1929), in effect the 
amount of service on Manhattan’s East side was cut in half without replacement 
(Derrick, 2001, pp. 236-238).  
Image 1: Demolition of the Third Avenue El 
 
 
Source: Image provided by Peter Derrick (photo taken around 1974, Third Avenue at Fordham Road, 
Bronx) 
Competing Priorities: Highway Boom 
	  
	  





From the 1940s to the 1960s, New York City stabilized in population and the 
metropolitan area changed. The automobile was seen as the means of transportation of 
the future, and the city and the surrounding suburbs experienced an unprecedented 
automobile and highway boom. During that time, in 1953, the authority over subways, 
until then operated by the New York City Board of Transportation, was transferred to the 
State-chartered Transit Authority. The general political climate became less favorable 
towards transit, and most money went to the highways system, until, in 1964 the federal 
government began its focus on transit with the Urban Mass Transit Act. 
During the highway boom, a good part of New York’s policy power had been 
concentrated in the hands of Robert Moses (in office 1924-1968), whose preference for 
building highways over investing in mass transit helped shape New York’s suburbs. 
Moses, who became transportation commissioner in 1933 (and, as such, was responsible 
for the capital budget) had no use for public transit. He went out of his way to block any 
public transit spending: for instance, even when asked to build provisions for potential 
later public transit along the Long Island Expressway route – a new highway project in 
planning – he refused to do so (Caro, 1975). At the same time, the federal government 
did not give any money to transit, either, so there was not much of a chance for new 
transit expansion. 
The idea of a Second Avenue Subway remained popular because of continuing political 
promises and their repetition in the press. This “continued official sanction over several 
decades” fixed the subway in the public mind (Grava, p. 34). According to Grava, every 
NYC Mayor – from John Francis Hylan in the 1920’s, to Abraham Beame, under whose 
reign the first construction took place – was supportive of the project and made it a 
political promise (with the possible exception of Fiorello LaGuardia (1934-1945), as 
Grava notes). Politicians, planners and the media still continued to search for ways to get 
	  
	  





started, and somehow everyone was confident that construction would begin soon. As 
soon as the idea came up to tear down the Second and Third Avenue els, the Second 
Avenue Subway was specifically promoted as a replacement project: in 1940, Mayor 
William O’Dwyer promised that work on the design of the Second Avenue Subway would 
start within four years (Grava, 1980, p. 34), so that the els could be demolished.  
In sum, New Yorkers were very optimistic about the project, particularly as a 
replacement for the els. Grava captures the optimism well: “In 1951, a $500 million city 
bond issue was passed that promised major expansion of the transportation system, 
particularly along Second Avenue (although it was vocally opposed by Queens politicians 
and residents). The Third Avenue El was demolished in the mid-1950s because 
construction of the new subway was just about to begin” (sic) (Grava, 1980, p. 34 – 
emphasis added). The bond proceeds, however, were now being spent on the 
replacement of subway cars, as the state of the subway system had deteriorated badly in 
the meantime, with pressing signs of decay, operational deficits and dropping passenger 
numbers. 
Despite the odds, various plans, White Papers (e.g. Mayor John Lindsay’s White Paper of 
1965 that proposed a Second Avenue Subway including an extension into the Bronx), 
and technical studies were commissioned. A state bond issue act was passed in 1967, 
providing yet another $500 million for design and construction of the Second Avenue 
Subway (Grava, 1980, p. 35), but then the TA ran out of money. Grava notes that after all 
the different developments and changes in New York, the subway project was never 
thoroughly examined and re-evaluated, at least according to the standards of our time. 
Though after the Moses era subway optimism picked up again, it had become 
increasingly obvious that New York’s subway system now required investments in 
	  
	  





maintenance rather than new construction. It was not until the MTA was created and the 
city and the Federal government provided larger sums, that the Second Avenue Subway 
became a plausible reality. 
5.2.1.	  A	  New	  Transportation	  Agency	  
In 1968, William Ronan, the “Empire Builder” (Derrick, 2012), reorganized the regional 
transportation system by integrating all formerly independent agencies like the Long 
Island Rail Road, New York City Transit and the Triborough Bridge and Tunnel 
Authority into one state agency: the MTA. This involved a huge transfer of power from 
the city into state hands, helping to disempower Robert Moses. The new special purpose 
authority was created to develop and organize a unified regional mass transportation 
policy, including parts of New York State, as well as two Connecticut counties. Within the 
MTA, the Transit Authority is responsible for subways.  
New York State established an internal and external decision-making platform: first the 
MTA Board and then later, in 1981,42 the CPRB. The chairman of the MTA Board, 
nominated by the New York State Governor and approved by the State Senate, serves for 
six years and provides the face of the agency.43 As of 2013, the board has seventeen 
members, also appointed by the Governor, who serve for six years as well. (The MTA 
board was smaller in 1968.) The mayor of New York City recommends four officials, and 
each of the counties of Nassau, Suffolk, Westchester, Dutchess, Orange, Rockland and 
Putnam recommends one. Commuter councils for Metro-North or the Long Island Rail 
Road, as well as Metro-North Rail Road unions, have been listed as recommenders, as 
well.  Each representative has one vote, with the exception of the latter four counties, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 The State Legislature created the Review Board in the same Transportation System Assistance and 
Financing Act that confirmed the 5-year plans to confront the public transit crisis of the 1970s. 
43 List of Chairmen: William Ronan, 1968-1974; David Yunich, 1974-1977; Harold Fisher, 1977-1979; Richard 
Ravitch, 1979-1983; Robert Kiley, 1983-1991; Peter Stangl, 1991-1995; Virgil Conway, 1995-2001; Peter 
Kalikow, 2001-2007; Dale Hemmerdinger, 2007-2009; Jay Walder, 2009-2011; Joseph Lhota, 6 months in 
2012 (MTA website). 
	  
	  





which hold one collective vote (MTA website). Once the MTA Board approves the capital 
plans, they submit them to the CPRB. 
The CPRB approves or disapproves the five-year capital funding programs proposed by 
the MTA board. The CPRB has four members, representing the State Governor, the State 
Senate, the State Assembly, and the New York City Mayor. Each of these members has 
veto power over the capital plan. The Senate President appoints the Senate member on 
the Board. The elected assembly member represents the State Assembly Majority. 
Usually, the State Department of Transportation Commissioner is the representative for 
the Governor. The appointee for the New York City Mayor has no vote on Metro North or 
Long Island Railroad capital plans. Another non-voting member represents the State 
Assembly minority (Higashide, 2010). There are two official capital plans, one for the 
TA, and one for the commuter railroads. 
Both boards were relevant decision points for the subway: the MTA Board decided to put 
the project on the agenda and set aside (partial) funding for it, and the CPRB later 
approved it. The politics of decision-making play out on both boards. 
Before the MTA’s founding, the subway and bus system were technically run by state 
agencies, although publicly perceived as local, city matters (Interviewee 3). The creation 
of the CPRB solidified New York State power over New York City transport projects by 
holding three independent vetoes from the Governor and the State legislature over 
potential NYC projects, while the NYC mayor holds veto power only over NYC projects.  
From the start, money has been an issue for the MTA with its deteriorating subway 
system. Money was needed to fix the system. Richard Ravitch, board chairman from 
1979-1983, successfully introduced long-term capital plans through the Transportation 
System Assistance and Financing Act of 1981, to enable the sub-agencies to plan their 
	  
	  





budgets and crucial repairs (Lardner, 1984). While prior allocation decisions had been 
conducted on an annual basis (although small agencies had their own, long-term range 
plans), Ravitch’s plan provided the MTA with the authority to issue bonds and 
introduced the five-year capital programs (PCAC, 2012).  
Table 19 provides an overview over these capital programs from 1982 - 2014. Since the 
first capital plan (1982), the agency has received funding from federal, state and local 
sources, with each contributing an average of 31.4%, 27% and 7.2% to the capital 
program, respectively. Debt financing has funded the remainder. In 2012, the agency had 
$32 billion in long-term debt, with an annual debt service of $2.3 billion. Additionally 
the agency took out loans from the Federal Railroad Administration (all information: 
PCAC, 2012, p. ii).  
Table 19: MTA Capital Program Funding Sources 
Capital Programs Funding Sources Use  
1982-1986    
1987-1992 
Federal 33%,                        
MTA Bonds 29%,                 
State Capital Grants 15%,   
Other 13%,                          
NYC 10%  
$14.399 billion Total Core 
Program 
   State-of-good-repair works and 
service improvements 
$0: MTA Capital Construction 
(MTACC)* 
1992-1999 Federal 33%,                        
MTA Bonds 26%,                
Other 20%,                        
State 12% (11% DTF bonds),          
NYC 9% 
$16.7133 billion: Total Core 
Program 
   State-of-good-repair works and 
service improvements 
$157.7 million: MTACC 
2000-2004 Federal 27%,                        
MTA Bonds 26%,                  
 MTA Debt Restructuring 21%,            
State Bonds 18%,              
Other 5%,                            
NYC 3% 
$17.5 billion 
   for Second Avenue Subway:* 
$1,050 billion ($744 million local, 
$306 million federal) 
2005-2009      
2005 Transportation 
Bond Act 
Federal 39%,                      
State 27% (State Bonds 18%),                   
MTA Revenue Bonds 18%,  
Other 5%,                            
NYC 11% 
$22.56 billion 
   for Second Avenue Subway:* 
$1,914 billion ($846 million local, 
$1,068 million federal, (or $758 
federal, as recorded 7/2013)) 
2010-2014 MTA Revenue Bonds and State DTF 
Bonds 66%,              
Federal 25%,                      
Other 6%,                           
NYC 3% 
$26.3 billion 
  for Second Avenue Subway:* 
$1,487 billion ($1,487 million local) 
Source: Permanent Citizens Advisory Committee (PCAC) Report, 2012, MTA Capital Construction; 
*Specific numbers for Second Avenue Subway: Mark Nachbar/ provided by Peter Derrick 
	  
	  





From 1982-2011, the budget totals $84 billion, or $116.7 billion in 2011 dollars (PCAC 
Report, 2012, p. i). Table 19 shows that the first funding of the current project was 
allocated in the 2000-2004 Capital Program, and another installation in the 2005-2009 
program, related to the Bond Act. I will analyze the actors in the capital program debates 
in more detail in the analysis part below. 
5.2.2. The First Second Avenue Subway Construction Attempt under the New 
Agency 
Led by its first chairman William Ronan, the MTA decided to develop a profile and 
massively expand by introducing an ambitious plan called Metropolitan Transportation: 
A Program for Action, which included the Second Avenue Subway. The plan was a 
collection of progressive ideas that had long been discussed, though it failed to support 
them with any relevant hard data – like cost-effectiveness, impact analyses, alternatives 
evaluations, and so forth (Grava, 1980, p. 35). Ronan was confident the new agency 
would be better equipped to implement a Second Avenue Subway than prior 
administrative arrangements, and in the beginning, it looked like it would be successful. 
However, as the plan began to expand, ever increasing anticipated costs became a 
significant problem. 
It started with a bang: Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller (1959-1973) presented the plan – 
the “grand design” that would expand the subway system, and overhaul other mass 
transit facilities in the metropolitan area. Some of its key elements included a subway 
line into the Bronx, extensive new service in Queens, and the Long Island Railroad spur 
to John F. Kennedy Airport. The Second Avenue Subway was still to replace the Second 
and Third Avenue els, in order to provide more subway service on the East side of 
Manhattan (NYT, Witkin, Feb. 29, 1968).  
	  
	  





Ronan, who had strong support from Rockefeller, began advocating for the project 
extending from Whitehall Street – at Manhattan’s southern end – to 138th Street in the 
Bronx, at a price of $335 million (NYT, Neuman, Apr. 9, 2007). Ronan had powerful 
backing besides Rockefeller, as well: the media, many local politicians, and influential 
interest groups all wanted the project. Chief among them were Wall Street-area interest 
groups, focused on the planned development of 120,000 new workers to fit expanding 
transportation needs – a plan that got the necessary support and approval within the 
MTA. Furthermore, the residents of the poor Lower East side successfully demanded 
access to the new subway, as well, although their piece would have been completed later 
in the construction process. The residents of other neighborhoods (Upper East side, 
Yorkville, and Harlem) also had a costly influence on the proposed plan, augmenting the 
station alignment scheme by forcing the MTA to plan for more frequent stations (Grava, 
1980). 
In September 1968 the New York City Board of Estimate (a government agency that was 
responsible for budget and land use questions) cleared the way for the entire “grand 
design” scheme: it was expected to add $500 million to the city’s budget (the total cost 
was estimated at $1.26 billion). The State would provide $600 million from bond issue 
funds, and the Federal government was expected to provide the remainder. Of that 
portion, the Board approved the Second Avenue line from 34th to 126th street, and a later 
extension south to Battery Park, but as a two-track instead of a four-track line (NYT, 
King, Sep. 21, 1968). Within a few years, the project started construction, and, in a highly 
publicized ceremony (with Governor Rockefeller and New York City Mayor John Lindsay 
in attendance), ground was broken in 1972. Three pieces were then completed: the 
tunnels between 99th and 105th Streets, 110 and 120th Streets, and another one near the 
	  
	  





Manhattan Bridge at Canal Street (New York Magazine, w/o year). (The tunnel pieces 
were abandoned until the current construction.) 
Image 2: Second Avenue Subway Groundbreaking Ceremony 1972 
 
Source: New York Times “Mayor John V. Lindsay swung his pickax at a subway groundbreaking in 
1972. Looking on, from left, were Percy E. Sutton, the Manhattan borough president; Senator Jacob K. 
Javits; John A. Volpe, United States secretary of transportation; and Gov. Nelson A. Rockefeller.” (NYT, 
Neuman, April 9, 2007). 
5.2.3. Construction Halted: Another Recession and Maintenance Priorities 
As noted above, at the time of the fiscal and economic crisis of the 1970s, the MTA found 
itself in a financial crisis, too. In 1972, the projected price for the subway had risen from 
$335 million to $1 billion, and to $1.3 billion the year after. One year after the 
groundbreaking, Mayor John Lindsay publicly stated that subway construction would 
probably have to stop if more Federal funding did not arrive (NYT, Neuman, Apr. 9, 
2007). While the costs escalated, no new funding was made available. Though voters 
approved the 1967 bond issue, the money not used for the subway. Two bond issues 
(1971 and 1974) were defeated because highway and transit proponents were not able to 
agree on the proposed budget allocations (Interviewee 3). At the same time, economic 
recession sent the City’s income base spiraling down, so that it did not have the 20 
	  
	  





percent matching funds to complete the federal contribution of 80 percent (Interviewee 
2). So the MTA ran out of money for the project and construction was halted in 1975. 
By 1979, New York City’s existing subway system was in such bad shape that the newly 
incoming MTA chair, Richard Ravitch, prioritized bringing the city's subway system back 
into a “state of good repair” and introduced five-year capital programs to regain control. 
Subsequently, over the next few capital programs, money was allocated predominantly 
for repairs and maintenance, while capital project expansion plans were put on hold 
until the 1990s.  
5.3. The Politics of Decision-Making     
Second Avenue Subway construction was re-started with the ceremonial groundbreaking 
on April 12, 2007. The first phase of the Second Avenue Subway is currently under 
construction and scheduled to open in December 2016. This section will focus on the 
politics of decision-making that led to its resurrection. Effectively, the MTA and the 
CPRB were where the politics played out.  
5.3.1.	  MTA	  Decisions	  
Given the bad state of repair of the subway system, Ravitch had not been able to expand 
the subways in the 1980s but had to stop the existing system from falling apart by 
redirecting all funds towards repair. But Transit Authority staff made sure the project got 
back on the schedule when the time was right. In 1989, leading planners within the TA 
proposed to include money for project studies for a Second Avenue Subway in the next 
capital program. David Gunn, head of the Transit Authority from 1984-1990, supported 
this agenda, and, after some more or less effective lobbying of MTA chairmen and the 









Two MTA Chairmen spoke on behalf of the project during the budget negotiations of 
2000 and 2004. MTA Chairs Virgil Conway (1995–2001) and Peter Kalikow (2001-
2007) both helped advance the project against headwinds. While Conway did not 
unequivocally support the project, he did not oppose it, either. Kalikow has been 
described as a “project enthusiast” (Interviewee #1) who did not need much convincing. 
With the MTA in support, all that remained was to convince the CPRB to approve the 
project. Here I will describe some of the studies project selection was based on before 
turning to the politics. 
5.3.2.	  Project	  Studies	  and	  Selection	  Criteria	  
There is no question that the project had a lot of supporters. Every one of the 
interviewees – most from New York transportation agencies, including the MTA – 
emphasized that project selection was not difficult, and that the project was a “no-
brainer” (Interviewees #1). As one of the interviewees from the TA who was involved in 
the planning process stated: “I often felt that, unlike similar studies I was involved in or 
observed, I had the unique problem that people, both inside and outside the agency, 
presumed that a Second Avenue line was justified and should be built if only the money 
could be found” (Interviewee #4). The question now is how, under continuing budget 
pressures, the MTA selected the project: what were the transport-economic 
considerations and study process. To this end, I will summarize some of the project 
selection criticism, and then outline various studies and efforts that addressed project 
selection.  
Project critics were not too numerous. They questioned the rationale of project selection 
(Grava, 1980), and the absence of transport-economic studies (Berechman, 2009). In 
1980, Grava, then Vice President and Technical Director for Planning at Parsons 
Brinckerhoff, and Professor of Urban Planning at Columbia University, criticized the 
	  
	  





project for its lack of realistic application. Despite the political and media support, 
financial crises and anti-transit resentments were hindering any real capacity for such a 
project. He questioned why, even in periods of dropping passenger volumes and interest 
in transit (like the post-war periods), the Second Avenue Subway stayed on the agenda – 
without serious transport-economic evaluations: “construction was started in 1972 
without a fundamental evaluation of feasibility or need at that time, although the basic 
conditions had changed dramatically over several decades and unrecognized forces were 
strongly present” (Grava, 1980, p. 33).  
There is criticism of the current project, as well. Berechman and Paaswell conducted a 
comparative cost-benefit study of several large infrastructure investment projects 
underway in the New York metropolitan area. They found that the Second Avenue 
Subway did not rank among the first three projects to be recommended, mainly because 
of its massive capital needs and long construction time (Berechman and Paaswell, 2005). 
It has been suggested not to expand the construction beyond the first phase, as the 
money would be better spent on continuing to bring and keep the subway system in a 
state of good repair (Berechman, 2009).  
Other criticisms, on the other hand, are directed at the “truncated” project outline. This 
mainly refers to the political (and funding) compromises involved in implementing the 
project in stages – and without a connection into the neighboring boroughs. Diana 
Fortuna, head of the Citizen’s Budget Commission, argued that this project is not 
needed: “Capital improvements planned by the Metropolitan Transportation Authority 
should accomplish two things: reduce crowding on the subways during rush hour and 
support economic expansion by accommodating more workers bound for midtown 
Manhattan. By these criteria, the agency's plan for the Second Avenue Subway is either 
too much or too little.” In the dimensions of the first phase, $3.4 billion [the estimate in 
	  
	  





1999] would be an extraordinarily expensive way to reduce crowding on Manhattan’s 
East Side; and, if the intended goal is to move workers more efficiently around the city, 
the Second Avenue Subway should extend into other boroughs (NYT, Fortuna, 1999). 
As these critiques indicate, there was skepticism around the transport-economic 
sensitivity of the project. In the following, I describe some of the studies that have been 
conducted. 
Within the Transit Authority, in the mid-1990s the MTA/TA initiated the Manhattan 
East Side Transit Alternatives (MESA) study (final draft published in 2001). MESA 
contained a Major Investment Study (MIS) part and a draft Environmental Impact 
Statement (EIS). An EIS would be required to apply for federal funding. MESA looked 
into “transportation problems and needs” on Manhattan’s overcrowded East Side and 
compared several approaches on how to improve transportation conditions there. The 
Second Avenue Subway was found to be the best solution to the problem of insufficient 
East Side transportation services.  
The MIS established project need based on five problems: the limited capacity of the 
current system, limited transit accessibility, travel time problems, decreased system 
flexibility (unpredictable bus and subway service in the area due to overcrowding), and 
environmental and socio-economic concerns. The study then evaluated and compared 
different alternatives along Manhattan’s East Side, like Second Avenue Subway 
segments, Lexington Avenue Subway segments, bus alternatives, Metro North Stations, 
light rail options, elevated trains, private and ferry services, and no-construction 
alternatives, based on the characteristics below.  
Within the scope of the MESA study, the Second Avenue Subway made it through 
various screening stages. In 1999, a draft report was published that considered the no-
	  
	  





build alternative, bus lines along First and Second Avenue, and the Second Avenue 
Subway segment as it is being built right now – with an alternative (and dismissed) 
option of building a light rail line down to Lower Manhattan. After an initial, “coarse” 
screening, the remaining projects were examined for the following characteristics: total 
cost, average speed, transfer options, impacts on existing transit systems, engineering 
complications, use of existing tunnels, unresolved issues, potential for 
community/public support, expanded rapid transit area, ridership (comparison of 
ridership levels among same-mode options), street and operations impacts, legal issues, 
construction impacts, the possibility of phased construction, and implementation 
schedule.  
During the final screen, partial cost-benefit analyses eliminated some of the full-length 
options: “The final screen involved an analysis of specific quantitative and qualitative 
data for each of the remaining alternatives. Preliminary model output (including 
ridership and travel time information) and capital cost estimates were used to perform a 
partial cost-benefit analysis. This screen also used qualitative screening criteria, 
including a definition of accessibility; potential for displacement; service to low-income, 
minority, and transit-dependent populations, community character effects (such as 
impacts on land use/public policy, visual character, open space, and historic and 
archaeological resources); hazardous materials issues; traffic impacts; impact on parking 
and goods delivery; air quality impacts; compatibility with existing transit system; and a 
general analysis of construction impacts” (MESA, 2001, p. 13). For instance, some 
projects were excluded from consideration because the “cost [would be] prohibitive to 
expected benefits”; others for not being physically feasible, disruptive to the existing 
transportation system or the neighborhood, not providing sufficient transport-economic 
benefits, or unable to comply with government or agency policies.  
	  
	  





Certain aspects of the full-length project of the Second Avenue Subway, including an 
eastward alignment and/or an east-west connection, were eliminated during the second 
screening because of “cost-effectiveness and impact factors. “The full-length subway 
without those options and the north subway with Lower East Side subway shuttle (which 
had been developed in Screen 2) were eliminated in Screen 3 because of high capital and 
operating cost and high cost factors (cost per hour saved and cost per hour spent in less 
crowded subway)” (MESA, 2001, p. 14). In the end, the MESA study concluded that the 
full-length subway would be best, but suggests in the face of high project costs to build 
the project in stages:  
“The evaluation conducted for Screen 3 concluded that the full-length Second 
Avenue Subway would provide the greatest benefit in solving transportation 
problems on the east side of Manhattan. The full-length Second Avenue Subway 
was also found to have the highest capital and operating costs. To address the 
most critical problems in the study area first, a lower cost alternative that could 
serve commuters in East Harlem and the Upper East Side who were traveling to 
Midtown and Lower Manhattan was selected as preferable to the full-length 
subway at that time. This lower cost subway alternative, which involved 
construction of a new tunnel segment between 125th and 63rd Streets and 
continuation on existing routes from 63rd Street south to Lower Manhattan, did 
not preclude future extensions of the subway route farther south to provide a full-
length subway. To allow for the future pursuit of a full-length subway option, 
conceptual engineering of the subway alternatives that were advanced past this 
point were designed to allow continuation of a full-length subway at a later time” 
(MESA study, p. 14). 
The MESA study cemented the already growing subway support outside the agency, 
among others, the Regional Plan Association (more about the agency below), which 
called for a Second Avenue Subway in a well-noted study of 1999 (RPA, 1999). In 
combination, the MESA study and the EIS (described in the following) formed the basis 
for the MTA decision to go forward with the Second Avenue Subway. 
The 2000-2004 capital program funds also provided funding for the Environmental 
Impact Statement (EIS) as part of the planned application for Federal New Starts funds 
at the Federal Transit Administration (FTA). (Federal law in the U.S. holds that an EIS 
must be delivered for projects that receive federal funding.) Because of some project 
	  
	  





critique, and in synch with the MIS study, the MTA and the Transit Authority completed 
all environmental and planning work for a “full length” subway, even if it would be 
implemented in phases (Interviewee #4). As required, the EIS described the proposed 
project in detail, considered reasonable project alternatives, some benefits and costs, and 
allowed for citizens to comment on the drafted version, providing opportunities for 
public participation.   
An EIS does not typically discuss transport-economic feasibility, and is not a project 
selection document per se. The study named improving mobility on Manhattan’s East 
Side, achieving economic feasibility and cost-effectiveness, and the maintenance or 
improvement of environmental conditions to be the main project goals. It compared a 
Second Avenue Subway and different alignments to a no-build alternative, and lists the 
following “enormous” project benefits: bolstering the economy of the city and the region, 
reduction of subway crowding and the improvement of reliability, subway access 
improvement, and the reduction of vehicle use and air quality improvement. It also 
described the phasing of construction, as a way to address the most urgent needs 
immediately, as well as an elaborate public outreach process (MTA, 2004). 
Federal funding was approved in 2007, based on the ranking of a Federal study and MTA 
willingness to proceed in phases. In the Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users 
(TEA-LU) Federal Act44 of 2005, the FTA ranked the project (Phase 1) as a “highly 
recommended” transit investment project.45 The project was one of only two nationwide 
to receive this tag and designated funding in TEA-LU (Maloney, 2005).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 Every six years the Federal government provides funding through the Federal transportation bill, which is 
mostly funded by a gasoline tax. Gasoline tax revenue is mostly spent on highways and, to a minor degree, 
also funds mass transit projects, depending on State regulation. Within the transportation bills, capital 
project grants may be capped at 80 percent under the Federal matching grants New Starts program.  
45 Decision criteria: “Under 49 USC 5309(d), major capital investment grants for the construction of a new 
fixed guideway system or the extension of an existing system seeking $75 million or greater in Federal New 
Starts funds may be made only if the Secretary determines that the proposed project is: (A) based on the 
results of an alternatives analysis and preliminary engineering; (B) justified based on a comprehensive 
	  
	  





The report ranked the project as “high” for each component of the “land use evaluation” 
(projects rank highly that address significant transportation problems or opportunities 
and provide significant mobility and economic development benefits in a cost-effective 
manner, e.g. uses existing structures, facilitates transit-supportive plans and policies, 
high-performance expectations in a strongly used corridor); “high” on the 
“environmental benefits” rating, as well as the “transit-supportive lane use” rating 
(which evaluates the degree to which transit use is integrated and promoted); “medium-
high” in terms of its cost-effectiveness, its mobility-improvement ratings, and local 
financial commitment (capital finance plan and operating finance plan ratings); and 
“medium” on operations efficiency criteria. The total project justification rating was 
“high” (FTA, 2007). 
In summation, the MTA conducted project alternatives studies, including partial cost-
benefit analyses, and an environmental impact study. Project selection criteria remain 
somewhat unclear at this point, if measured in terms of a cost-benefit ratio, and outside 
criticism is still significant. The MTA exercised its decision-making autonomy to get 
started on the project it wanted. In this sense, the project was not strictly based on 
criteria of transport-economic feasibility. In the following section, I will address how the 
MTA succeeded in keeping the project moving through the politically challenging 
territory of Manhattan. 
5.3.3.	  The	  Issue	  of	  Funding	  
The issue of funding is a driving force throughout the political debates I will outline 
below. There has never been enough money to fund the project: “In 1953 the money 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
review of its mobility improvements, environmental benefits, cost effectiveness, and operating efficiencies, 
economic development effects and public transportation supportive land use policies and future patterns; 
and (C) supported by an acceptable degree of local financial commitment (including evidence of stable and 
dependable funding sources) to construct, maintain, and operate the system or extension, and maintain and 
operate the entire public transportation system without requiring a reduction in existing public 









wasn't there because you needed money to fix up the existing system, in 1980 the money 
is not there, or if he [Ravitch] is going to get money, it is going to fight get money to fix 
up the existing system, because there is never enough to fix the existing system and to 
build new lines” (Interviewee #3). Compared to the 1970’s, the general state of repair of 
the subway network had improved, but the MTA was not back in a healthy financial 
state. Nonetheless, as Interviewee #4 put it, the goal was to move the project idea from 
“this is something that should be built if we ever had the money” to “we should get the 
money to build this.”  
Funding options were limited for four main reasons. First, as described in the historical 
outline, for much of the time the political priorities were on highways, and explicitly not 
on transit, and federal funding scarce. Second, in the 1980s the priorities were 
necessarily on system maintenance rather than expansion. Third, the regional 
competition between rural and urban areas, both with their own transportation needs, 
spread state financial resources for transportation thin. Fourth, since Governor Pataki 
cut the MTA funds, the agency had to borrow more money, the repayment of which cuts 
into the available resources by now. 
Besides regular budget sources, two additional sources of funding helped enable the 
project. First, a significant portion of funding was provided through a successful 2005 
State Transportation Bond Act. The bond issue act was the result of a long-term effort by 
the Empire State Transportation Alliance (ESTA) that has accompanied the subway 
decision-process to accumulate sufficient public support. By its own description, the 
coalition includes “business, civic, labor and environmental organizations that seek to 
build consensus for expanded resources for New York State transportation” (RPA, 2013). 
	  
	  





46 Robert Yaro, President of the Regional Plan Association (RPA), a New York based 
association that has done research on “land use, transportation, environmental issues, 
economic development and security” (RPA, 2013) and Elliot Sander, who has served 
most city and state transportation agencies, spearheaded it. They significantly 
contributed to the success of the 2005 Transportation Bond Act. 
Transportation Bond Acts were very important to Second Avenue Subway decisions, 
because they partly removed the project from budget competition with other projects 
and agencies, though they increase the debt burden. They also serve as a barometer for 
public support for the project. Voters rejected bond issues containing provisions for the 
project in 1971, 1974 and 2000. But they approved them in 1951 and 1967 (though, in 
both cases, the money was spent for other purposes), as well as in 2005. The 2005 Bond 
Issue Act was crucial for this project.  
Part of the support effort was RPA’s 1999 MetroLink Plan, which attracted significant 
media attention. To ensure better functionality of the entire system, and specifically to 
relieve overcrowding on the Lexington line, the RPA proposed that the time had come to 
go beyond striving for a “state of good repair” to capital expansion. The document states: 
“The keystone of MetroLink is a new north-south subway line to be built the length of 
Manhattan on the east side, largely under Second Avenue, and continuing downtown 
along Pearl and Waters Streets, and then through a new tunnel under the East River to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 ESTA members include: “Regional Plan Association, co-chair, AECOM, co-chair, American Council of 
Engineering Companies of New York, Associated General Contractors of New York State, Baruch College/ 
CUNY, Building Congress, Beaudoin and Co., Citizens Budget Commission, Construction, Industry Council 
of New York, Drum Major Institute, Environmental Defense Fund, Featherstonhaugh, Wiley & Cline, Fiscal 
Policy Institute, General Contractors Association of New York, HNTB, International Union of Operating 
Engineers, Laborer's Tri-Fund, Long Island Contractor's Association, M+R Strategic Services, Machinist 
Union, Macro Associates, Manatt Phelps & Phillips/Claudia Wagner Associates, MOVE NY, New York 
League of Conservation Voters, New York Roadway Improvement Coalition, NYPIRG Straphangers, NYU 
Rudin Center, O.T., Solutions/Machinists Union, Partnership for NYC, PB Inc., Permanent Citizens Advisory 
Committee to the MTA, Pratt Institute for Community Development, Real Estate Board of New York, 
Reinvent Albany, Robbett Advocacy Media, STV, Transport Workers Union Local 100, Transportation 
Alternatives, Tri-State Transportation Campaign” (http://www.rpa.org/esta) 
	  
	  





Brooklyn. This trunk line would connect with existing lines or be extended with branches 
in seven locations, including an extension into the Bronx, a connection to west Midtown, 
to Queens, to Grand Central Terminal, through the Lower East Side and the East Village, 
a link to the Nassau Street subway in Lower Manhattan, and an extension towards 
Jamaica and Kennedy Airport on the LIRR tracks” (RPA, 1999, p. 3). 
The RPA plan was crucial in gaining public attention, but even more so in building a 
broad coalition of project support. Over the years, the Alliance, a coalition of business, 
industry, union, environmental,47 and transportation groups worked successfully to get 
the Transportation Bond Act approved (Interviewee #1). It won by a 0.1 percent margin. 
The Second Avenue Subway had been specifically written into the act, but East Side 
Access was an option also (NYT, Baker, Jul. 13, 2005). 
Second, in 2007 the MTA secured part of the funding for the first stage of the Second 
Avenue Subway through a federal grant. The Federal share constitutes about a third of 
the total project funding.48 Importantly, the grant came with the condition to proceed 
with the project in phases: this removed the question of a full-length subway from the 
debates. Federal funding has not always been a certainty: the FTA was never particularly 
interested in New York and its transit projects. Interviewee #6 suggested that it was the 
events of September 11, 2001, that might have prepared the grounds for the FTA decision 
to fund the Second Avenue Subway. He argues that the dramatic impacts of that day 
made the country more sympathetic, shifting attention towards the needs of New York 
City – or large urban areas in general – that might be the target of attacks.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Recent environmental activist support came from environmentalists who had previously been opposed to 
the project (NYT, Steinhauer, June 7, 2005). 
48 The program provided funding for both the Second Avenue Subway and East Side Access (another 
important regional project, connecting the Long Island Rail Road, a regional commuter system, to Grand 
Central Terminal in Manhattan). The Federal share of $1.3 billion for the Second Avenue Subway is a larger 
amount than New Starts usually provides; still, as a share of the total cost for the Second Avenue Subway 
(the share is 26%), it is lower than for any other New Starts project. 
	  
	  





5.3.4.	  Calibrating	  Different	  Interests	  in	  New	  York	  State	  
Turning to the politics, the New York State area is divided with respect to its 
transportation needs: in the upstate area, people rely primarily on their cars, while in 
New York City and the surrounding boroughs they rely heavily on the subway. The MTA, 
a state agency, was created to calibrate the competing infrastructure needs. The 
Governor and the Legislature hold considerable influence over the agency and its 
projects. There are two different kinds of relevant politics: appointment and CPRB 
politics. The key decision-makers are the Governor and the representatives on the CPRB 
Board. 
The preferences of New York State’s governors matter, because they determine the range 
of options and funding available to the MTA by their appointment powers and capital 
plan approvals. Judged by appointment rationale, some MTA Board appointments were 
more political than others. As Interviewee #3 stated:  
“Under three chairmen –Ravitch, Kiley and Stangl— from late 1979 to 1994, the 
MTA acted pretty much as the independent public authority that was supposed to 
be. That's not to say Governor [Mario] Cuomo did not have the influence over 
what MTA did, but there was not a day-to-day interference in MTA's planning or 
anything. And it made proposals for capital funding and everything like that. 
Pataki just totally politicized the MTA headquarters – not the Transit Authority, 
though, because you have to have people who know what they are doing when 
dealing with railroads and buses. [But] he wanted to have people at the MTA 
headquarters who would do his bidding” (Interviewee #3).  
Governor George Pataki (1995-2006) appointed Virgil Conway (1995-2001) and Peter 
Kalikow (2001-2007) as MTA chairmen. Both were (initially) following the Governor’s 
agenda, and new subway construction was not high on the list for the Governor 
(Interviewee #1; NYT, Fisher, Apr. 22, 1995).  
Because of the MTA chairs’ political involvements, the project had finally (openly) 
arrived at the center of the complicated political thicket of NYC political complexities 
and battles. At this point, support for the Second Avenue Subway became entwined with 
	  
	  





that of East Side Access. Senator Alfonse D’Amato, a New York Republican whose career 
was financially supported by Peter Kalikow and Governor George Pataki, was a strong 
proponent of the East Side Access project. When the time came to find funding for the 
Second Avenue Subway, Kalikow departed from his loyalties to Pataki and supported the 
Second Avenue Subway, although it was not the project of choice for his political mates. 
This allowed the necessary negotiation leverage for the Second Avenue Subway project’s 
champion, the Democrat Sheldon Silver – also on the Capital Program Review Board – 
to use the other big MTA project, East Side Access, as a lever for Second Avenue Subway 
approval. 
5.3.5.	  Directing	  the	  Funding	  Streams:	  The	  MTA	  Capital	  Programs	  
Funding for the Second Avenue Subway has been submitted to the CPRB three times so 
far, as funding was negotiated twice during the relevant time: in the 2000-2004 and in 
the 2005-2009 capital plans, and then in the 2010 program.  
Negotiating the 2000-2004 MTA Capital Program: Capital plan approval from 
the CPRB required a unanimous vote from the Governor, the State Assembly 
representatives, and the New York City mayor. An aggravating factor was that, from the 
1990s and after, similar five-year capital plans were approved for the State Department 
of Transportation, which is responsible for highways. So, during both periods, 
competition for funding was high. When the 2000-2004 capital plan was up for debate, 
project selection itself was more of an issue in the debates. Still, the agency succeeded in 
getting $1.05 billion specifically for the Second Avenue Subway included in the capital 
program – already quite a commitment. Next, I will consider the different positions of 
the CPRB representatives during the negotiations for the 2000-2004 capital program. 
	  
	  





Governor Pataki had influence over agency appointments and veto power over the MTA 
capital budget. During the 1999 capital plan negotiations, Pataki vigorously supported 
the East Side Access project, making approval of the project a condition of his support 
for the 2000-2004 capital program (Interviewee #6). His support for the Second Avenue 
Subway was less certain and had to be negotiated. 
On the other hand, the powerful State Assembly Speaker Sheldon Silver, then 
representing the Lower East Side, threatened to refuse to approve the budget plan if the 
Second Avenue Subway was not on it – in full length. Subway access is a strong draw for 
the Lower East Side, which is underserved by subways. Silver worked with Pataki’s East 
Side Access preference and argued that both projects belonged together: the Second 
Avenue Subway needed to complement East Side Access, because of the increased 
ridership on the Manhattan’s East Side that would result from the project. Silver was 
particularly adamant about project length and for a while threatened to veto a truncated 
version of the project – a position he later relaxed in favor of the incremental plan. He 
got significant support from citizen groups, e.g. the respected and influential Community 
Board (Interviewee #5).  
Another related issue in the State Assembly was party competition. The first budget 
proposal for the 2000-2004 capital plan was blocked by Senate Republicans (by 
Republican Senator Dean Skelos) in 1999 and was subsequently revised. The anti-transit 
sentiment – less pronounced in New York State than it is in the rest of the United States 
– plays into this as well. At the state level, transit funding has to compete with the likes 
of highway funding; Senate Republicans, for whom highway funding was a major 
political issue, blocked the transit plan and the Second Avenue Subway for some time, 
arguing that there was no comparable state plan for investing in highways (NYT, 
	  
	  





Neuman, Dec. 22, 1999). The same is true for state bond acts, which provide a 50/50 
ratio for both agencies. 
To address these concerns and avoid future conflict, the MTA and the New York State 
Department of Transportation’s budget programs were then designed to be coordinated. 
This increased the chances for NYC subway plans, because both groups would get an 
equal share. However, the anti-transit votes were not necessarily a partisan issue; much 
of the divide overlaps with upstate (more suburban and rural) vs. downstate (urban) 
constituencies and their very different transportation habits and needs. In fact, both 
houses of the legislature had blocked the capital program at various times to demand 
changes (NYT, Perez-Pena, Mar. 15, 2000).  
Just like the legislature, New York’s voters tend to be regionally divided into upstate and 
downstate, or anti-transit and transit, constituencies. A $3.8 billion Transportation Bond 
Act was rejected in 2000. It would have provided $1.6 billion to the MTA for its mass 
transit systems, and $1.9 billion to the state highway program. The Second Avenue 
Subway was officially written into the proposal, as were the extension of the N-Train to 
LaGuardia airport, a Metro North extension to Penn Station, and an extension of the 
Long Island Rail Road to Grand Central Station. The outcome of the votes reflected the 
traditional split between upstate and city (or downstate) voters. Upstate voters rejected 
the plan 2:1, NYC voters approved it 2:1, and the suburbs voted in narrow approval. In 
the end, the supporting votes were not sufficient (NYT, Lipton, Nov. 3, 2000). So the 
money that would have gone towards the subway had to be found elsewhere.  
The project was not a priority for New York City’s mayor, either. While I have described 
some of the attitudes in the historical section above, New York City’s last two mayors 
could hardly be considered Second Avenue Subway enthusiasts. Rudolph Giuliani 
	  
	  





preferred another capital project: he strongly advocated the extension of the N line in 
Queens to LaGuardia Airport. And Michael Bloomberg, while supporting the 7-Line 
Extension, was ambivalent about the Second Avenue Subway project at best, especially if 
it would not extend all the way down to the Lower East Side. However, each mayor 
ended up casting a “yes” vote at the CPRB (Interviewee #1). 
In summary, all representatives on the CPRB approved the 2000-2004 capital plan – 
that includes representatives of Governor Pataki, Speaker Sheldon Silver, State Senate 
majority leader Dean Skelos, and a representative of NYC’s mayor. The plan designated 
$1.05 billion to the Second Avenue Subway project for environmental studies, as well as 
some design and construction work. Future funding was left to the next capital plan.  
During that capital plan, in 2003, the MTA Capital Construction, an agency set to 
manage capital projects, was formed to coordinate the ambitious new capital expansion 
projects within the agency and among its various subdivisions. Among these projects are 
the Second Avenue Subway, the Fulton Transit Center, East Side Access, the 7-Train 
Extension and the new South Ferry Terminal.  
Negotiating the 2005-2009 MTA Capital Program: By 2005, the Bond Issue Act 
was approved, providing some money and establishing project support. Little had 
changed regarding the political frontiers of the project. At this point, George Pataki, 
Mayor Bloomberg, Senate Majority Leader Joseph L. Bruno and Assembly Speaker 
Sheldon Silver had representatives on the CPRB. Silver continued to push for the Second 
Avenue Subway, while Senator D’Amato and Governor Pataki promoted the East Side 
Access program. Now the issues were about scheduling and phasing: while D’Amato was 
trying to get the East Side Access project fast-tracked, Silver refused and insisted on 
having both on the same schedule (Interviewee #3).  
	  
	  





At the same time, the financial situation at the MTA worsened again, and chairman 
Kalikow tried to get New York State to raise taxes to pay for the next 2005-2009 capital 
program. Under these circumstances, the main debates and political wrestling of the 
time focused on the capital plan budget and on project finances: the project was, as 
usual, competing against the funding demands for system maintenance. The MTA 
requested $27.8 billion in 2004, but the state and the legislature approved only $21.1 
billion in 2005. The $21.1 billion made MTA decisions difficult, because it had two 
capital projects running: the Second Avenue Subway and the LIRR-Grand Central 
Terminal Link, as well as a third in planning stages – the direct link from Lower 
Manhattan to Kennedy Airport (which is still not under construction). Emotions ran 
high. During the budget debates with New York State, MTA Chair Kalikow stated he 
would be willing to jettison projects like the Second Avenue Subway and just focus on 
maintenance (NYT, Chan, Dec. 22, 2004). 
By 2007, the FTA approved the $1.3 billion Federal New Starts grant discussed above, 
releasing the pressure of finding funding, but it came on the condition of project phasing. 
Powerful NY State politicos, like Senator Charles Schumer and Congresswoman Carolyn 
Maloney, both supported the approval (Interviewee #3). 
Negotiating the 2010-2014 MTA Capital Program: Of course, funding was short 
for the next requested MTA Capital Plan ($26.3 billion in total) as well, the pressure 
having risen from the 2008 recession and years of accumulated bond debts. At this 
point, there was a $1.487 billion shortfall to complete the first phase (see Table 19 
above), and the MTA succeeded in raising the funds, after a series of budget negotiations 
and budget threats. Governor Paterson vetoed the first plan in 2009, because of the 
desolate financial situation of New York State, which would have provided the largest 
	  
	  





part of the capital funding. The MTA adjusted their program by shortening the 
expenditures by $1.8 billion 
Another threat to not approve the budget came from the Republican minority in the 
State legislature. Power distribution in the NY State Senate was so balanced that 
Republican votes were necessary. Republicans stated a concern about a billion-dollar 
state rescue program for the MTA on the one hand and a big gap for highway and bridge 
funding on the other (Neuman, NYT, 2009).  
However, the third and last capital program containing budget allocations for the first 
phase of the Second Avenue Subway was approved in June 2010. 










In short, in April 2006 the FTA approved construction at a projected cost of $4.5 billion. 
Construction began April 2007. The current opening date, although it has been revised 
several times, is set for December 2016 since 2009. The first phase is fully funded, but 
	  
	  





the following phases, at this writing (December 2013), are nearly completely up in the 
air. 
With respect to the main policy stages identified in the model (Chapter 3, and at the 
beginning of this chapter), the following picture forms. In the 1920s, transit planners 
identified the need to expand the subway system and calculated the costs of building a 
Second Avenue Subway. The plan failed because of the recession. Over the next few 
decades the perceived need for a subway extension vanished with the car boom. With the 
destruction of the elevated trains and subsequent overcrowding of the 4/5/6 lines, the 
project idea remained on a vague agenda. It was fully restored with the reorganization of 
the transportation landscape in 1968 - the creation of the MTA. Without specific studies, 
project planning and construction began, only to be derailed again in the next economic 
crisis. Followed by years on the back burner because of the new prerogative to restore the 
entire subway system back to a state of good repair, planners within the Transit Agency 
revived it. They put it on the MTA agenda first, and after successful approval the project 
was subjected to state approval.  
The considered project alternatives included alternative bus systems, combination 
systems, and also the route as it is being constructed at present in the form of a general 
approval of the various MTA capital programs. Project approval took place on an MTA 
internal level and then on the state level. Indirect federal approval was provided through 
the federal funding share, which came at the recommendation of proceeding to 
implement the project in stages. Another approval, also related to funding, was the state 
bond issue vote in 2005.  
After outlining the history and politics behind the Second Avenue Subway decisions, I 
came to the following conclusions with respect to the hypotheses:  
	  
	  





Macro-level government arrangements matter for transportation decision-making 
because they organize the political arenas and institutions. Infrastructure governance 
is dependent on these structures and permeated by the dynamics and values of 
fragmentation, devolution and privatization.  
The devolution of transportation authority from the federal government to the state and 
local level ensured the importance of state level decision-makers, while the highly 
fragmented nature of decision-making in New York was somewhat offset by the political 
strength of the MTA. Though dependent on state-level approval, which requires 
compromising with more car-prone upstate constituencies, the agency successfully 
implemented the first stage of the project 
Physical attributes like project modes, types and location determine which actors are 
involved in project decisions. 
The MTA organizes transit operations in the New York metropolitan area. All decisions 
were made within the parameters of this agency. Constructing in New York City would be 
difficult. 
Various political, economic and social interests drive transportation investment 
decisions, and their respective impact is dependent on institutional arrangements and 
financial means. 
Outside project champions that understand the rules of decision-making are necessary 
for project success: in this case, Sheldon Silver’s support as a Lower East Side 
representative was crucial. Community boards and a powerful coalition of stakeholders, 
consisting of unions, businesses and environmental groups, backed him up. The fact that 
the CPRB decisions need to be unanimous and other board members were championing 
other projects was helpful in this case because board members took to trading votes.  
In addition to Silver’s influence, the coalition of business, labor, transportation experts 
and agencies, and environmentalists was crucial to secure part of the funding for the 
project (the 2005 Bond Act). 
	  
	  





Transportation authorities serve as the hinge between the general political and societal 
context and the projects themselves and thus channel national, regional or local 
politics. Depending on their degree of autonomy they are often the driving force behind 
project decisions. 
Special-purpose agencies have the power to hang on to project ideas, negotiate political 
support, and find funding. In this case, I find that transportation agencies hung on to the 
project over the decades, and in the end the special-purpose agency (MTA) finally 
implemented the Second Avenue Subway, despite budget constraints. The MTA’s 
internal decision to build the project (which also served to build up outside support) was 
based on the MESA study comparing different major investment alternatives, but not on 
a cost-benefit study. Though the MTA needed approval from state and local actors, its 
leadership skillfully navigated the politics.  
The politics of infrastructure investment decisions is the art of directing funding 
streams.  
The nature of funding and its arrangements has the power to overcome politics. In the 
case of the Second Avenue Subway, funding from the Federal Transit Administration 
Start-Up program, as well as federal loans, directly sustain large parts of the project, so 
that the pressure to compete for funds locally and statewide was diminished. The federal 
grant did require the project to be built in phases, too. The Transportation Bond Act, 
another funding mechanism, dodged the crucial upstate reliance by providing equally for 
both highway and transit projects. The State DOT funding plans that are synchronized 
with those of the MTA are another important conceptual lever that somewhat removed 
the pressure from the highway constituencies in the budget competition.  
Additional factors, not captured by the hypotheses, include: first, what policy theorists 
might call “window of opportunity,” which is an extremely unlikely “alignment of stars 
and galaxies” (Interviewee #6) that synchronizes agendas, politics and funding streams. 
As one of my interviewees (#6) argued, the horrific events of September 11 made the 
	  
	  





federal government and Americans in general more sympathetic to the (underfunded) 
plight of the large cities and more willing to give.  
Second, a long project history that provides the project idea with some legendary 
character may be of advantage. The Second Avenue Subway, over the years, was used as 
rallying point and slogan; it has been promoted for so long that it had become a 
“tradition” to promote it. Further, over the course of time the larger political-cultural 
environment has shifted from a heavy focus on individual travels and highways and 
subsequent riots, to a more balanced approach to transportation and more 
understanding for the plight of urban areas and their needs, which led to a shift in 
federal investment strategies. 
	  
	  





Chapter 6: The Politics of Large Infrastructure Investment 
Decision-Making: The Case of Alameda Corridor 
 
Compared to the Second Avenue Subway, much has been written about the Alameda 
Corridor. Much of the literature on the project is devoted to assessments of what went 
right; indeed, it is considered one of the most successful recent megaprojects, in terms of 
on-time completion, budget performance and its innovative funding scheme. Despite the 
views of some of my interviewees (Interviewees #7, 9, 2013),49 who opined that there was 
nothing “political” about the project because it was seen as so urgently needed, there was 
a good deal of politics involved in the Alameda Corridor project, as well. This chapter 
explores how and where politics intervened. The chapter follows the research questions 
laid out in the introduction. They involve the decision-making steps, which stages have 
been taken in the process, and in which order. I examine the contextual, macro-political 
factors and dynamics that shaped the project. Further I will illuminate the project 
rationales and interests behind those involved in project decision-making and explore 
the role of the responsible transportation authority. As with the Second Avenue Subway 
project, funding played a major role in this project, as well.  
The Alameda Corridor, a freight rail tunnel project in Southern California, had a much 
shorter history than the Second Avenue Subway. It responded to a widely acknowledged 
need and was completed in accord with the approved design, within the authorized 
budget, within the initially approved schedule and with an innovative governance and 
complex financing scheme and a high degree of federal lobbying. Projections assumed 
maximum utilization to be reached in 2020. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 Appendix I lists all interviewees with their main affiliations. For data protection and IRB purposes they 
are only cited anonymously.  
	  
	  





On the surface, project need appears equally unquestioned as that of the Second Avenue 
Subway. But like the Second Avenue Subway, the project was implemented within a 
particular “window of opportunity” and with the help of some extraordinary funding 
resources, and both projects hinged in part on federal funding. The main differences 
between the projects concern the length of the project history, the transportation 
problem to be addressed, and the different role of the implementing agency. While the 
implementing agency for the Second Avenue Subway is a special purpose agency, 
responsible for a larger chunk of transportation in the New York metropolitan area, the 
joint powers authority that implemented the Corridor was (at first) created as a single-
purpose agency solely dedicated to this project.  
An updated version of the model developed in Chapter 2 (Figure 2) illustrates the 
difference that makes for political-contextual interaction: Figure 11 reflects the different 
agency structure with its different anchorage in the area and the decision process.  
 









While in Figure 2 the actors and the agency are separate, in Figure 11 the decision-
making agency encompasses all political actors already. They do not act on the decision-
making agency. 
As a function of the strong fragmentation in the region, no individual agency or authority 
was originally responsible for a project like Alameda Corridor – a project that would 
cross and touch upon multiple jurisdictions. So in this project, the political compromise 
had to come first: multiple jurisdictions and actors founded the Alameda Corridor 
Transportation Authority (ACTA) to implement the project. In that sense, the decision 
agency and many of the political actors are the same, and thus their color in the picture 
is the same as that of the decision agency. But the agency channels the politics and actors 
involved in a very different way. That does not mean that the decision-process was less 
conflicted, but a number of stakeholders – or friendly competitors – were pulling in the 
same direction. The biggest obstacles were the railroad companies and the cities along 
the corridor. 
The Alameda Corridor’s implementation agency was structured in a uniquely integrative 
way but really functioned only after internal legal struggles and an external legal 
decision. A general pro-business climate that arose from globalization pressures through 
projected port growth forced the competing ports to come up with a joint solution. 
Further, project implementation was also due to the exercise of political threats towards 
the private railroad companies that now share the tracks of the new corridor. Project 
opposition led to the implementation of an accompanying job-training program, a trend 
that is not unusual for large-scale infrastructure investment in the United States. Federal 









I will first review the main project features and characteristics. As in the previous 
chapter, I will then examine the project context, the project study and the project 
politics. I conclude with a summary of the main findings. An overall conclusion will be 
drawn in the final chapter (Chapter 8). 
6.1. Project Summary 
Alameda Corridor is a 20-mile (32.2 km) grade-separated freight rail corridor 
connecting the Port of Long Beach and the Port of Los Angeles with the regional 
transportation hubs of downtown Los Angeles. Construction started in 1997, and the 
project opened in 2002. The corridor consists of three parts: the South End Project, 
including a “fork” to serve each of the two ports; the North End project area with the 
Redondo Junction flyover and multiple rail and street bridges; and the projects’ 
centerpiece, the 10-mile Mid-Corridor Trench, 33 feet deep and 50 feet wide; 30 bridges 
connect the street traffic on both sides of the trench and reconnect the Corridor 













In 1995, the ACTA hired a joint venture of four major engineering firms as the project 
management entity, called the Alameda Corridor Engineering Team (ACET), which was 
responsible for the preliminary design, environmental reviews, engineering and 
	  
	  





construction oversight of the corridor. ACTA and ACET designed and built the project to 
increase port efficiency in the Southern California transshipment bottleneck.  
By consolidating four formerly separate freight rail lines into one line, partially below 
grade, Alameda Corridor allows for more efficient freight rail transport, reducing train 
trip time from more than two hours to about 45 minutes, and eases regional road traffic 
congestion, as well. (In California, passenger trains have the right-of-way during the day. 
Before construction of the Corridor, freight trains needed to yield to passenger traffic 
and, in addition, would often block road traffic while waiting.) The project removed 200 
road/rail crossings and cut noise and air pollution in the Corridor cities and the region. 
The Corridor’s impact is expected to reach beyond regional confines, as the San Pedro 
Ports are the largest U.S. port complex and the efficiency of cargo distribution impacts 
the national economy (Nobbe and Brecher, 2009). 
The public-private partnership project has a complicated funding structure. The funding 
sources are displayed in Figure 13 below. Each of the funding sources is associated with 
political efforts, and I will touch upon the story of each in the remainder of the chapter.   
Figure 13: Alameda Corridor Funding Sources 2003 (in million $) 
 


















The Corridor’s largest source of funding is the $1.16 billion revenue bonds that were 
issued - $520 million in tax-exempt bonds and $643 million in taxable bonds. In 
addition, $394 million came from the ports, $347 million as a grant from the Los 
Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA) and – after long struggles 
- a $400 million federal loan. Other sources contributed $131 million to complete the 
financial package. To date, the revenues collected from the use fees and container 
charges have been sufficient to cover ACTA’s annual debt service obligations without 
using the ports’ shortfall advances.50 
The major portion of funds, $1.5 billion, went into construction, design and engineering 
costs. The main contract for the mid-trench corridor, the below-grade part of the 
Corridor, went to Tutor-Saliba as a single design-build (DB) contract of $778 million. 
Other cost items included the initial purchase of the rights-of-way from the railroads for 
$394 million. Financing costs and legal fees took $329 million, and $200 million was 
allocated as a contingency fund. Particularly controversial were the trench and right-of-
way costs. 
Currently, the Corridor remains underutilized in terms of its capacities, peaking in 2006 
with 55 trains a day and 3.4 million TEUs (twenty-foot equivalent units, the standard 
transport unit for containers), and declining since. As of 2009, this was in line with 
project expectations laid out in the EIS, as the project was built to fulfill its capacity by 
2020, when 97 trains per day were projected to move in and out of the ports (EIR, 1996). 
The maximum capacity is 150 trains per day.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 As scheduled, ACTA paid off a tax-exempt subordinate lien 1999B bond series in 2006, while the other 
series are due in 2015 and 2037, respectively (ACTA 2009). Also, the $400 million federal loan was paid 
back far in advance in May 2004 instead of 2034. ACTA paid back nearly $475 million in tax-exempt bonds, 
plus interest of $211 million accrued on the taxable bonds (FHWA 2004). Traffic volumes over the next years 
will determine the likelihood of paying back the revenue bonds by 2032, as scheduled. The DOT loan 
repayment requirements were subordinated to some of the revenue bonds. The entire project, including the 
DOT loan, required bond rating agency evaluation. The DOT loan provided ACTA with some flexibility of 
timing. However, as noted, the DOT loan was repaid thirty years early in 2004. 
	  
	  





6.2. Project History and Context 
Transportation investment responsibility is increasingly localized in the United States 
(Altshuler and Luberoff, 2003). To stay competitive and confront projected growth, the 
ports of L.A. and Long Beach had to convince local and state stakeholders to help them 
get a project off the ground – just like the MTA did. There were no national or state-level 
models for the development of a freight rail corridor and no national public financing 
program for intermodal freight transportation. The resulting lack of “organizing 
principles” (Petersen, 1998, Special Report 252, 258) had all stakeholders involved 
starting from scratch. Yet the financing mechanism of the Corridor was so successful that 
it became a model for the national Transportation Infrastructure Finance and Innovation 
Act (TIFIA).51  
Further, like the New York Metropolitan Area, the Southern California region is 
politically fragmented – and, hence, politically complex – according to a fragmentation 
score cited by Giuliano (2007). Decision responsibility for the ports is entwined with that 
of the cities and overlaps with various regional planning agencies and jurisdictions. 
Other large projects in the region had already failed because of regional animosities 
(Erie, 2001).  
Both ports combined are one of the busiest port areas in the world, channeling a large 
share of global and regional freight traffic. They were adversarial competitors until the 
1980s. In contrast to most ports in the United States, the Long Beach and L.A. ports are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 The TIFIA “program provides Federal credit assistance in the form of direct loans, loan guarantees, and 
standby lines of credit to finance surface transportation projects of national and regional significance. TIFIA 
credit assistance provides improved access to capital markets, flexible repayment terms, and potentially 
more favorable interest rates than can be found in private capital markets for similar instruments. TIFIA can 
help advance qualified, large-scale projects that otherwise might be delayed or deferred because of size, 
complexity, or uncertainty over the timing of revenues. Many surface transportation projects - highway, 
transit, railroad, intermodal freight, and port access - are eligible for assistance. Each dollar of Federal funds 
can provide up to $10 in TIFIA credit assistance - and leverage $30 in transportation infrastructure 









municipally, not regionally, run and enjoy a comparatively high degree of policy and 
fiscal autonomy (Erie, 2004, p. 31). Administratively, they are connected to the cities of 
Long Beach and Los Angeles. The Port of Los Angeles is part of the government of the 
city. The port governance structure is the same for both: five commissioners, appointed 
by the respective mayor and approved by the relevant city council, run each port, 
although the Port of Long Beach is much more independent from the mayor than the 
Port of Los Angeles (Interviewee #9, 2013). When freight backlog became an issue, the 
ports and other actors started cooperating to address the problem through a variety of 
task forces and studies. 
Three larger trends benefited the project: globalization, beneficial political 
circumstances, and few environmental requirements.  
The San Pedro ports in the 1990s, expecting vastly increasing trade volumes by 2020, 
needed to expand their capacities to remain globally and regionally competitive. The 
streets and ports were already overburdened. More cargo would only make sense if 
goods could be transported efficiently and without much processing time to and from the 
ports; otherwise, the ports would lose competiveness (Erie, Ch. 2) against other regional 
ports that competed for their share of the global market. 
Politically, the circumstances were unique: the powerful Los Angeles mayor, Richard 
Riordan, and his pro-business administration were in power from 1993-2001. At the 
same time, at the beginning of the 1990s, President Bill Clinton was preparing for 
election and made friends in the State of California by supporting several beneficial 
deals. For example, Clinton supported the federal loan for the project that came to be the 
powerful catalyst for the remainder of the funding.  
	  
	  





Third, the environmental requirements are important for project decisions. As one of the 
interviewees (#9, 2013) stated, the project barely slipped through and could not have 
been built a few months or even years later. Instead, powerful environmental groups 
would have sued, or project implementation would have at least been delayed at 
enormous expense (Interviewees #9, 2013, #10, 2009, #11, 2009, #12, 2009). 
6.2.1.	  Project	  Need	  and	  Project	  Studies	  	  
A series of studies projecting port growth became the basis for the decision to build the 
project. Subsequent studies and reports evaluated project alternatives and different 
organizational forms, and in time an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) followed. 
Project need was easily established and received significant support from all sides, 
although the region is known for the large number of adversarial cities, agencies and 
institutions, and the Corridor goes through several different governing districts. There 
was no cost-benefit analysis.  
Since the 1980s, a series of studies was conducted that established the desirability of a 
consolidated railway. In general, the project did not face much opposition, because the 
rail traffic situation in the Southern California region was notoriously bad: long cargo 
trains from three different rail carriers slowly went from the ports to L.A. On their way, 
they would block countless streets, worsening already horrendous traffic jams. With port 
activity projected to grow even more, the Southern Californian Association of 
Governments (SCAG), the local Metropolitan Planning Organization (MPO), took the 
initiative to propose a solution.   
At the beginning of the 1980s, SCAG created a Port Advisory Committee (PAC) to 
address the growing rail-freight traffic problem. The board was composed of a broad 
range of local elected officials, port representatives, engineers, trucking companies, the 
	  
	  





several private railroads that served the area, and the Los Angeles County Transportation 
Commission. PAC sponsored two highway and rail technical studies. The 1982 highway 
findings were actually constructed with the help of a federal grant. 
The 1984 Rail Access Study dealt with the projected increase in train traffic demand over 
the coming decades and, specifically, its impact on the surrounding communities. The 
proposed rail project at that point was budgeted for $220 million (in 1983 dollars) for 
surface-grade tracks. The first study already suggested the consolidation of different 
lines into one corridor and the creation of a task force to analyze the legal, financial, 
design and environmental implications (Erie, 2004, p. 150f).  
SCAG proposed an Alameda Corridor Task Force (ACTF) to address these railway 
concerns. ACTF was implemented in 1985 and included a similar set of stakeholders as 
PAC and additionally included the cities along the proposed corridor. ACTF consisted of 
one commissioner from each of the ports, one each from the Cities of Long Beach and 
Los Angeles (city council representation), one each from the L.A. County Board of 
Supervisors and the Los Angeles County Transportation Commission, a non-voting 
member from SCAG itself, a voting member from Caltrans, and a voting member from 
each of the six small cities along the Corridor. Joan Milke Flores, councilwoman from 
L.A.’s 15th District, chaired ACTF for four and a half years. In the meantime, PAC 
worked on the institutional arrangements (Agarwal et al., 2004, p. 7ff). 
In April 1988, a long-term freight and traffic study commissioned by the ports projected 
massive freight growth by the year 2020. The purpose of the study was to determine the 
steps to be taken and the amount of capital investment needed to stay competitive with 
other West Coast ports. While most of the studies were directed at on-port facilities, the 
ports commissioned a study to solve the problem of long-haul freight trains that would 
	  
	  





have enough potential to further distribute the freight. They hired Transportation 
Marketing Services to determine the preferred routes and important operating and 
engineering issues (ACTA, 2013, p. 28f). In November 1988, the study concluded with 
the recommendation of a single rail right-of-way.  
A “newly built grade-separated rail line, completely rebuilt to handle high volumes of 
train movements, would be cheaper than the sum of individual capacity expansion 
projects that would have to be undertaken by the individual railroads along with the 
multiple grade separations that continued use of the other rail lines would require. Of 
the choices, one alignment appeared to contain sufficient land and to lie largely in 
industrial territory: a line along Alameda Street known by its owner, the Southern 
Pacific, as the San Pedro Branch” (1988 study, p. 21). 
Among other recommendations, the study outlined several ownership structures for the 
corridor: 1) ownership could remain with the current owners; 2) a jointly-owned 
company might be developed, with ownership vested in the three railroads at an agreed 
percentage; or 3) an independent organization might be formed that would acquire the 
property rights – the solution that was eventually picked. Regarding the organizational 
structure, the study presented the following three alternatives: 1) the establishment of an 
independent operating authority under the auspices of the ports; 2) the creation of an 
operating entity jointly owned by the railroads with equal shares; and 3) retention of 
existing ownership, having the individual railroads grant reciprocal trackage rights to 
each other.  
The study further recommended evaluating a 2.5-mile below-ground segment through 
Compton. However, it was “generally believed that such an undertaking would be 
politically challenging and prohibitively expensive, given the number of communities 
	  
	  





along the corridor who might also want the line below ground in their city” (ACTA, 2013, 
p. 27). Subsequently, several at grade/combined bridge options were considered.   
In the Environmental Impact Statements and reports the rail corridor was projected to 
cost $2.4 billion, a number which, in the end, the project did not exceed. Further, the 
actual design does not differ from the initial design as laid out in the EIR of January 
1993 and the EIS of February 1996. Both reports define the main outline of the project. 
Depressing the largest part of the Corridor below surface level was among several 
conceptual engineering alternatives considered, already circulated in the EIR, and 
identified in the Final EIR/EIS as the preferred alternative of the cities. Other 
possibilities considered were trainway, roadway or other grade separation alternatives, 
or a combination of these elements. All alternatives were rejected, in large part because 
they would affect a larger population along the route (FEIS, 1996). There were only 
minor deviations from the EIS, which included a variety of additional improvements 
along Alameda Street and some specific additions to public space, as separately 
negotiated with the cities, further discussed below. Traffic forecasts played a crucial role, 
as the project is funded by revenue bonds. Both the EIR and the EIS expected increases 
in freight volume due to port growth (FEIS, 1996). 
In sum, the decision to build the Corridor was supported by a range of traffic forecast 
studies. No cost-benefit analysis, however, was conducted to compare the project’s costs 
and benefits with alternatives or a “no-build” option. 
6.3. The Politics of Decision-Making 
In the previous sections I situated the project decision process within the larger context 
and political climate of the time, and described the project studies that were conducted. 
Now the most frustrating part, crucial for the project, were the negotiations with the 
railroads for the rights-of-way, which had to be secured before any other project 
	  
	  





decisions could be made. The ports paid the sum of $394 million to obtain the rights-of-
way from the hard-bargaining railroads, which initially refused to cooperate. After this 
was settled, the next problems occurred on the ACTA Board, where not everybody was 
pulling in the same direction, with looming consequences for the requested federal 
funding. In the remainder of the chapter I will describe in more detail the actors, their 
rationales and their interactions as they participated in and shaped the decision process.  
6.3.1.	  Negotiations	  With	  the	  Railroads	  
Three private railroad companies, Southern Pacific Railroad, Santa Fe and Union Pacific 
served the Southern Californian area since the 19th century. On their old rights-of-way, 
laid out for the requirements of that time, long freight trains were slowly moving to their 
destination, clogging the now extensive road network at 200 at-grade crossings. These 
three competitors for port access had to be convinced to give up their own tracks in favor 
of one consolidated freight corridor. Besides the general problem to find the funding for 
the corridor, these negotiations proved to be a great obstacle.  
The railroads were concerned about their loss of value on the properties, their loss of 
exclusivity, and the associated loss of competitive edge. Therefore, they demanded high 
prices. To resolve the freight traffic bottleneck, the ports agreed that they should put up 
the money for the railroad rights-of-way and started to negotiate with them in 1992. The 
mayors of L.A. and Long Beach and several advisors facilitated the negotiations, but the 
ACTA board itself was not part of it.  
The negotiations were fierce. A transcript of a 1993 Joint Hearing by the Assembly Select 
Committees on the Alameda Corridor Project and on California Ports reveals the 
frustrations felt by all the relevant California representatives and agencies. Co-chaired by 
assembly members Martha M. Escutia and Betty Karnette, the hearing established 
	  
	  





several problems with the right-of-way purchases: at that stage in the negotiations, no 
public information concerning the prices was available, only rumors of substantial 
demands. Further, there appeared to be no established procedures for property 
appraisals and criteria, nor any acknowledged precedents by the railroad spokespersons 
(in this case: Robert Starzel of the Southern Pacific Railroad). There also was a degree of 
incredulousness about the fact that the railroads had been, at the time of their founding, 
given the land and rights-of-way for free (testimony of Daniel Fessler, the President of 
the California Public Utilities Commission), and that they now demanded large sums of 
money to transfer them (Escutia and Karnette, 1993). 
In fact, the railroads needed the project. They were motivated by the prospects of rail 
track improvements in the future – like grade separations at Redondo Junction, which 
would eliminate conflicts between passenger and freight trains. It helped that the 
charges were implemented uniformly for all rail companies, so that they could likely be 
included in the cost of the goods and products shipped. Originally, they had not been 
willing to put any money into the project (Interview #13, 2008). In particular, the idea of 
future user fees prolonged the negotiations. The Southern Pacific Railroad was especially 
reluctant, as it had the strongest competitive edge among the three rail operators and 
was using the corridor that would become the joint right-of-way (Starzel at the Public 
Hearing, Escutia and Karnette, 1993). 
When the negotiations failed, politics took over. In 1993, Assembly Member Juanita 
MacDonald introduced a bill that would grant the California Department of 
Transportation “the right to condemn the railroad property should negotiations fail” 
(ACTA, 2013, p. 49, Escutia and Karnette, 1993). One of the proposed options, should 
negotiations fail, was to implement new state legislation establishing the right to exercise 
the state’s eminent domain power (e.g. pp. 21, 56, 93). A bill to that effect was actually 
	  
	  





passed by the state legislature in August 1993. The bill authorized the State Department 
of Transportation to exercise the right of eminent domain over property owned by “a 
railroad corporation” upon request of ACTA, if “necessary, incidental, or convenient for 
the construction of the Alameda Corridor project” (AB 871, 8/93). Pressure on the 
railroads increased. However, the substantial cash benefits emerging from the 
immediate sale of the railroad rights-of-way to the ports finally convinced them 
(Interview #13, 2008). 











The original deal with Southern Pacific was set at $260 million and was approved by 
both harbor commissions but was annulled a short time after the port commissioners 
had approved it by the new mayor of Los Angeles. The prior mayor, Democrat Tom 
Bradley, had presided over the negotiations, but the incoming mayor, Republican 
Richard Riordan, cancelled the proposed agreement because it was “expensive and 
incomplete” (ACTA, 2013, p. 50). In the next round of negotiations, the right-of-way 
costs were negotiated together with the future user fees the railroads would have to pay, 
and which would be funded by bonds. The railroads entered an unprecedented 
“Memorandum of Understanding for Joint Use and Operations Agreements” that was 60 
pages long and included the railroad companies’ use of the corridor as well as their 
payment of user fees.52 However, it would take another four years until the details were 
hammered out and memorialized in a final agreement (Hahn, 2002, ACTA, 2013, p. 54). 
Although the ports had initially resisted calls for them to pay for the rights-of-way, the 
final deal resulted in the ports’ paying $394 million to the railroad companies. 
The ACTA remained responsible for securing funding. The Memoranda of 
Understanding with the railroads and ports, based on various freight projection studies, 
established user fees as a source of revenue for the future bond repayments. In return for 
the port’s contribution to secure the rights-of-way, the understanding held that the 
railroads would pay for user fees. This financial base made it possible to support the 
project’s revenue bond obligations of more than $1.1 billion and also served to 
underwrite repayment of the DOT loan, thus contributing 65 percent of the $2.4 billion 
project budget (Agarwal et al, 2004).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 Railroad use fees and container charges were calculated as follows: for each loaded 20-foot equivalent unit 
the railroads would initially pay a fee of $15 (and $4 for each empty container; $8 for other types of loaded 
rail cars), with increases of between 1.5 percent and 4.5 percent per year (depending on inflation) over a 60 
year period. Effective January 1, 2010, the fees are $19.60, $4.96 and $9.92, respectively (ACTA 2010). 
	  
	  





Paying the railroads was quite controversial. In a Los Angeles Times article entitled “A 
Robbery from Downtown to the Sea,” Jerry Epstein, a member of the California 
Transportation Commission, questioned the rationale of paying $200 million more to 
the Southern Pacific Railroad than the State Board of Equalization’s valuation of the 
property. Epstein wrote: “If consummated, Southern Pacific Railroad will have received 
approximately $945 million – almost $1 billion—in public funds in the past three years 
for rights-of-way that Southern Pacific will continue to use after billions more of public 
funds are spent to finance improvements to the lines. California’s other railroads also 
have profited from similar public largess, even when the railroads were granted the 
rights-of-way for free more than a century ago” (Epstein, Los Angeles Times, 1993).  
6.3.2.	  Politics	  on	  the	  ACTA	  Board	  
The Alameda Corridor Task Force formed a Joint Powers Authority, because a variety of 
government agencies and boundary crossings were involved in the project, and SCAG, 
the regional planning agency, was legally excluded to take on that role (ACTA, 2013, p. 
29f). The Joint Powers Authority (JPA) agreement that formalized cooperation of the 
cities, the ports and all other actors, including the cities along the corridor, on 
implementation of the corridor, was signed on August 30, 1989. The JPA (or, rather, the 
“Consolidated Transportation Corridor Joint Powers Authority” (CTCJPA)), changed its 
name into the less confusing acronym ACTA in October 1990. ACTA held design and 
implementation authority over the corridor.  
The JPA’s broad responsibilities were: the development of a comprehensive plan and 
implementation schedule for a consolidated corridor; handling the financing, land and 
right-of-way issues; and potentially managing construction, maintenance and operations 
(ACTA, 2013, p. 33). Upon execution of the final agreement, the ACTF was disbanded 
and some of its managers went to other positions. This is also when the first political 
	  
	  





differences with the corridor cities, which wanted greater representation on the JPA, 
arose. 
6.3.3.	  The	  Corridor	  Cities	  
Alameda Corridor runs through the cities of Long Beach, Carson, Compton, Lynwood, 
South Gate, Huntington Park, Vernon and Los Angeles. The political clout of some of 
these (very poor) communities was not as big as that of the port cities or Los Angeles. 
The communities were uncomfortable with a train running through their neighborhoods 
and questioned their share of the project’s costs and benefits. They would have to bear 
construction noise and disruption, air and noise pollution, increased truck traffic 
alongside the corridor, and potentially hazardous freight coming through, which led to 
severe conflicts.  
The cities had been represented in the project on the Alameda Corridor Task Force, the 
JPA and now on the ACTA. According to the ACTA (2013), there was some negotiation 
around the representation on the JPA board. ACTF, which created the JPA, suggested 
that only (financial) stakeholders should be represented on this board. This would 
include Los Angeles and Long Beach but not the inland corridor cities. After protests by 
the latter, they were offered one (consolidated) vote on the board (for all six corridor 
cities), which they opposed on the ground that one vote would not adequately reflect the 
diverse needs of the different cities. They nearly had to acquiesce, but the ACTF chair 
Joan Milke Flores took their side and negotiated a voting representation for all six. She 
says: “I could identify with them. […] My (council) district with its discrete, identifiable 
areas had the feel of several little cities within it.” Eventually, the ports relented (ACTA, 









For the corridor cities, the megaproject, though beneficial for the region, was most 
invasive, because it cut through residential neighborhoods. The main achievement of the 
corridor cities was securing the long mid-trench stretch of the Corridor. The initial 
project proposal envisioned tracks at surface grade the entire length of the Corridor, and 
the ports resisted the idea of a trench because of increased cost. It became obvious very 
soon (in 1989) that the corridor cities would use their voting power on the board if the 
increased train traffic would run through their communities at surface grade. So, moving 
forward, the ACTA agreed to an open-air trench, which added an estimated $700 million 
to project costs. According to the ACTA (2013, p. 36), it was Huntington Park mayor 
Tom Jackson, later the ATCA chair, who fought relentlessly for the below-grade option.  










Some actually argued that a trench could lower costs, given the overpasses that would 
have to be built for automobile traffic to cross tracks at surface grade. The below-grade 
option was analyzed in the DEIS and FEIS and declared the preferred option, because 
the corridor cities would not have supported the document otherwise. The ports, since 
they were already spending so much money on railroad properties, agreed to the trench 
option if it were funded by other sources (ACTA, 2013, p. 42). 
The problems on the board increased, however, with the ACTA arguing that the corridor 
cities were posing too many demands. From the ACTA’s perspective, the corridor cities 
tried to “milk” the project for financial support, economic development and ongoing 
compensation. Job training and local labor turned the project into one of the most 
significant public-works projects in the United States. For instance, local workers 
accounted for thirty percent of the hours worked on the trench (Interview #16, 2009). 
The general perspective on the ACTA governing board was that the ACTA had made 
substantial investments already – e.g. by agreeing to the mid-Corridor trench at 
enormous expense. The ACTA insisted the project was not an economic development 
project. As Interviewee #10 (2009) argued, it was important to keep the job training and 
employment programs in perspective, avoiding the situation (which occurred with the 
Big Dig) of permitting local employment to become the main focus of the project.  
At first, the ACTA amended the joint powers agreement and introduced a clause that 
held that only financial stakeholders could vote on decisions concerning project finances. 
All fourteen voting members on the board approved the amendment (including the 
corridor cities’ representatives), possibly because they did not understand what they 
were doing (Erie, 2001). The corridor cities came to regret this decision.  When they 
discovered they no longer had direct leverage, they tried to gain influence over project-
related decisions in other ways.  
	  
	  





When they resorted to legal action, the situation further deteriorated. In 1996, the court 
ruled against them, holding that the ACTA and the financial stakeholders could structure 
their decision-making processes “any way they like.” This led to the removal of the six 
corridor cities from the governing board (ACTA, 2013, p. Ch. 4&5). The remaining 
parties on the board all had some kind of financial stake in the project and thus had an 
interest in quick decisions.  
The corridor cities continued to possess political leverage through (potentially) causing 
construction and permit delays, complaints to their Congressional representatives, and 
lawsuits.  
First, the cities were in control of the crucial local permitting process, which could 
potentially be used to delay construction and project implementation (Erie, 2004, p. 
161). Second, some corridor cities filed a series of lawsuits over the course of several 
years pertaining to a variety of issues, among them suits seeking reinstatement on the 
board under the terms of the original JPA or attempting to block a terminal expansion 
project on the waterfront in 1994. (In an angry response, the City of Long Beach initially 
announced it would withdraw from the ACTA) (ACTA, 2013, Ch. 5). Both options carried 
several problems: first, they threatened bond funding, as the time-sensitive revenue 
bonds relied on the timeliness of project approval. Second, the cities directly threatened 
to withhold approval of important project documentation, like the EIS. Third, discord 
with the cities might threaten the united front that the ACTA touted when lobbying for 
financial support for the project in Washington. 
Third, the corridor cities, according to the ACTA, negatively influenced their 
Congressional representatives:  
	  
	  





“On the political front, while ACTA was trying to convince Secretary of Transportation 
Frederico Pena that the project should receive federal funding, in part, because it 
enjoyed the support of local governments, the small cities were reporting just the 
opposite to their state and congressional representatives. Community support for the 
project was essential. Competition for federal dollars was keen and many other 
competing projects had strong, united, broad-based community support. The small 
cities’ political strategy of blocking project funding, therefore, threatened to derail the 
project” (ACTA, 2013, p 57f). 
So it became necessary for the ACTA to negotiate individual agreements with the small 
cities to ensure the fast forward momentum of the project and to create the united 
regional front that would help obtain federal funding (described below). Individual 
“settlement agreements” allocated a total sum of $12 million to the cities for mitigation 
of construction activities, agreements to not challenge the EIS/EIR, and for Memoranda 
of Understanding that eliminated uncertainties like permit licenses (Hicks 2008). 
(I have several times (over the course of 3 years) attempted to reach representatives from 
some of the corridor cities, but they have either been out of office for too long, or even 
imprisoned, as I learned by calling the official numbers) (local administrators, and 
Interviewees H and K). 
6.3.4.	  Other	  Political	  Struggles:	  Putting	  Together	  the	  Funding	  	  
The costs of the project were a concern, and piecing together project funding became a 
political masterpiece. When project planning began in 1989, the project was thought to 
cost $400 million. Although the ACTA struggled to keep project costs under $2 billion 
(Interview #13, 2008), by the time of final budget approval costs were projected at $2.4 
billion – which the actual project costs did not exceed. About $700 million of this 
	  
	  





increase was attributable to the decision to build the project below ground, as preferred 
by the communities it passes through. Another reason for the increase was that the 
ACTA originally did not know how much money would be needed to secure the rights-of-
way from the railroads until the final route was defined in the EIS/EIR. 
Since the ports are municipally regulated in Southern California, their problems and 
needs must be met locally. By this point, they had already paid the $394 million right-of-
way costs to the railroads (which in the end constituted 14 percent of the entire sum). 
But most of the money still needed to be found. The ACTA had looked into different ways 
to finance the Corridor and finally put together an elaborate financing scheme.  
The contractual arrangement helped establish trust in the revenue-based financial model 
for all parties involved. A special section in the Los Angeles City Charter provided the 
ACTA with the legal authority to proceed with a design-build (DB) procurement, which 
treats two project stages simultaneously. The DB contract enabled the ACTA to shift the 
risk of liquidated damages to the contractor, if the project was not completed on time. 
Thus, it produced strong incentives to complete the work on time, which was necessary 
because the financial model was based on future revenue streams. The incentives 
worked, and the contractor delivered the project seven days ahead of schedule (Hicks, 
2008). The financing structure (revenue-dependent) disciplined both the project time 
and budget, making it easier for other parties to approve of the project, because financial 
risks were minimized. Further, a certain degree of flexibility was also built in because of 
a $200 million contingency fund, which eventually became available to spend on 
additional small projects related to the corridor (Interview #9, 2009). 
	  
	  





6.3.5.	  Obtaining	  the	  Federal	  Loan	  
The federal portion of the money ($11 million in 1982, $42 million in 1987) had been 
earmarked a long time before but had never been used, because the state and local 
matching funds were not available. In an effort at fiscal house-keeping, Congress 
threatened to remove the earmarked allocations, a move that the ACTA had not 
expected. After failed attempts to secure some state funding for the project and declined 
federal allocations, the ACTA had to change its strategy.   
The enormous dimensions of the project and the absence of freight transportation 
structures made it difficult for the ACTA to obtain funding from traditional sources 
(FHWA, 1999). The ACTA decided to apply for federal funding, requiring an 
environmental analysis under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1970, 
and applied for a $700 million federal grant from the Surface Transportation 
Subcommittee of the House of Representatives in 1994. One of the strategies to obtain 
federal support was to provide a unique regional front in favor of the project. The 
corridor cities’ opposition and lawsuits did not help that cause, setting incentives for the 
ACTA to placate them with financial support, employment programs and lowering the 
tracks below grade, as described above. The ACTA was successful: in the words of 
Assemblywoman Escuria, vis-à-vis the federal government, everybody involved 
presented a united front when lobbying for federal support like “one big, happy 
dysfunctional family” (cited by Erie, 2004, p. 155).  
Another lobbying strategy was emphasizing the project’s global and national importance. 
For instance, with regard to economic issues, the ACTA commissioned an economic 
study that characterized Alameda Corridor’s potential economic impact and trade and 
transportation benefits for each Congressional district (all 435), giving each member of 
Congress reason to support the project (Interview #13, 2009, ACTA, 2013, p. 69f).  
	  
	  





As a consequence, the ACTA was able to establish strong bi-partisan support among 
Senators and House members. Among the supporters for the high-priority designation 
were Republican Congressmen Steve Horn and David Dreier and California Governor 
Pete Wilson. California was well-represented on transportation-related Congressional 
committees: there were eight California members on the House Public Works and 
Transportation Committee, Senator Barbara Boxer sat on the Senate Environment and 
Public Works Committee, and Senator Diane Feinstein sat on the Senate Appropriations 
Committee. Both Democratic senators (especially Boxer) were crucial in promoting key 
legislative provisions, particularly opening the federal highway program and National 
Highway System Designation Act up to the support of a freight rail corridor (Interview 
#7, 2013). 
But still, securing funding was a tall order, and few believed funding would be secured 
(Buntin, Los Angeles Times, March 16, 1994). Because of the budget crises and the 
federal government’s concern that the railroads would be unnecessarily subsidized by a 
grant (Interviewee #9), the support waned. A crucial change came about in 1995, when 
the Alameda Corridor project was elevated by Congress to a project of national 
significance – designated as “high priority corridor.” The argument was that the cargo 
bottleneck became a national security problem when a tremendous amount of material 
had to be transported through the ports during the first Gulf War in 1990-91.  
Reportedly, a then-staff member in Mayor Riordan ’s office first brought up the idea for a 
federal loan rather than a grant (Erie, 2004, p. 263). The project’s status as a “high 
priority corridor” provided the legal authority for the U.S. Secretary of Transportation to 
structure a loan (ACTA, 2013, p. 74). The loan was confirmed by the federal DOT and 
ACTA in 1997. The resulting funding scheme was so successful that the loan became the 
model for the federal TIFIA loans. 
	  
	  





The White House under President Bill Clinton was also crucial for forging a successful 
federal loan agreement, due to strong California connections. Clinton proposed and 
promoted a very important $59 million federal appropriation that was needed to back up 
the $400 million DOT loan over three years, and Congress eventually approved it. As a 
final obstacle, the opposition of Republican Congressman Frank Wolf (Virginia) had to 
be overcome. His opposition was based on the transportation earmark the federal 
appropriation held (he generally opposed earmarking), his wariness of public-works 
projects going wrong (like the Big Dig debacle), and a disagreement with L.A. Mayor 
Richard Riordan “over the use of airport revenues to supplement police and fire 
department budgets.” This set in motion a series of phone calls among Congressional 
representatives, the governor and House Speaker Newt Gingrich. In June 1996, the 
Governor was able to issue a press release announcing the federal loan (ACTA, 2013, p. 
74ff). 
The White House held a specific signing ceremony for the loan. As the Los Angeles Times 
suggested, both political parties were eager to please the “vote-rich” California area with 
favors and “pork barrel” spending in order to attract votes for the 1998 presidential 
elections (Leeds and Borneman, L.A. Times, 1997). Then, in 1999, the ACTA secured the 
remainder of the funding with revenue bonds.  
6.4. Conclusion 
The Alameda Corridor was completed in 2004 at an on-budget cost of $2.4 billion. 
Revenue service began immediately. Until about 2009, payments on bonds were on 
schedule, but the ACTA fell behind because the recession decreased the amount of cargo 
coming through the ports (ACTA website).  
With respect to the decision-making stages described in Chapter 3, the process went as 
follows: The problem of disastrous traffic situation by the 1980s was impossible to 
	  
	  





ignore. A range of studies projected the situation would only worsen, and follow-up 
studies determined a freight rail corridor to be the only viable option. The only choices 
involved were the route and whether to build it at or below grade. In order to remain 
competitive on the regional and global markets, the ports of Los Angeles and Long 
Beach, backed by relevant local agencies and politicians, decided to address the problem. 
They put it on the regional agenda by establishing a joint powers authority that went 
looking for solutions and funding. Establishing the implementing authority, which then 
took up design and the search for funding, implied project approval by the ports, cities 
and regional agencies. Another source of project approval was implied by the federal 
designation of the project as a project of “national significance,” and subsequent funding. 
Project approval was wrung from the opposing cities along the corridor with a 
combination of legal means and economic incentives. 
With respect to the hypotheses:  
Macro-level government arrangements matter for transportation decision-making 
because they organize the political arenas and institutions. Infrastructure governance 
is dependent on these structures, and permeated by the dynamics and values of 
fragmentation, devolution and privatization.  
Similar to the Second Avenue Subway case study, the macro-level structures mainly 
come in through the nature of federalist systems to delegate infrastructure investment 
decisions to the state and local levels. In this case, no federal funding precedence was 
available, and the ACTA successfully carved out a mold to obtain funding from the 
federal government.  
On the other hand, a second aspect of federal influence on project decisions concerns the 
requirement to document project decisions: one of the interviewees (#9, 2013) remarked 
that the corridor would not have been successfully implemented in today’s era of 
environmental awareness. Instead, environmental activists and groups would have sued. 
	  
	  





The ACTA did fulfill the then-new federal EIS procedures, because they aimed to get 
federal funding. Further, with an eye on Boston’s disastrous Big Dig, ACTA planners and 
engineers early on integrated the Native American community in order to be able to 
quickly and adequately deal with old gravesites upon their discovery, which was assumed 
to be a near-certainty.  
Lobbying for the federal loan involved further project politics. It helped that California’s 
Congressional delegation was well represented in transportation-relevant committees, 
and they all lobbied for the project. The nature of the U.S. congressional system, with its 
multiple committees, but especially its unique power to actually draft bills (and not just 
vote on them), made it easier for Alameda Corridor proponents to be heard in multiple 
committees. I assume it facilitated legislation because the already numerous supporters 
received more widespread consideration. It was a hard but crucial piece of lobbying and 
strategic effort to secure full Congressional support by presenting material that 
demonstrated how freight movement to and from the relevant ports affected every 
Congressional district throughout the country. Further, the federal decision to reject the 
grant application and extend a loan instead speaks to the uncertain nature of the railroad 
deal and is testimony to the ongoing delegation of transportation decisions to localities. 
Physical attributes like project modes, types and location determine which actors are 
involved in project decisions. 
Because the corridor runs through multiple, horizontally organized (in terms of formal 
political power) jurisdictions and its proponents made the case for the corridor as a 
project of national significance, the project had to integrate and receive support from a 
complex political network of stakeholders beyond the metropolitan area at all levels. 
The project type, freight rail, influenced the political decision-making process by its lack 
of formal procedural decision rules: in recent history there were no such projects built. 
	  
	  





Hence, project proponents had to structure the organizational setting themselves and set 
up a single-purpose authority. 
Transportation authorities serve as the hinge between the general political and societal 
context and the projects themselves and thus channel national, regional or local 
politics. Depending on their degree of autonomy, they are often the driving force 
behind project decisions. 
The negotiations with the railroads were a politically delicate endeavor because so much 
public (port) money went to private railroad corporations (with the stipulation they 
would pay user fees for the corridor later) that had received their land for free from the 
public, along with a variety of other public support. Their demands for several hundred 
millions of dollars seemed excessive to those participating and interested in the 
decisions. The tension between the public interest (politics) and these private 
corporations went so far as to provoke new legislation that would have allowed the ACTA 
to seize the rail properties if no agreement had been reached. 
A general pro-business climate furthered this project. The pro-business climate arose 
from the forces of globalization that entered the two ports in a regional competition for 
global trade shares. Expected growth projections accelerated the need for better freight 
distribution in the region. At the same time, the powerful L.A. mayor Riordan, a former 
business entrepreneur, and his administration were known as business- and 
development-oriented. Their support was necessary, because, traditionally, Los Angeles 
exercises strong control over its port. Although the poor communities along the Corridor 
welcomed the economic opportunities, they might not have chosen these opportunities 
over their undisrupted neighborhoods, but their veto power was muted.  
Job training and employment programs, at least in the United States, became an 
important element in negotiating the implementation of megaprojects (e.g. Big Dig, 
AirTrain JFK). Structuring project construction in part as a public-works project appears 
	  
	  





to consolidate political support for projects, especially among constituencies with 
NIMBY concerns.  
A variety of political, economic and social interests drive transportation investment 
decisions, and their respective impacts are dependent on institutional arrangements 
and financial means. 
Because freight rail corridors did not have established decision structures, stakeholders 
had to create new organizational forms and funding sources. The ACTA, the main 
organizational agency, was uniquely structured, because it was established by and 
included relevant decision-makers, including competitors and opposition. The ACTA still 
exists, and, in addition to managing the Alameda Corridor, it extended its 
responsibilities to other projects.  
The politics of infrastructure investment decisions is the art of directing funding streams.  
The ACTA was able to secure funding because it secured a strong group of project 
supporters in Congress, thus turning the project decision over to the legislature. 
Negotiating with the corridor cities on and off the board, which allowed the construction 
of a unified front of project support, was a second mechanism to secure funding. A third 
mechanism – the nature of the DB contract – was not a stroke of political craft but, 
rather, a deft managerial move, which built trust in a revenue-based project. 
	  
	  






Infrastructure investment decisions were always crucial, but the effects of increasing 
populations, climate change and international and regional conflicts increase the 
importance of careful consideration of project alternatives. The accelerating 
technological progress of the past one and a half centuries, and particularly the last few 
decades, increased the number of potential transport options. Newer, smarter and more 
sustainable ways to implement infrastructure are available and necessary. One of the 
important questions for our time is how projects get selected. I showed that cost-benefit 
analyses were conducted for only half of the projects in the database, which indicates 
that various agendas other than transport-economic objectives –politics— account for 
project selection criteria. Politics can be both supportive and detrimental to the new 
infrastructure challenges. This dissertation illuminated how murky and contested the 
decision-making processes are. Informed by the hypotheses, I will present the main 
findings of the dissertation in turn, then discuss some of their major implications, and 
provide an outlook for future research. I will draw on the quantitative and case study 
findings, where appropriate. 
1. Any infrastructure investment project is a product of its time. Besides 
technological advances that open new possibilities, notions of modernity and progress 
influence infrastructure. In the dissertation they were part of the project “context.” For 
decades, the pro-highway bias in the U.S. hampered the Second Avenue Subway 
implementation (and then financial constraints). Major events, like the catastrophe of 
September 11, 2001, which might have opened up national sympathies for large urban 
areas and their disparate infrastructure security burdens, impact project decisions as 
well. The decision to build Alameda Corridor was facilitated by declaring it a project of 
	  
	  





national significance with respect to national security implications. Further, heightened 
environmental awareness and documentation requirements might make building 
Alameda Corridor impossible today, just a few years later.  
2. Transportation investment decisions most frequently are funding 
decisions. The U.S. does not formally stipulate funding for subways or a project like 
Alameda Corridor. Instead, federal grants are subject to funding competitions. Both case 
studies succeeded in getting partial federal financial support. Still, a majority of funding 
needs to be secured locally. Because a lot of money is at stake and everybody wants a 
piece, funding competitions are fierce.  
3. The dwindling role of national governments across the globe in favor of 
local decision-making shifts project and funding decisions to the local level.  
The database indicates a general proliferation of funding sources for transportation 
investment projects over the past decades. Though national governments still provide a 
large share of infrastructure investment funding (in federal and centralized systems 
alike, although the most in Europe), their share decreased over the past few decades, 
while that of local funding sources increased. The case studies show, however, that 
despite both projects being deeply local projects, national-level institutions are routinely 
involved in project decisions. Initially not involved in the decision-making, Congress 
became crucial though when ACTA went lobbying them for money. And federal funding 
stipulated the building of the Second Avenue Subway in phases, as opposed to a 
complete project. 
4. Creating broad pro-project coalitions is crucial. Each transportation 
megaproject is composed of different sets of support and opposition groups. 
Agency fragmentation and privatization trends further contribute to more 
complicated decision and funding schemes.  
Changing dynamics that affect the macro level governance arrangements, such as 
decentralization and fragmentation, strengthen project complexities and thus the 
	  
	  





pressure to compromise. Support coalitions become increasingly complicated, as local, 
urban, regional, state and national departments, agencies, institutions, interest and 
lobby groups or organizations compete with each other for influence. In recent decades 
environmental and transportation lobbying activists have joined them, while a push for 
security measures became an ever-stronger concern, too. The data analysis confirms the 
increasingly complexity of funding sources for projects.   
The composition of actors may vary by project type also. In the U.S., decision-makers are 
organized by project mode: investment decisions for highways take place in the highway 
administrations on the federal, state or local level, while investment decisions for rail 
within the railroad administration. Here the politics of subways is different than the 
politics of highways because of different institutions, decision-making structures, 
physical implications in dense urban spaces, and because of different support and 
opposition coalitions.  
Further, certain types of macro-political arrangements actually increase the numbers of 
actors. The data shows that the number of potential project veto points in federalist 
governments exceeds those of their centralized counterparts. The state agency MTA, or 
more specifically, the Transit Authority, was a main driving force behind the Second 
Avenue Subway project. The MTA answers to the governor and the state legislature (in 
capital decisions). Thus the city subway became a project of statewide relevance. Actual 
final approval of the project came from the state level and implied approval from the 
national government, when the Subway won the grant competition. A metropolitan 
planning advocacy group, and statewide transportation alliance sufficiently backed the 
project by lobbying for a 2005 Bond Issue Act that provided crucial seed funding for the 
subway. Altogether, the stakeholder coalition included 37 regional groups, ranging from 
transit enthusiasts over research centers to industry, like Parsons-Brinckerhoff, business 
	  
	  





associations and unions. The Upper East Side, industry and construction workers got a 
new subway, the utility of which will be improved when extended further. 
The Alameda Corridor was supported by a broad social and political coalition that sought 
to improve traffic conditions in the metropolitan area. Further, the project benefited 
from a climate of local and national economic competitiveness that restructured the 
entire region to fit globalization demands, e.g. gaining a larger share of the global freight 
traffic (Erie, 2004). On the other hand, some of the actors required “convincing.” The 
consent of the private railways, accompanied by some outside protest, was literally 
bought: Political pressure was exercised on the three private railroad companies to give 
up their individual right-of-ways to share one track. That strikes me as a strong instance 
of politics in transportation decisions. The poor cities along the Corridor were initially 
concerned about the “concentrated costs and dispersed benefits” of the project (Erie, 
2004, p. 158) and thus lost their voting position on the ACTA board in the process. They 
gained job programs and local projects, especially when their support was needed to 
present a unified front in Washington to obtain federal funding.   
5. The nature of transportation agencies matters. Depending on the type 
(line agencies, special purpose agencies, or single purpose agencies) 
transportation agencies either contain the inbuilt conflicts of their creators, 
or they already embody consent for a project. This yields strong impacts on 
project decision and implementation processes. On the other hand, 
transportation agencies may act as a potential shield from politics, with the 
ability to hold and maintain items on a long-term agenda.  
Transportation agencies change only slowly, and they reflect the structures that created 
them. They are not very flexible because they are in a double bind: they reflect and 
depend on the structures that created them, and they develop own agendas and 
institutional inflexibilities over time.  
It was the MTA/TA that kickstarted the Second Avenue Subway – a project on the 
agenda for nearly a century, and throughout changing transportation needs in the area. 
	  
	  





The project idea only really took off once the agency was in place. Most importantly, the 
agency put the project on the relevant decision board in Albany. The TA made the 
decision to build the project, twice, and in tandem with its support coalitions funding 
was eventually secured (for the first phase). ACTA, on the other hand, was specifically 
created to build the Corridor. The agency ensured the project remained on track and, 
among other things, successfully removed critics from the ACTA board when they 
delayed project decisions. ACTA was not formally dependent on approval by any higher 
level institution. Instead, it was able to choose its battles and actively directed a lobby 
campaign on the federal level for funding.  
The nature of the transportation agency determines how the decision process is 
structured. The Second Avenue Subway project decision process is vertically arranged: 
the state agency MTA, implementing a local project, requires project approval from state 
level actors from the legislature and the Governor. ACTA, on the other hand, integrated 
regional stakeholders whose weight counted equally on the decision board (at least 
initially). It did not need approvals from higher levels, because it already embodied 
project approval. This reflects the different degrees of autonomy of the implementing 
authority and thus their necessity to compromise, or their potential for independent 
decision-making respectively. 
6. National governments disproportionately fund projects that have cost 
overruns and long implementation times. 
The database shows that projects underwritten by national funding are less efficient than 
privately funded ones: they experience longer implementation times and more cost 
overrun. This finding is particularly relevant as it indicates potential decision rationales: 
It is possible that the national level takes on more high scale and complex projects that 
could not be handled by lower levels to begin with. Another explanation might be that 
	  
	  





nationally funded projects tend to be poorly implemented. Privately funded projects, on 
the other hand, have shorter completion times. The explanation then might be that the 
private sector only takes on “simple” projects. In the Alameda Corridor project, the 
national government was involved in project funding with a loan only – and the project 
came in on time and without cost overrun. Second Avenue Subway is still under 
construction at the time of this writing.  
7. Generally, national level and grant-funded projects face weaker 
opposition. Further, opposition and cost overrun are associated. 
The data confirms that bond funding raises the likelihood of (“issue-oriented”) 
opposition in general. However, the finding requires further investigation, as the 
direction of the relationship is not clear. In both case studies, bonds provided a missing 
piece of funding. Politics come in because bond funding can serve to shift the financial 
risks of a project away from a dissenting party: In the Second Avenue Subway case the 
risk remained in parts with the tax payers who approved the Transportation Bond Act 
after a tough fight. Particularly Alameda Corridor drew opposition, mainly initial 
resistance from the railroads, and then NIMBY-type opposition from the Corridor Cities. 
Because of the Corridor Cities’ opposition and also because of reservations about 
“subsidizing” the private railroads, the federal government withdrew its grant earmark 
(and provided a loan instead). As a consequence the revenue risks remained entirely with 
the project sponsors responsible for the bonds, overcoming opposition and allowing the 
project to succeed. 
Public grants, on the other hand, are statistically associated with the absence of 
opposition (and with extended construction times), both in correlations and the 
regression analyses. The analyses show that project opposition is less likely, particularly 
when the projects are additions to already existing networks, and not entirely new ones. 
	  
	  





The in-depth analysis of the case studies confirms the relationship. Second Avenue 
Subway –pretty much without any major project opposition— is a network addition with 
partly national grant funding. Alameda Corridor, on the other hand, (was) entirely new 
and with a federal loan (and not a grant) and did encounter opposition. The case studies 
support the statistical findings. 
Implications for Infrastructure Investment   
New transportation infrastructure investment ideally addresses increasing population, 
environmental, and security concerns. Solutions include long-term energy saving 
measures through resilient infrastructure projects that can withstand changing weather 
conditions and anomalies and introduce or integrate more sustainable ways of transport, 
and affordable mass transit systems. Questions of context, decision structures, funding 
schemes and actor coalitions –of politics—become important for addressing these 
challenges. Political influence determines whether infrastructure investment benefits 
political constituencies or maybe under- or over-privileged social groups and 
neighborhoods, or whether it benefits industries and contractors, or whether 
transportation investment includes environmental goals or not.  
Using social and environmentally friendly types of infrastructure investment as a 
yardstick, the findings in this dissertation highlight the following limitations and 
opportunities in the politics of transportation decision-making.  
First, the diminishing role of national governments in decision-making removes the 
potential to cut through established local power structures in order to prepare the way 
for new infrastructure, e.g. environmentally friendly technologies. The role of the 
national governments –normatively speaking—remains important: in the 1950s the U.S. 
government implemented the federal highway system, today it could be a national 
railway system, a central goal of the Obama government.  
	  
	  





On the other hand, devolution trend of decision-making power undermines local 
stakeholder participation, and renders projects more complex. On local and state levels 
project decisions are often determined by local hierarchies or driven by personal gain. 
(The national level is not safe from these dynamics, seeing that the California piece of the 
proposed national highway system is continuously being challenged by Congress 
Republicans. However, rail investment, an allegedly unprofitable branch of 
transportation investment, has better chances with national support.) But local level 
decisions also allow for creating innovative resilient infrastructure projects through 
stakeholder engagement that reflects the very specific needs on a neighborhood or 
region.  
Second –and related to the first point—that project decisions were frequently funding 
decisions makes innovative projects dependent on old and new funding sources, and not 
on the merits of transportation utility, social justice or environmental friendliness. It is 
potentially more difficult for local projects to secure funding sources for innovative 
experiments, especially with respect to expensive transportation infrastructure. 
Third, inflexible political arrangements put comprehensive and innovative planning at 
risk, especially when separate departments deal with different transportation modes. I 
discussed that above. However, even though “picket fence federalism” prevails, national 
funding is associated with less project opposition and some positive success measures. 
Hence national governments could play a positive role in future infrastructure decisions 
as well. Thus restructuring national governance arrangements (in the U.S.) to open them 
for intermodal decisions, which might effectively open transportation options and 
address investment challenges. 
	  
	  





Fourth, depending on the type, transportation agencies could facilitate investment in 
new technologies, or be a barrier to it. As pointed out, most types of agencies are still 
dependent on outside approval that first needs to be established and thus enshrine old 
partisan frictions. Also, research suggests that agencies become less flexible over time. 
Therefore they might be slow to respond to new challenges. New agencies are more 
promising tools to address new infrastructure challenges. 
Fifth, looking forward and beyond economic rationales, the role of decision criteria like 
social, security and environmental sustainability goals need to be strengthened in the 
decision-making process. Many countries have already introduced social and 
environmental criteria in their decision processes. Sometimes they are included in the 
cost-benefit analyses, at other times individual studies are required. However, existing 
partisan politics, power structures and hierarchies that make changes difficult often 
overcome these criteria. While practitioners critique the required documentation 
because it is expensive or holds up project implementation, environmental and 
neighborhood groups often hold that such documentation is ineffective or manipulated. 
It is up to the national government to emphasize and fund appropriate goals and 
solutions.  
Outlook for Future Research 
I suggest the following points to be addressed in future research on transport investment 
politics:  
First, the analysis of the politics of infrastructure investment needs to collect more 
information on and explain why certain projects did not happen. This is to gauge and 
evaluate the relative impact of politics in their capacity to block projects. This point is 
also related to the study of project alternatives, and how they affected decision-making.  
	  
	  





Second, there is a need to more thoroughly identify new transportation challenges in the 
light of technological progress and environmental risks. A growing literature is already 
underway to do so. Henceforth, the attempts to introduce new transportation systems 
need to be included in the analysis, and where they fail within the old structures of power 
that might be in place. The study of discarded project alternatives will be useful. Valuable 
lessons may thus be drawn for the relative impacts of expertise vs. politics.  
Multi-methods research should be extended. It is an appropriate approach to questions 
of political decision-making because it weakens the trade off between depth and breadth. 
In future research we must expand the range of quantifiable transportation project data, 
to learn more about political dynamics. Data collection should include, for instance, 
party constellations and time overrun. Due to the sensitive nature of the data collection 
because megaproject decision-making is not very transparent by nature, all megaproject 











APPENDIX A: List of Projects 
  
1  Argentine/ Rosario-Victoria Bridge; Nuestra Señora del Rosario (Our Lady of 
Rosario); Puente Rosario-Victoria 
2 Australia/ City Link 
3 Australia/ South West Corridor Railway: Mandurah Line New MetroRail; 
(Mandurah Line); South West Corridor Railway 
4 Australia/ Sydney Cross City Tunnel 
5 Australia/ Sydney Harbour Tunnel  
6 Canada/ Canada Line  
7 China (Hong Kong)/ Highspeed Airport Express Line (AEL), excludes Tung 
Chung  
8 China (Hong Kong)/ KCRC West Rail (Kowloon-Canton Railway Corporation) 
9 China (Hong Kong)/ Western Harbour Crossing 
10 Denmark/ Copenhagen Metro  
11 Denmark/ Great Belt Fixed Link; Great Belt Fixed Link Rail and Road Project 
12 Denmark/ Oeresund Link; Øresundsbroen 
13 France/ Météor; Paris Météor 
14 France/ Millau Viaduct  
15 France/ LGV Méditerranée; TGV Med 
16 France/ LGV Est-Européenne; TGV Est 
17 France/ TGV Nord; LGV Nord 
18 Germany/ BAB 20 Motorway; Bundesautobahn 20; German Unity Transport 
Project 10; Verkehrsproject Deutsche Einheit 10/ VDE10; Baltic Sea Highway; 
Ostseeautobahn 
19 Germany/ ICE; Intercity Express (ICE) line Cologne-Rhine/Main; 
(Neubaustrecke (NBS) Koeln-Rhein-Main) 
20 Germany/ Tiergartentunnel Tunnel Tiergarten Spreebogen; larger project:  
transport facilities in the central area (Verkehrsanlagen im zentralen Bereich) 
21 Greece/ Attiki Odos 
22 Greece/ Athens Metro; Attiko Metro 
23 Greece/ Rion Antirion Bridge 
24 Israel/ Tel Aviv Light Rail 
25 Italy/ Frejus Road Tunnel 
26 Japan/ Kyushu Shinkansen 
27 Japan/ OEDO Line (Loop Section) 
28 Japan/ Linimo Aichi; Aichi High-Speed Transit Tobu Kyuryo Line 
29 Japan/ Yamate Tunnel; Metropolitan Expressway Central Circular C2 -  Shinjuku 
Route (Shuto Expressway) 
	  
	  





30 Korea/ KTX-1 Korea Train Express; Gyeongbu High Speed Rail 
31 Netherlands/ HSL-Zuid; (Hogesnelheidslijn) Zuid 
32 Netherlands/ RandstadRail  
33 Netherlands/ Beneluxlijn  
34 Russia/ Severo-Murskiy Tunnel  
35 Sweden/ Arlanda Air-Rail Link; Arlandabanan (the Arlanda Rail Link) 
36 Sweden (and Denmark) Oeresund; Öresundsförbindelsen 
37 Sweden/ Southern Link; Södra länken 
38 Thailand/ Bangkok/ Metro Blue Line; Mass Rapid Transit (MRT) system"; 
officially known as Chaloem Ratchamongkhon (Thai สายเฉลิมรัชมงคล) – 
"Celebration of Royal Auspice"  
39 Thailand/ Bangkok/ BTS Skytrain; รถไฟฟ้าบีทีเอส rot fai fa BTS or: "Elevated 
Train in Commemoration of HM the King's 6th Cycle Birthday 
(รถไฟฟ้าเฉลิมพระเกียรติ 6 รอบ พระชนมพรรษา)" or Green Line 
40 United Kingdom/ CTRL; Channel Tunnel Rail Link, CTRL; now High Speed 1 
41 United Kingdom/ Jubilee Extension; London Underground Jubilee Line 
Extension (JLE) 
42 United Kingdom/ M6 Toll Road 
43 United States/ Second Avenue Subway - Phase 1  
44 United States/ AirTrain JFK  
45 United States/ Alameda Corridor   
46 United States/ Big Dig; Central Artery/ Tunnel Project (CA/T); sometimes 
Central Artery/ Third Tunnel Project 
47 United States/ Big Dig (Tunnel); Ted Williams Tunnel 
48 United States/ Big Dig (Road); Big Dig Central Artery 
49 United States/ Honolulu Rail  
50 United States/ Denver FasTracks  
51 United States/ Portland-Milwaukie Light Rail  
52 USA/ ARC Tunnel  
53 USA/ Florida High Speed Rail  
54 Turkey/ Istanbul-Ankara HSR 
55 Turkey/ Marmaray  
56 Panama/ Panama Metro  
57 Israel/ Yitzhak Rabin Trans-Israel Highway 6   
58 Thailand/ Bangkok/ Elevated Road and Train System  
59 Germany/ Maglev  
60 Portugal/ Lisboa-Madrid Highspeed Rail 
	  
	  






List of Variables 
 
Variable  1 
Variable Name Project Name  
  
Variable  2 
Variable Name Country 
Description The political state or nation in which a project is located. 
Coding Coded into digits 
 
Variable  3 
Variable Name Continent 
Description Continent on which the project is located. 
Coding 1. EU (member states), 2. North America, 3. South America, 4. Asia, 5. 
Australia 
Comments Recoded into binaries (not overlapping – only one choice possible) 
 
Variable  4 
Variable Name National Population 
Description Population of a Country (2011) 
Comments Source: Information from Index Mundi, 
http://www.indexmundi.com/g/r.aspx?t=0&v=21&l=en, (November 
11, 2011; based on CIA world fact book) 
  
Variable   5 
Variable Name GDP PPP per Capita 
Description Purchasing Power Parity, in 2010 US$ 
Comments Source: Google public data, accessed April 29, 2012 
 
Variable   6 
Variable Name GDP per Capita 2010 
Description Gross Domestic Product in 2010 US$, 
Comments Source: Google public data, accessed April 29, 2012 
 
Variable   7 
Variable Name GDP per Capita 2000 
Description Gross Domestic Product in 2000 US$ 
Comments Source: Google public data, accessed April 29, 2012 
 
Variable   8 
Variable Name GDP per Capita 1990 
Description Gross Domestic Product in 1990 US$ 
Comments Source: Google public data, accessed April 29, 2012 
 
Variable    9 
Variable Name Political System 
Description National level distinction, by country, between unitary System 
(centralized political system) or federalist system  
Coding 1. Federal System, 2. Unitary System  
	  
	  






Variable   10 
Variable Name Legislative Structure 
Description National level legislative distinction between one and two chamber 
legislatures 
Coding 0. Two-chamber systems, 1. One-chamber systems 
  
Variable   11 
Variable Name Location 
Description The type of region spanned by the project.  Five categories: Inner-city 
projects:  Projects within the confines of cities or counties (the 
smallest political unit with transportation agencies). Metropolitan 
Area projects crossing city or county lines within the larger 
statistically defined metropolitan areas. Regional Projects serve 
specific regions, understood as areas with more than one city or 
metropolitan core. National projects: Projects a) spanning the large 
areas of a country or b) parts of larger, national infrastructure 
systems, like France’s high-speed rail system. International projects 
are projects that cross international borders. 
Coding 1. Inner-city projects, 2. Metropolitan projects, 3. Regional projects, 4. 
National projects, 5. International projects 
Comments Recoded into binaries (not overlapping – only one choice possible) 
  
Variable   12 
Variable Name Project Type 
Description The type of the project refers to the main structure of the project. E.g. 
highway, rail, bridge or tunnel.  
Coding 1. Highway, 2. Rail, 3. Tunnel, 4. Other  
Comments Recoded into binaries (not overlapping – only one choice possible) 
 
Variable    13 
Variable Name International Border 
Description Project crossing international border 
Coding 0. Not crossing international border, 1. Crossing international border 
 
Variable   14 
Variable Name Physical Dimensions I 
Description Project length in kilometers 
 
Variable   15 
Variable Name Physical Dimensions II 
Description Project length in lane or track kilometers. 
 
Variable   16 
Variable Name Nature of Project 
Description Whether the project is publicly funded, or has private funding 
participation 
Coding 0. Purely private or PPP, 1. Purely public 
 
Variable   17 
Variable Name Concession Type 
	  
	  





Description Type of concession or contractual arrangement 
Comments Data uncertain and incomplete 
   
Variable    18 
Variable Name Description 
Description Distinction whether a project is a new project, including 
improvements of former transportation options, i.e. Alameda 
Corridor, AirTrain JFK, Randstadrail, or an additional piece to 
existing projects (i.e. CTRL, Arlandabanan, Hongkong Airport 
Expressline) or a piece of a larger megaproject (i.e. tunnel in Big Dig); 
Additional piece in a larger network (i.e. TGV system, highway 
system) 
Coding 0. Additional project, 1. New project 
 
Variable   19 
Variable Name Project Stimulus 
Description Naming the main project stimulus, as far as it could be determined;  
Coding 1. Public effort (e.g. Part of a larger, long-term development plan) 
2. Special interest effort; e.g. International Bank for Construction and 
Redevelopment for KTX 
3. Crises/ opportunities (e.g. system change (i.e. German re-
unification); mega-events (Olympics, world fairs) 
4. Project history (since the 1920/30s) 
5. Addendum to other project (CTRL, Hongkong Express Rail, 
Arlandabanan) 
Comments Recoded into binaries (multiple choices possible) 
 
Variable    20 
Variable Name Project Status 
Description This variable informs about the project status with the following five 
options. 
Coding 1. Completed (includes those where I just look at first stage, too), 2. 
Partially completed, 3. Under planning, 4. Under construction, 5. 
Cancelled 
Comments Not used in the analysis 
 
Variable   21 
Variable Name Years in Planning 
Description Time measured in years from the beginning of planning to the year of 
inception. >In years  
Coding In years 
Comments Determining a specific date when project planning has started is 
difficult because either there is only an idea mentioned, or a project 
mentioned in a larger development plan, or the available information 
is not sufficiently specific, or because of different available dates, due 
to different definitions of what constitutes planning.  
I chose, wherever possible, that year in which first careful, but specific 
studies and analyses have been conducted. 
 
Variable   22 
Variable Name Year of Inception 
	  
	  





Description The year of inception is the year the project got formal approval by 
decision-makers, usually political approval in the form of legislative or 
other consent, depending on the political system. If the exact year or 
date could not be determined, or there were multiple occasions fitting 
that characteristic, either the most likely year considering the history 
of the project, or the year of construction begin was chosen. 
Coding In years 
 
Variable   23 
Variable Name Years to Completion 
Description “Year to Completion” describes the time measured in years from the 
year of inception (project approval) until project completion. Often it 
varies from the construction time of a project. 
Coding In years 
Comments Projects in planning or under constructions are counted as missing.  
  
Variable   24 
Variable Name DUMMY Years to Completion 
Description Dummy variable; measures time from official project approval to 
opening. In years. 
Coding 0. Less than 10 years, 1. More than ten years 
 
Variable   25 
Variable Name Construction Time 
Description This variable provides the construction time from begin to end.  
Coding In years 
Comments Projects in planning or under constructions got no value. 
 
Variable   26 
Variable Name Project History 
Description Project history from the first project idea to project approval. 
Coding In years 
Comments Variable originally provided a summary of the significant events that 
lead up to approval, construction and completion of the project. 
 
Variable   27 
Variable Name Project Support 
Description A list of project backers and promoters. 
Comments Reliable information was not found.  
 
Variable   28 
Variable Name Project Opposition 
Description Summary of any major opposition to the project.  I created four 
categories: 1) political opposition (opposition at crucial political 
decision-making points, like parliament, party issues, international 
cooperation problems, etc.); 2) Finance/ funding opposition/ 
neoliberal critique + Competing project alternatives (i.e. transit 
advocates vs. highway constituencies); 3) Very clear, issue-oriented 
opposition (environmentalists, NIMBY); 4) No opposition/ no 











1. Political opposition, 2. “Ideological critique”, 3. Very clear, issue-
oriented opposition, 4. No opposition/ no opposition mentioned/ 
unclear opposition 
Comments Recoded into binaries (projects can fall into more than one category) 
 
Variable   29 
Variable Name Initially Estimated Costs 
Description Projected price at the time of project approval. 
Status/ 
Comments 
I chose the costs estimated at the time of inception or political 
approval of the project – or the closest figure I could find to that year, 
in the currency the project was built in. Many of my cost values are 
taken from OMEGA Centre research.  
There were various problems: sometimes there were whole lists of 
estimated costs available through cost analyses, while for other 
projects it was difficult to find any reliable cost estimate at all. Cost 
estimations were also not necessarily provided in a form comparable 
to the finished project. For example, in some projects the estimated 
costs referred to a different-sized project than the final one. Wherever 
possible, in original currency. Variable used to calculate the Cost-
Overrun Ratio variables. 
 
Variable   30 
Variable Name Actual Costs 
Description Actual price at the time the project opened. 
Comments If possible, in the original currency. 
 
Variable   31 
Variable Name Capital Costs 
Description This figure represents the total costs necessary to bring the project to 
completion (in $2010).  
Comments Wherever possible, I use the currency corresponding to the initially 
estimated costs. If that was not possible, I used other credible values, 
mainly in dollar.  
The main problems with this variable was that different sources might 
name different project costs, which often reflects different measures 
of what constituted the specific project, or which connectors were in 
or excluded from the calculations, without specifying that. 
 
Variable   32 
Variable Name Cost Overrun Ratio I 
Description This variable is the cost overrun ratio, not inflation-adjusted. It is 
calculated by dividing capital costs by the estimated costs. Calculated 
cost-overrun ratio from the original currency values if possible. 
Coding Ratio 
 
Variable   33  
Variable Name Cost Overrun Ratio II Cost Overrun Dummy 
Description This variable is the cost overrun 
ratio, inflation-adjusted, and 
calculated by dividing capital 










Calculated cost-overrun ratio 
from the original currency values 
if possible, and inflation-
adjusted. 
Coding Ratio Dichotomous 
 
Variable   34 
Variable Name Costs per Kilometer 
Description The price per lane/ track in 2010 U.S.$ 
Coding In U.S. Dollar 
 
Variable   35 
Variable Name Sources of Funding 
Description Origin of financing for the project  (in percent of the total) 
Coding 1. Local, 2. Provincial, 3. State/National Authority, 4. National, 
5. International, 6. Private 
 
Variable   36 
Variable Name Type of Funding 
Description Involved funding types (in percent of total) 
Coding 1. Grants, 2. Bonds/ Loans, 3. Equity, 4. Government Loans, 5. Other 
 
Variable   37 
Variable Name Financial Data 
Description 1. Interest rate on main loan, 2. Main loan period (years), 3. Interest 
rate on secondary loan, 4. Secondary loan period (years). 
Comments Currently: data incomplete and quality uncertain. 
 
Variable   38 
Variable Name Planned Level of Utilization 
Description Estimated levels of use in terms related to the project, e.g. passengers 
per hour or vehicles per hour. 
Comments Variable used for calculation of utilization ratio (Var. 40) 
 
Variable   39 
Variable Name Actual Level of Utilization 
Description Recorded levels of use in terms related to the project. 
Comments Variable used for calculation of utilization ratio (Var. 40) 
  
Variable   40 
Variable Name Utilization Ratio 
Description Actual Level of Utilization/ Planned Level of Utilization 
Coding Ratio 
 
Variable   41 
Variable Name Cost-Benefit Analysis Cost-Benefit Analysis II 
Description A summary of any official cost 
benefit analyses done for the 
project. 
A summary of any official cost 
benefit analyses done for the 
project. 
Coding 0. Not done (not found or not 
obviously available) 
0. Not done 
1. Partial/ possible/ fishy 
	  
	  





1. Done 2. Done 
Comments Optimistic counting of the done 
CBAs. 
Less optimistic count 
 
Variable   42 




Variable   43 
Variable Name CBA Value 
Description Value of Cost-Benefit Analysis 
Comments Information found not sufficiently comparable 
 
Variable   44 
Variable Name Risk Analysis 
Description A summary of any official risk analyses done for the project. 
Coding 0. Done, 1. Not done 
Comments Optimistic counting of the done risk analyses. 
 
Variable   45 
Variable Name Year Risk Analysis 
Description Year Risk Analysis was done 
 
Variable   46 
Variable Name Environmental Impact Study 
Description Summary of Environmental Impact Statement, if possible 
Coding 0. Not done, 1. Done 
Comments Optimistic counting of the done EIS. 
 
Variable   47 
Variable Name Year Environmental Impact Study 
Description Year of Environmental Impact Statement, if possible 
Coding Year 
 
Variable   48 
Variable Name Economic Development Analysis 
Coding 0. Done, 1. Not done 
Comments Unreliable data 
 
Variable   49 
Variable Name Type Economic Development Analysis 
Description Type of Economic Development Analysis 
 
Variable   50 
Variable Name Project Transparency 
Description The variable captures the transparency of decision-making by adding 
or subtracting the presence and availability of the studies of variables 
40, 43, 45, 47. 









Variable   51 
Variable Name Stakeholders 
Description Major parties who contribute capital costs or at least retain partial 
ownership 
Coding 1. Local, 2. State/provincial, 3. Transportation authority, 
4. National/federal, 5. International, 6. Private 
Comments  (Categories not overlapping) 
 
Variable   52 
Variable Name Decision-Makers 
Description People or entities involved in decision-making 
Coding 1. Local, 2. State/provincial, 3. Transportation authority, 
4. National/federal, 5. International 
Comments (Categories not overlapping) 
 
Variable   53 
Variable Name Funding Sources: Count 
Description Count of different funding sources to gauge project complexity 
Coding Scale from 1 to 7, counts number of funding sources 
 
Variable   54 
Variable Name Political Type 
Description While Variable 12, Project Type, codes projects according to their 
physical structure, this variable codes them according to their 
political context and potential support and opposition 
Coding 1. Highway, 2. Passenger rail, 3. Subway, 4. Other 
 
Variable   55 
Variable Name Party System 
Description Political party organization on the national level 
Coding 0. Two party system 1. Multiple party system 
 
Variable   56 
Variable Name National Voting System 
Coding 1. Proportional, 2. Plurality/ Majority, 3. Mixed  
Source http://www.idea.int/esd/world.cfm 
 
Variable   57 
Variable Name Utilization Ratio Dummy 
Description Actual Level of Utilization/ Planned Level of Utilization 
Coding 0. Below projections, 1. On target or above projections 
 
Variable   58 
Variable Name Inception Decade  
Description Scale variable, capturing project approval years in four decades 


















Variable   59 
Variable Name Anglo-Saxon Countries 
Description Dummy Variable 
Coding 0. Non-Anglo-Saxon State, 1. Anglo-Saxon State 
 
Variable   60 
Variable Name Presidential/ Parliamentary Systems 
Description Dummy Variable 




Database Description - International Transportation Megaprojects 
This Appendix provides an overview over the database. I will briefly describe the 
variables and their categories, and add either brief lists of counts, or graphs and figures, 
as appropriate. Wherever necessary, I also outline the main problems I encountered in 
the data collection process. The presentation of the findings follows the numbering of the 
variables. For presentation purposes I grouped the variables into seven subsections: 
Context variables, project characteristics and costs, timing, funding, studies and actors 
involved. 
 
1. POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC PROJECT CONTEXT  
 Country (variable 2) and Continent (v3) 
Variables 2 and 3 provide the name of the country and continent where a project is 
located. As shown in Table 1 I have data on 60 transportation megaprojects, from 5 
different continents, and in 21 countries. (Variable 1, “Project Name” will be addressed 
together with the physical dimensions variable 14 below.)  
Most of the projects (28) are 
located in 10 European 
countries. All of these 
countries, except for Turkey, 
are also EU-member states. 
But while 5 European 
countries with 15 projects are 
also part of the EU monetary 
union, 3 EU member states 
(Great Britain, Sweden, 
Denmark), with a total of 9 
projects, are not part of the 
Eurozone, as well as Turkey. 
(One Italian project was 
implemented prior to 
  
Table 1: Geographical Distribution of 
Transportation Mega-projects 
Continent # of Projects # of Countries 
   European Union* 28 10 
   North America** 12 2 
   Asia*** 14 6 
   Australia 4 1 
   South America 2 2 
Total 60 21 
*except Turkey 
**only one project in Canada 









European monetary integration.) 
Two North American countries are home to 12 projects in the database. Except for one 
project in Canada, all of them are US projects.  Only 6 projects are actually implemented, 
and the remainders are either in planning, under construction, or entirely cancelled. (See 
Variable 21, project status.)   
Of the list of 14 projects are from six Asian countries (including Russia/ Soviet Union, 
and Israel), four Australian projects, two South American projects.  
Country (v2) and Population (v4)  
Table 2 below shows the list of all countries in which the projects are located, and the 
respective population of each country. The United States, with over 300 million 
inhabitants, is the most populous country of all, and Panama the least. 
  
Table 2: Countries and Population* 
Country Population Country Population 
USA 313,232,032 Argentine 41,769,728 
Russia 138,739,888 Canada 34,030,588 
Japan 126,475,664 Australia 21,766,712 
Germany 81,471,832 Netherlands 16,847,008 
Turkey 78,785,552 Greece 10,760,136 
Thailand 66,720,152 Portugal 10,567,178 
France 65,312,248 Sweden 9,088,728 
United Kingdom 62,698,360 Israel 7,473,052 
Italy 61,016,804 Hong Kong/ China 7,122,508 
South Korea 48,754,656 Denmark 5,529,888 
  Panama 3,405,813 
*from http://www.indexmundi.com/g/r.aspx?t=0&v=21&l=en, based on CIA factbook. Accessed November 11, 2011; number for Panama accessed July 2012 
  
Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) 2010 (v5), and GDP 2010, 2001, 
1990 (v6-v8) 
For each country, I collected data on the purchasing power parity (2010), in U.S. 
Dollar.53  Figure 1 shows that in 2010, the United States citizens had the highest most 
purchasing power, and the Thai citizens the least.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




R:ISR:JPN:CAN:KOR:THA&ifdim=country&hl=en_US&dl=en_US&ind=false,  accessed April 29, 2012 
	  
	  






Additionally,	  I	  collected	  World	  Bank	  Data	  on	  GDP	  per	  capita	  for	  the	  years	  2010,	  
2000	  and	  1990,	  in	  US$,	  as	  contextual	  information.	  In	  Figure	  2,	  the	  numbers	  are	  
arranged	  by	  highest	  GDP	  per	  capita	  in	  2010.54	   
 
 National Level Political Variables (v9, v10, v55, v56, v57) 
Another aspect of each country’s decision-making context is the political and legislative 
structure (see Table 3). Both variables have an effect on the economic policies and 
decision-making (e.g. Persson, 2002). Variable 9 (political system) is important for 
investment decision-makers because it affects funding, or impacts the policy and 
decision autonomy for regions and metropolitan areas. Table 3 displays a count of 21 
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in	  US$	   Figure	  2:	  GDP	  per	  Capita,	  2010,	  2000,	  and	  1990	  (in	  US$)	  
GDP	  p.C.	  (2010,	  in	  US$)	   GDP	  p.C.	  (2000,	  in	  US$)	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  p.C.	  (1990,	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projects under federally organized states (more than half of these projects in the U.S.), 
and 39 under centralized governments.  
 
Variable 10 is the legislative 
structure: Both, unicameral and 
bicameral parliaments are equally 
represented in the database.55 This 
variable suggests how the main 
elective body in a country is 
structured, and will allow us to see 
whether there are effects on decision-
making. Further: 5 projects are in 
federal monarchies (Canada and 
Australia), and 17 projects in constitutional monarchies. I have not found any literature 
suggesting that decision-making in monarchies differs in significant respects.  
Variables 55 and 56 provide further macro-political information. The party system 
variable (v55) holds that 14 projects are located in two-party systems, and 46 projects in 
multiple party systems. The “party system” binary (V55) distinguishes between two- and 
multiparty systems on the national level. 44 projects (73%) are in multiparty systems. 
The variable “type of voting system” (V56) distinguishes between proportional, 
majority/plurality and mixed voting systems. 20 (33%) projects are in proportional 
systems, 24 (40%) in the second category, and 12 (20%) in the third. Four projects could 
not be clearly categorized. The “cultural” variable, “Anglo-Saxon countries” (the U.S., 
Great Britain and Australia) (59), which hosts 19 projects (32%) – the majority in the 
United States 
 
2. PROJECT CHARACTERISTICS 
Project Type (v12, v54 v80, v81)56 and Location (v11) 
Table 4 provides a count of project location and project types. More than half of the 
projects are located in inner city and metropolitan areas, nine are regional projects, five 
national, and seven57 cross national boundaries. I have 22 rail (includes one freight rail) 
and 22 tunnel projects (which include 12 subway projects). They are followed by 
multimodal projects. The greatest concentration of projects is inner-city subways. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 The zero-count for projects in federal states with unicameral parliaments is likely a result of the 
relationship between state size, states rights, and governability: larger states tend to have a federal, and 
hence bicameral setup, while smaller states do not. Federal bicameralism is historically modeled after the 
U.S.-American type, to balance the difference between regional population differences and the influence of 
the subordinated polities. In the U.S. the federal system is supposed to ensure the political weight of small 
states, or states with low population densities, in the face of large states with dozens of millions of voters. 
56 V80 and v81 are counted out of order because I added them very late. 
57 Actually, only five of the projects cross national boundaries, because I collected data on the Oresund link, a 
link between Sweden and Denmark, from the perspective of both countries. 
Table 3: Political and Legislative 
System 






cameral  Total 
Centralized 31 8 39 
Federal 0 21 21 
60 
 31 29   
Total 60     
Table 4: Project Types and Location 
 Highway Rail Tunnel Multimodal  
Inner-city 2 4 17 2 25 
Metropolitan 1 8 2 3 14 
Regional 2 2 1  4 9 
National 1 4 1 0 5 
International 0 4 1 2 7 
	  
	  







determining the location of a project are quite clear, but not always mutually exclusive, 
so I made some judgment calls: Inner-city projects are those within the boundaries, and 
usually the core, of cities, and which are also serving an important function for inner-city 
transportation needs. Metropolitan projects are not limited to a core, and are often of 
longer physical length than inner-city projects. The rationale was to allocate projects, 
which serve two or more important cores in a metropolitan area as metropolitan. 
Distinguishing between regional projects and national projects was most difficult. 
Regional projects connect two or more metropolitan areas, like the Florida High Speed 
Rail. If projects were parts of national transportation networks, like the French TGV rail 
system, I allocated them into the national category, even if they connect two 
metropolitan areas. 
The distinction between project types was particularly challenging as there are different 
ways to do so, each with their own underlying rationales, and all relevant to the project. 
For example, one might distinguish by the principle construction of a project, like tunnel, 
bridge, road, and rail. This distinction would be most meaningful regarding project costs 
and engineering complexity. However, it would not capture e.g. subways, which might be 
reasonably subsumed under “tunnel.” But a subway distinction carries political 
implications, as well as a distinction between freight and passenger rail. The importance 
of subways in that respect lays in their usually specifically regulated agency and 
institutional structures. (Usually there are special agencies in place responsible for 
metropolitan or inner city transportation structures, in addition to the national or state 
transportation structures.) The freight/passenger rail distinction is politically relevant 
because transporting passengers -because of their agency- holds very different dynamics, 
characteristics, and challenges than carrying freight.  
In the end, I decided to simplify and distinguish, classically, according to the principal 
project structure: highways, rail, tunnel and multimodal projects, as shown in Table 4 
above, but also to add a “political type,” in which I coded highway, subway, passenger 
rail and other, to account for the different politics behind the projects. In this variable I 
have 6 highways, 21 subways, 13 passenger rails, and 21 other projects (v54). 



























































































































































































































































Figure 3: Physical Dimensions (in km) 
 6 22 22 11 60 
	  
	  





The projects range from 2 km length (Western Harbour Crossing, Australia) to 640 km 
(Portugal Highspeed Rail) and more. Figure 3 provides the length and names of some of 
the projects in order. (I plotted the distribution of project costs per lane km in Section 
3.3. on project costs.) 
Table 5 below provides more detail on the length of the physical structure, and the 
cumulated approximate lane or track lengths. The average length of the projects is 82.12 
kilometers, with a standard deviation of 131 km.  The median is 22,6 km.  
  
Table 5: Length of Projects (in km) 
 Count Median Average Standard Deviation Maximum Minimum 
Project Length 60 22.6 82.12 131 640 2 
Lane/Track 
Length 53 64.4 186.2 245.05 928 6 
  
The lane or track lengths of a project were more difficult to determine than expected, as 
precise numbers of lanes, tracks, and associated structures like repair tracks or overhaul 
lanes are not always provided. The range is between 928 and 6km, the average 186.2, 
and the median track and lane length 64.4 kilometers58. In case of rail length, for 
instance, in the absence of more precise data I assumed a double length of the general 
project length; I did the same with highway lanes.  
Project Status (v20), Project Description (v18) and Project Stimulus 
(v19) 
The projects are in different stages of implementation or completion. At the time of this 
writing, 42 projects have been completed, 7 are partially completed, 1 is in planning, 5 
are under construction and 5 have been cancelled. Both cancelled projects were planned 
rail projects in the U.S. 
Status: 
Completed:   42       
Partially completed:   7 
In planning:   1 
Under construction:  5 
Cancelled:   5 
Total:    60 
30 of the projects are new projects entirely, which means they are unrelated to other 
projects. They are either stand-alone projects, or their construction starts a new network. 
30 are additional pieces in already existing larger networks, expansions of existing 
facilities or projects related to other developments, i.e. the Channel Tunnel Rail Link, 
which is serving the larger Channel Tunnel (UK), or Arlandabanan (Denmark). 
Description: 
New projects:      30 
Additional piece in a larger network:   30 
Total:       60 
Project Stimulus: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 These are approximations because the specific numbers were not always provided. 
	  
	  





44 projects were public efforts or parts of larger, public long-term development plans. 12 
projects were special interest efforts, like the International Bank for Construction and 
Redevelopment initiating the KTX high-speed rail project in South Korea. I think that 
seven projects are the result of crisis or opportunity situations - like post-German 
reunification projects, or infrastructures servicing world fares. Eight projects are results 
of historical long-term plans. Three projects were necessary constructions to serve even 
larger megaprojects, and two of the projects to some degree the result of party 
competition. 
Public effort  44 
Special interest effort 12 
Crises/ opportunities 7 
Project history  8 
Necessary addendum 3 
Some projects were allocated into multiple categories, explaining why the sum is not 60, 
the project total. For instance, public efforts may easily correspond with opportunity 
moments or project history. I have chosen this particular distinction between different 
project stimuli to test for some political implications. (This will be discussed in more 
detail in another paper.)  
The main problem with collecting information for this variable is that project stimulus is 
often not obvious, especially if there are special interests at work, which may or may not 
influence political positions. For instance, in the case of the cancelled Florida High Speed 
Rail (in the U.S.), a connection between the governor’s decision to cancel the project, and 
some think tanks with anti-rail positions may be assumed, but not entirely proven. The 
other way round, I assume that project stimulus and the investment pushes are not 
always as visible as in the Argentinean case, where international development agencies 
pushed for investment. Also, the Argentinean bridge had been on the public mind for 
several decades. 
 
3. CAPITAL AND COSTS 
Capital Costs (v30) and Costs in 2010 $ (v31) 
I recorded each project’s capital costs in their original currency and subsequently 
converted it to 2010 dollars (own calculations). Since the figures varied at times, I used 
those either provided on the project websites or those, which were most often cited 
among the sources. Wherever possible, I tried to find those figures (in the specific 
currency), which corresponded to the initially estimated costs. If that was not possible, I 
used other credible values, provided by different sources, and mainly in dollar.59 
The most expensive projects are the Boston Artery Tunnel project, and the Korea Train 
Express, a high-speed rail line in South Korea (both over $15 billion). Three projects are 
between $10 billion and $15 billion, 16 between $10 and $5 billion; 32 projects are 
between $1 and $5 billion. Six projects were below or around $1 billion (in 2010 US 
dollars): three of them between $520 and 620 millions, and two projects over $900 
million.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 I often faced the problem that different sources named different project costs, depending on where they 
drew the project boundaries, whether rolling stock, if applicable, was included or not, conversion values 
used, etc. Often the characteristic of the provided value would not be specified. Wherever possible, I used the 
value given on the project website. 
	  
	  





 Number of Projects    Total Investment 
Volume 
Over $15 billion  2   $32.01 billion 
Between $15 and $10 billion  3   $36.96 billion 
Between $10 and $5 billion 16   $115.64 billon 
Between $1 and 5 billion 32   $72.5 billion 
Under $1 billion  6    $4.19 billion  
Unknown/ Cancelled  6 
Total    60   $262.3 billion 
 
Nature of the Project (v16) 
I have divided the projects into three major categories: public, private, and public-
private partnerships (PPP). Public projects are those projects with exclusive public 
funding and which clearly remain in public control for most of the project’s life span. 
Private projects are projects with minimal public sector risk: they derive their funding 
entirely from private sources, and their maintenance remains in private hands until an 
agreed date.  Public-private partnerships are those projects where risk is split between 
the two parties. The private partner may also carry out maintenance. Though this 
division is sometimes ambivalent, and the true nature of a project might be difficult to 
determine, the sample has a significant number of public projects - and an equal number 
of PPPs. Only five projects qualified as exclusive private projects, they are included in the 
PPP projects. For one project, the Panama Metro, I was unable to find reliable 
documentation, so it is missing in this count. 
Public  25 
PPP _______34  
Total  59 
Concession (v17) 
In this variable I collected information on the type of project contracts and their 
structures. However, I will use this information for background analyses, and did not 
quantify it.  
Costs per Lane/ Track km (v34) 
To assess the price per km of actual lanes or tracks built, I have collected data not only 
on the total length of projects but also on the lane and track kilometers effectively built. 
Figure 4 provides an overview of the cost/lane distributions of the projects. The numbers 
are calculated in 2010 US dollars. More than half of the projects cost less than $50 
million per kilometer, 12 projects more than $50 million per kilometer, and 9 were more 
expensive than that, among them. I did not find data, either on the project price, or on 










Figures 5 and 6 show the respective project counts for rail and road projects separately.  
 
Rail projects include subway projects, and road projects include tunnel projects as well. 
The combined count is different from that in Figure 4, because the database contains 
intermodal projects. 
 
Initial Costs (v29), Actual Costs (v30), Cost Overrun Ratio (v32) 
and Cost Overrun Ratio Inflation-adjusted (v33) 
I calculated cost overrun ratios for the projects using figures provided, if available, in the 
original currencies. I have two values of cost overrun ratios. The first is the result of 
dividing actual project costs by the estimated project costs at the time of project 
inception. I was able to obtain data (for any, or both values) for 37 projects. The numbers 
show that project cost overrun, without taking into account inflation, averages 1.52, with 





Figure 4: Project Costs per Lane/Track km 
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Figure 5: Road Projects, Costs/Lane (in km) 
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Figure 6: Rail Projects, Costs/Track (in km) 
>$100	  million/	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is inflation-adjusted figures. 45 projects have overrun average of 1.32, with a 2.98 
maximum, and a cost under-run of 0.67: 
  
Table 6: Cost Overrun Ratios 
 Count Median Average Standard Dev. Maximum Minimum 
Cost Overrun (not 




45 1.22 1.32 0.48 2.98 0.67 
  
The more detailed frequency distribution provides the following picture: 
 
Figure 8 illustrates a comparison between 35 project cost overrun ratios with and 
without taking into account inflation rates. The data shows that in most cases the non-
inflation adjusted cost overruns are higher than in the six cases, where the ratio is equal 
or negative (cost-underrun). I was unable to calculate the necessary cost overrun 
information for either inflation adjusted or non-adjusted figures for the remaining 
projects, because either the projects were not completed, yet, or I did not find sufficient, 
appropriate or trustworthy data.  
 







































































































































































































































































































































Ratio	   Figure 8: Cost Overrun Ratios, not inflation-adjusted/ inflation-
adjusted  
Cost	  Overrun	  Ratio,	  not	  inelation	  adjusted	   Cost	  Overrun	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  inelation	  adjusted	  
	  
	  





Year of Inception/ Project Approval (v22), Project Planning 
Time (v21), Years of Construction (v25), Years to Completion 
(v23) and Project History (v26) 
I collected several project planning and construction time measures. They include 
planning time, year of inception, and construction time. Planning time is defined as the 
numbers of years it took to plan a project and is measured in years from the beginning of 
planning to the year of inception. I was able to determine the project planning time for 
46 projects. (Table 7). 
Determining a specific date when project planning has started is difficult for the 
following reasons. a) Often there is an idea mentioned, which may or may not start the 
planning process immediately. b) A project might be mentioned in a larger development 
plan, but gets built decades later. c) The available information is not sufficiently specific. 
d) Often there were different available dates, due to different definitions of what 
constitutes planning. I focused on the year at which more comprehensive studies on how 
to solve a perceived transportation problem has begun.  
The year of inception is the year the project got formal approval by decision-makers, 
usually political approval in the form of legislative or other consent, depending on the 
political system. If the exact year could not be determined, or there were multiple 
occasions fitting that characteristic, either the most likely year considering the history of 
the project, or the year of construction begin was chosen. Most of the projects are fairly 
recent and were decided upon after 1990, only 14 projects got consent before that year. 
Next, I measured the time from the year of inception to the end of construction 
(“implementation time), and from the beginning of construction to the end of 
construction (“construction time”), because some projects, although having been 
approved, took some time until construction actually began. If projects were in planning 
still, or construction has not begun, yet, I assigned the planned values, anyway, and 
included them into the calculation. Project history gives the time from the first idea to 
project approval. Table 7 summarizes these measures. 
  
Table 7: Planning, Implementation, and Construction Times (in years) 







Planning Time 46 6.5 7.67 5.46 22 1 
Implementation 
Time 51 9 11.5 11.17 72 3 
Construction 
Time 54 5.5 7.2 4.6 26 1 
Project History 51 20 28.9 31.19 136 0 
  
The more detailed frequency distribution provides the following picture: 
	  
	  





*Not	  included:	  two	  outliers	  for	  implementation	  time,	  with	  49	  and	  72	  years	  each. 
 
5. PROJECT STUDIES 
Estimated Utilization, Actual Utilization, Utilization Ratio (v38-
40) 
Another important indicator is project utilization, which I define as the ratio between 
utilization estimates, and actual utilization after project implementation. I calculated 
utilization ratios, presented in Table 8 below. I collected comparable data –pre-project 
estimates, and those after construction- for 38 cases (the number is low because not all 
of the projects have been completed at the time of this study). The data shows that de 
facto project utilization is at 90 percent, the values ranging between three times the 
expected utilization, and not even 20 percent of the calculated range. 
  
Table 8: Utilization Ratio 
Count Median Average Standard Deviation Maximum Minimum 
38 (60) 0.9 0.88 0.53 3.28 0.19 
  
Table 8 shows that 11 projects were above the initial user estimates, and five projects 
right on target. The majority of projects (20), however, came in below the original 
estimations when actually used. The positive outlier here is the CTRL project with 33 
percent more users than expected, the Blue Line in Thailand has achieved the lowest 
utilization ratio. The distribution is as follows: nine projects (15 percent) have a 
utilization ratio of below .5. Another 9 projects are between 0.5 and < 0.9. 15 projects (25 
percent) are between 0.9 and 1.2. Four projects (6.7 percent) had a utilization ratio of 































Cost-Benefit Studies, Risk Studies, Environmental Impact 
Studies, Economic Development Studies (v41, v44, v46, v48) 
Table 9 provides an overview of the various studies done on the projects in the database. 
Note that many countries require Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) studies before 
a project starts but these then serve as substitute for a complete cost-benefit analysis. I 
found that 40 projects conducted (publicly available) EPS studies. 20 projects have 
conducted cost-benefit studies (or included those aspects in their feasibility studies). 
Risk studies were barely available.   
  
Table 9: Cost-Benefit Studies, Risk Studies, Environmental Impact 





available Partial # Projects 
Cost Benefit Studies 20 29 10 55 
Risk Studies 8 46 1 53 
Environmental Impact 
Studies 40 14 3 57 
Economic Development 
Studies 19 36 4 57 
  
Cost-Benefit Values (v43) 
Of the 28 cost benefit studies I was able to obtain 19 values, expressed variously in ratios 
or net present benefit values. The average ratio is 1.7, with 0.91 as the lowest, and 4.18 as 
the highest value. 
Cost-Benefit and Other Studies (v41, v42, v44, v45, 46, v47) 
An important indicator for the influence of environmental, risk or cost-benefit studies 
(CBA) on decision-making is the point of time when they were actually conducted, 
respectively released.  This is important because these studies are designed to guide and 
support the decision process, and hence should be available before inception (the year a 
project received formal, e.g. legislative, political approval). In one of the Swedish projects 
(Southern Link), for example, cost-benefit studies were publicly released only after the 
project received its official political confirmation, and as it turned out, they did not 
1.13	   1	  
0.43	  0.31	  
1.05	  












































indicate a positive cost-benefit ratio. I found that most CBAs were done (or available) 
before inception, but a significant number was only done after the point of inception. 
Most of the few risk studies I found were done after inception, too. Environmental 
impact studies were far more often done, available, and conduced before the year of 
inception (as far as I was able to locate information). This also might have to do with 
strong U.S. American and European requirements regarding environmental concerns. 
Table 10 summarizes a lot of information on various project studies and their timing. 
  
Table 10: Cost-Benefit Studies, Risk Studies, and Environmental Impact 




At year of 




Studies 17 2 11 3 
Risk Studies 2 0 6 1 
Environmental 
Impact Studies 16 7 16 0 
  
Note: The discrepancy in the sums of the various studies in this table from the numbers provided in Table 9 
above is explained by the fact that I was not always able to tell when studies had been released. 
Degree of Transparency (v50) 
I collected information on the availability of cost-benefit analyses, risk studies, 
environmental impact studies, and economic development studies, in order to assess the 
degree of transparency of different projects. I looked for studies which were sponsored 
either by the project management, by a public entity, or by a university. I did not count 
studies done by groups and think tanks with a clear political agenda. Those documents 
were registered under project opposition or support. 
 
Figure 11 shows the degree of transparency, measured in terms of the availability or non-
availability of the studies. The degree of transparency has been calculated by assigning 
value 1 for an available study, value 0r for non-available studies. I then calculated an 
availability average for each study by adding what’s available and dividing the sum by 
four. I grouped the results on a scale from very transparent to not that transparent. The 
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Figure 11: Project Transparency 
	  
	  






6. PROJECT FUNDING 
Sources of Funding (v35) 
Projects are often funded from multiple sources, often corresponding to the different 
layers of the political system. I collected data on funding sources for each project, and 
tried to determine the approximate percentage of the funding source vis-à-vis the project 
capital costs. Some sources of information provided very clear funding distributions, 
others provided only approximations. Using this information, I calculated rough 
estimates. For some projects any distribution was difficult to estimate. 
 
Nearly all of the 60 projects were funded by more than one funding source. Among the 
projects with reliable data, the average project received 38 percent national funding, 30 
percent private funding, 13 percent funding channeled through transportation 
authorities, and 9 percent came from provincial sources, and 5 from local funding 
sources. This distribution is based on 56 projects; missing data is the result of 
insufficient public data. Figure 12 shows the average megaproject and its funding 
sources. 
The more detailed frequency distribution provides the following picture: 
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I distinguish between grants, bonds (including private loans), government loans, equity, 
taxes, and others. The main types of funding of the projects in the database are grants, 
bonds and loans. Equity funding plays a role in over a third of the projects. As can be 
expected many projects have multiple types of funding (thus the total does not add up to 
55). Here is the count for how many projects have any of the following funding types. 
Grants:    36 
Bonds/ loans:   37 
Equity:    23 
Government loan:  12 
Revenues/ other:  14 
Both variables - the sources and the type of funding - are not sufficiently clear or 
transparent in many project documents. Plan changes and shifts over time render non-
transparent projects even more ambiguous. So these categories and allocations need to 
be understood as cursory. Figure 14 displays the average funding type composition of a 
project. 
 
The more detailed frequency distribution provides the following picture: 
 
Financial Data (v37) 
I collected data on interest rates on both main and secondary loans, and the respective 
loan periods. I was unable to obtain a sufficient amount of comparable data, so this 
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Interest rate on main loan:   7 counts with an average of 4.4 
percent 
Main loan period:   21 counts with an average of 25 years 
Interest rate on secondary loan:  1 count of 7.5 percent 
Secondary loan period:  3 counts with an average of 29.66 years. 
 
7. ACTORS: PROJECT STAKEHOLDERS, POLITICAL DECISION-
MAKERS, OPPOSITION and SUPPORT 
Project Stakeholders and Political Decision-Makers (v51, v52) 
I define project stakeholders as those actors with a financial stake in the project. I define 
political decision-makers as main actors responsible for major project approvals and 
decisions. The comparison between stakeholders and decision-makers on different levels 
shows that national governments are heavily involved in large infrastructure 
investments, and slightly more often as stakeholders than as decision-makers. In the 
following order, the national and the provincial (political sub-units like states and 
regions) actors are most heavily financially involved in the decision-making; they are 
also the main political decision-makers. The private sector is, to different degrees, 
financially involved in 23 projects. International and transport authorities channeled 
funding are next. The local level has the least stake, and is financially involved in only 12 
projects.  
 
The data on decision-makers and stakeholders is comparable in the sense that I chose 
the same categories: stakeholders, defined as having a financial stake in the project, may 
come from local, provincial, national, international or private backgrounds, as well as 
from transportation agencies. The same goes for decision-makers, except for the private 
category (Here the problem of non-transparent decision-making presumably comes into 
play, as private sector lobbying and support, are not openly linked to political decisions). 
The discrepancy between the two variables might be telling in terms of geo-political 
power relationships. According to the data, the international category is much more 
involved in the funding, than in the decision-making of projects. (Of course, funding is 
one of the most crucial and factual aspects of large infrastructure investment, and 
difficult to separate from a political decision.) The national and sub-national entities are 
also stronger involved in the funding than in the decision-making. That relationship is 
reversed regarding the local and transport authority categories.  
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Figure 16: Project Stakeholders and Decision-Makers 
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Reliable or specific data on project opposition is difficult to obtain. Official sources tend 
not to mention it, so I relied on newspaper and journal accounts to gather information 
on project’s opposition. I collected data on the main sources of opposition, which were 
mentioned in more than one source. However, it is difficult to evaluate the degree of 
actual input of opposition on the decision-making process, because it is either non-
transparent, or does not exist. Even in cases where the public protest was officially 
integrated into the decision-making process, it is difficult to assess whether opposition to 
the project was immense or meager, and what was opposition’s real impact on decision-
making. Many projects faced multiple sources and themes of opposition, which is why 
the total count is more than 60.  
I grouped opposition into 4 themes, though I think that several categories might be 
under-represented because data has not been available, or opposition has not been 
touted, for instance lawsuits. Issue-oriented opposition is, numerically, the strongest 
data point.  It includes very clear opposition aims and goals, for instance NIMBY 
opposition, or environmentally motivated protest. “Political” opposition is the second 
largest data point. It captures opposition at crucial political decision-making points, e.g. 
in the parliament, party issues, problems of international cooperation, etc. For 14 
projects I could not find any opposition, except for maybe some citizen complaints 
during construction, but I was careful to not overestimate that finding. It is equally likely 
that project opposition just did not receive a good platform. The next point relates to 
opposition to the type of funding and is often grounded in some sort of neoliberal 
critique of land-use or need for the project, especially with such large budget items. 
Related to that is opposition due to competing project alternatives, for instance transit 
advocates vs. highway. In a few cases I found some opposition, but the information 
available was not sufficiently specific, unclear or seemed unreliable, so I integrated it 
under “no or little opposition.”  
 
                 Project Support (v27) 
Political support for a project was –like project opposition-- difficult to establish. 
Moreover, the literature states that it often is indirect. Thus I was unable to collect 
reliable, trustworthy data to be used in an analysis. Parts of project support are captured 
in variable 19 “project stimulus.” 
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Figure 17: Main Project Opposition 
	  
	  





The projects share most megaproject characteristics observed in the relevant literature, 
which is not surprising, because both the dataset and the general megaproject literature 
are skewed towards projects in developed countries (e.g. Flyvbjerg et al., 2003, Altshuler 
and Luberoff, 2003, Swyngedouw, Hall, 1980, UCL-OMEGA Project Study, 2011).60 
However, the 60 projects are in a broad range of 21 countries, which includes countries 
with the highest GDPs, like the U.S. or Germany, and countries with very low ones, like 
Thailand or Panama. All countries are legislative democracies with a roughly similar 
distribution of federal vs. centralized states, and bi-cameral vs. uni-cameral legislative 
structures.  
Close to half of the projects are inner-city projects, mainly subways. The remaining 
projects are metropolitan, regional or national projects. Five projects cross international 
borders. Passenger rail and subway projects constitute the majority of projects. Further I 
included highways, bridges and tunnels, or mode combinations. The majority of projects 
are completed, or at least partially (49), while the remainder is incomplete, except for 
two, which were cancelled. The number of public projects (nearly entirely publicly 
funded) and public-private partnerships is nearly equal; both sets constitute the 
majority, and thus reflect the typical funding distribution. Only five projects are private 
projects entirely. Only a minority of projects was more expensive than US $100 million 
per kilometer. Most were below $10 million per kilometer. Generally, the rail projects are 
cheaper than highway projects. In accordance with the literature, the projects experience 
heavy cost overruns as well, even if I take inflation into account. 
By average, the planning and implementation times of the projects (more than 20 years 
in total) are longer than the construction times (which are with 7.4 years part of the 
implementation time). The utilization ratios are mostly negative, which is typically one of 
the standard points of critique on megaprojects (Siemiatycki, 2010, Flyvbjerg et al., 
2010), so the projects fit the bill as well. The projects do not seem very transparent, 
either, which is another main point of critique in the literature. Project-related 
assessment and evaluation studies are only insufficiently publicly available. 
Environmental studies are best available – but they are required in most countries. The 
availability of studies is followed by cost-benefit analyses and economic development 
studies, while they often seem quite superficial or partial though. That also follows some 
of the transparency concerns in the literature (mainly Flyvbjerg, 2003). 
Most of the projects have funding from the national state, followed by private funding 
shares. Transport agencies were an important channel for funds. 16% of all projects 
received funding from regional and local sources. Grants, bonds and equity account for 
most of the funding, while government loans are not nearly as common.  
 
APPENDIX D  
Investment Volume by Country 
This Appendix establishes the representativeness of the data in the database by stating 
the database investment volumes as a percentage of the total investment volume of a 
country for a given period of time (last column).  
The data is from the OECD website. The rail and road investment figures are sums of 
gross road and rail infrastructure investment spending (in Euro) in each country 
between 1992 and 2010. The numbers do not include maintenance expenditures. I 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 There are exceptions, of course. There is a range of studies focusing on megaprojects as development tools 
in developing countries. (See Kennedy et al., 2011) 
	  
	  





summed up rail and road spending over the years, converted the database infrastructure 
investments per country from U.S. dollar into Euro, and calculated the percentage in 
terms of the entire infrastructure investment spending over that period of time. 
 
Gross Infrastructure Investment by Country 


























Argentine    0.052 -  
Australia 20,100 94,672 114,720 6.64 5,000 4.36 
Canada 8,600 102,380 110,980 2.13 1,600 1.44 
Hong Kong 
China 
   11.12 8,300  
Denmark 10,300 11,078 21,374 11.75 8,800 41.17 
France 68,000 207,810 275,810 22.46 16,800 6.09 
Germany 102,000 210,085 312,085 23.05 17,300 5.54 
Greece 6,100* 13,224* 19,324 11.28 8,500 43.98 
Israel    4.3 3,200  
Italy 82,700 114,630 197,3    
Japan 150,400 1,593,226 1,743,626 24.97 18,700 1.07 
South Korea    15.96 12,000  
Netherlands n.a. n.a.  12.32 9,200  
Russia [n.a.] [n.a.]  0.65 0,500  
Panama    1.4 1,100  
Portugal 6,900 22,400 29,300 7.8 5,900 20.13 
Sweden 17,500 19,900* 37,400 6.5 4,900 13.10 
Thailand    6.7 5,000  
Turkey 5,100 19,200 24,300 4.28 3,200 13.17 
United 
Kingdom 
99,100 109,800 208,900 18.14 13,600 6.51 
USA 61,500* 935,600* 997,100 70.33 52,700 5.28 
      Average: 
13.5%  
*some years have missing data 
Source: http://www.oecd.org/statistics/, accessed January 10, 2014 
 
APPENDIX E  
List of Hypotheses 
This Appendix lists all hypotheses tested in Chapter 4. 
 
Macro-Political Influences 
H2.1: Project success varies by political system: Projects built in centralized 
governments are more successful. 
H2.2: Macro-political factors such as the political system, the legislative structure, the 
party and the national voting system impact funding sources for projects. 
H2.3: Bond-funded infrastructure investment is more prevalent in federalist than in 
centralized countries. 









H2.5: Infrastructure projects in two-party systems are underwritten by a greater 
variety of funding sources than projects in multiple party systems. 
H2.6: Projects in Anglo-Saxon countries experience more opposition than projects in 
centralized countries.  
H2.7: The nature of the voting system affects project success measures like cost 
overrun. 
H2.8: Macro-political organization affects choices between project types like highways 
or rail projects.  
H2.9: Local decision makers are more involved in project decisions in federalist 
countries than in centralized ones. 
Project Decision-Making Levels 
H3.1: Anglo-Saxon projects involve more local and regional decision-makers in project 
decisions.  
H3.2: The types or nature of the project stimuli influence the types of project decision-
makers.  
H3.3: There is less project opposition when national decision-makers are involved than 
when decisions are made on sub-national levels. 
H3.4: National level decision-makers conduct more cost-benefit analyses than project 
decision-makers on local or regional levels. 
H3.5: Project planning varies depending on project decision levels. Project-planning 
times are longer for national level projects than projects on any other level.  
H3.6: The higher the GDP PPP, the more project decisions are taken at the national 
level.  
H3.7: If (special-purpose) transportation agencies are involved, cost overruns are 
smaller.  
H3.8: National level decision-makers tend to take on more complex, long-term projects. 
H3.9: National level decision-makers are involved with the more expensive projects 
(costs/km). 
H3.10: Project decision-making levels changed over time, specifically from the 1980s 
onward. More projects are now decided on sub-national levels. 
Project Transparency 
H4.1: Project transparency or cost-benefit analyses differ by project type: rail projects 
are more transparent than highway projects. 
H4.2: The project stimulus affects transparency: projects that arise out of special 
occasions are less transparent. 
H4.3: Project transparency increases with the rank of the decision-maker. 
H4.4: The wealthier a country, the more transparent are its projects.  
	  
	  





H4.5: Projects in centralized countries are more transparent than in federalist 
countries. 
H4.6: Entirely new projects are more likely to have CBAs than extensions to existing 
networks. 
H4.7: The less transparent a project, the more protest potential is there.  
H4.8: Project transparency affects project success (here, cost overruns) negatively. 
H4.9: Inner-city projects are more typically based on cost-benefit analyses. 
Funding Sources 
H5.1: The wealthier a country, the more sources of funding are available at the 
national level.   
H5.2: Local funding sources became more important over time. 
H5.2.1: The number of funding sources (or funding complexity) increases over time. 
H5.3: Projects underwritten with national funding will take longer to implement. 
H5.4: Projects underwritten with national funding will experience more cost overruns. 
H5.5: The more national funding, the better the projects meet utilization goals. 
H5.6: Projects underwritten with private funding will experience fewer cost overruns 
or better utilization ratios. 
H5.7: When special interests are involved in project decision-making, the funding 
sources become more complex. 
H5.9: Project funding varies by region (like continent, or culture). 
H5.10: Inner-city projects, because of their limited reach, are less likely to receive 
international funding. 
H5.11: Funding sources impact project opposition types.  
H5.12: The type of funding and the availability of a cost-benefit analysis for a given 
project determine the general degree of project support (measured by the absence of 
opposition). 
H5.13: Project types are associated with funding sources – e.g., rail projects are less 
likely to be privately funded than any other project type. 
Funding Types 
H5.13 GDP impacts funding types. 
H5.14 The nature of project funding impacts project-related factors like construction 
time.  
H5.15 The nature of project funding impacts project utilization ratios.  
H5.16 Projects with equity funding are more often canceled than projects with other 
types of funding. 
	  
	  





APPENDIX F  
Statistical Tests 
This Appendix provides an overview over the statistical tests that were used. 
Pearson’s Correlation Coefficient: Pearson’s correlations are measures of linear 
statistical correlation or the dependence between two variables, e.g. if the value of one 
variable increases or decreases depending on the value of another one. The values of the 
outcome coefficient range between -1 and 1. The closer the coefficients are to the values 1 
and -1, the stronger the correlation. With a coefficient of 0 the variables show no 
statistical association. The negative or positive value describes the direction of the curve. 
The Pearson’s test, a parametric test, works best with scale data. It may be calculated as 
follows: 
  
Spearman’s Rank Order Test: The Spearman Rank Order Test is a non-parametric 
measure testing an association between two variables, e.g. if the value of one variable 
increases or decreases depending on the value of another one. The test may be used with 
discrete or ordinal data. Similar to the Pearson’s Correlation coefficient, ranges of 
outcomes are between -1 and 1, with -1 being a negative correlation, 1 being positively 
correlated, and a value of 0 describing no correlation. Spearman correlations are less 
sensitive to outliers than the parametric Pearson’s correlations. The formula is this:  
 
Mann-Whitney U Test: The non-parametric or rank order Mann-Whitney U Test 
ranks two independent groups by ranking them or comparing their means against an 
assumed distribution (for instance whether one population features larger values of a 
specific outcome than another). As opposed to parametric alternatives, the Mann-
Whitney U Test is less susceptible to abnormal distribution of the data and unequal 
sample sizes. The output is the Mann-Whitney U value, the interpretation of which 
depends on the sample size, and the p value, which indicates whether there is a 
statistically significant difference between both groups (if so, then p<.01). 
 
Kruskal-Wallis Test: The non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis test is an extension of the 
Mann-Whitney U Test. The test allows comparing more than two independent groups. 
Similar to the Mann-Whitney Test, the data does not need not be in equal interval scale, 
the population does not need to be normally distributed, and the samples need not have 
equal variances. It assumes that the dependent variable is measured at an ordinal level, 
and that the independent variable consists of more than two independent categories. The 
test provides a ranking for each group, and the statistical significance, which allows for 
conclusions about the effect of the independent variables on the groups. The test statistic 
is given by: 
	  
	  






Binomial Tests: Binomial tests test the probability that a binary sample reflects a 
likely distribution in the general population. Statistical tests operate with the default 
threshold of .5 (50%). With this threshold, the sample distribution is evaluated against 
the probability that the data distribution corresponds to 50/50 in the real world. The test 
value reflects the deviation from that probability. The threshold may be changed to 
reflect hypothesized proportions of the given general population based on theory or 
observation.  
An example: A binomial test may establish whether the observed frequencies of two 
categories of a dichotomous variable, for instance heads or tails in repeated coin tosses, 
correspond to the equal probability of heads or tails (a hypothesized 50% chance): if your 
coin tosses produce tails 70% of the time, the very small significance level indicates that 
that your 70% sample is unlikely to happen by chance. Hence the null hypothesis (50% 
probability in either direction) must be rejected. One possible conclusion is that the 
hypothesized real-world threshold is wrong. But since a 50/50 probability has been 
generally accepted for coin tossing, the other conclusion must be that the coin has 
probably been tampered with. 
Multivariate Regressions: Regression analysis allows making quantitative 
predictions about the effects of one or more variables on a “dependent” variable. The 
independent variable/s exercises a hypothesized influence on the dependent variable: 
depending on the values of the independent variable/s, the dependent variable changes 





In the given relationships Y is the dependent variable and b represents the slopes of the 
functions. In linear, quadratic and cubic model specifications, the dependent variables 
are continuous. Linear, quadratic or cubic model choices refer to the hypothesized curve 
of the slope: a linear function assumes a straight curve, quadratic and cubic ones curved 
slopes (i.e. they signify thresholds at which the association noticeably changes). 
Associated tests of statistical significance evaluate how likely it is that the predicted 
shapes of the associations reflect the true associations in the real world. 
R Squared: R Squared is the typical “model fit” test that assesses how well the 
hypothesized model fits the sample data. The closer the value is to 1, the better the 
model. 
Regression Assumptions 
Generally, the data must meet four assumptions to conduct linear regression. 
	  
	  





Linearity Test: The relationship should indeed be linear, otherwise the reported results 
lose their explanatory power. Linearity tests test whether the best model fit is, in fact, 
linear, and not logistic, quadratic or cubic. We used the SPSS “lack of fit” test. The test 
statistic, in order to meet the linearity assumption, must have a p-value larger than the 
set “alpha value.”  
Homoscedasticity/ Heteroscedasticity: Another assumption for linear regression is 
homoscedasticity, which refers to the equal distribution of residuals. The opposite, 
heteroscedasticity, refers to the situation in which the residuals of a model are unequally 
distributed, also called the inequality of variance. Heteroscedasticity indicates 
correlations between the independent variables. Homoscedasticity is the desirable state 
of the data; heteroscedasticity might distort the regression results.  
Independence of Error: This assumption presumes that the independent variables 
are not correlated. Looking at a plot of residuals, residuals must be randomly distributed 
and do not form any kind of pattern. 
Durbin-Watson Test: The test provides a value to test the “independence of error.” 
The statistic ranges from 0-4; a value around 2 is desirable (meaning: the assumption of 
the independence of error is met). The acceptable range is given with 1.5-2.5. 
Normality of Error: Shapiro-Wilk Test: This test uses studentized residuals to 
determine whether the assumption of the “normality of error” is met. That means that 
residuals, or errors, should be random and normally distributed at the values of the 
dependent variable. Any value that is larger than p<.05 (if that it the set threshold, or 
“alpha value”) is good to go, meaning that the errors are normally distributed, and p=1 is 
perfect. 
Binary Logistic Regressions: The dependent variable in logistic regressions is 
binary, and the independent variables scale or ordinals. Non-parametric tests require the 
data to meet fewer assumptions than parametric tests. The model is then as follows 
(sample data from the data analysis): 
 
 
Receiver Operating Graphs: Receiver Operating Graphs (ROC) may assess the 
strength of binary logistic regressions. ROC curves allow conclusions about the strength 
of a specific test on the model and the test population, by measuring the sensitivity and 
specificity of the results. Sensitivity and specificity refer to the intrinsic quality 
(appropriateness) of a test, and allow conclusions about the property of a test AND the 
population. Sensitivity refers to the power of a test to identify positives (the proportion of 
cases correctly identified by the test as meeting a certain condition) – specificity to 
identify negatives (proportion of cases that do not meet a certain condition).  
The closer the curve is to .5 (a diagonal line), the less meaningful is the test. The closer 
the curve is to the left and upper border of the ROC space, the more accurate. For 
instance, a ROC value of .673 indicates that 67 percent of pairs (bond funding/ no bond 
funding) are identified as true positives, when randomly drawn. It also indicates that the 
	  
	  





results from the model are of poor quality, using the following quality scale: .50-.60 
(fail), .60-.70 (poor), .70-.80 (fair), .80-.90 (good), and .90-1 (excellent). Poor test 
results may either indicate problems with the choice of the test, or the quality of the data. 
Model Fit Values for Logistic Regression:  
The Cox & Snell R Squared and Nagelkerke R Squared are used as model fit tests 
for binary regressions. I report both values in the database. The two model fit tests 
technically differ from the R Squared values that assess model fit in linear regressions, 
but their interpretation is similar: The closer the value is to 1, the better the does the 
model fit the data points in the database – or, the larger the value the better the model 
fit. 
APPENDIX G  
Sample Questionnaire for Interview Questions 
 
 
1. What was your role in the Second Avenue Subway decision-making? Did that role 
change during the process? 
2. Where did the idea, or project stimulus, come from? What were the main 
objectives for building this project? 
3. Which were the most relevant actors involved in the decision-making process, 
and why? What were their objectives?  
4. What was the role of the implementing agency? 
5. Which were the main sources of opposition or project support? Did they further, 
complicate, or delay the project? 
6. How was funding secured? 
7. Were there major changes during project implementation?  
8. What are the specific problems or benefits of transportation decision-making in 
this jurisdiction?  
9. How should this project be evaluated? What are its main measures of success? 
10. What, in your or your agency’s view, constitutes a “successful” megaproject? 
What are the main defining features and characteristics? 
11. In your view, what do you consider to be the most important factors and actors 
that determine the outcome of decision-making process in the planning and 
delivery of any megaproject? 
 
APPENDIX H 
Data Quality Assessment Graphs 
This Appendix collects data assessment graphs to evaluate the strength of regression 
models, e.g. ROC Curves, Scatterplots, Durbin-Watson and Shapiro-Wilk Tests. The tests 
are described in more detail in Appendix F. 
Table 2.5/ Model 1: ROC= .726, S.E. .076, Lower 
Bound .579, Upper Bound: .874, sig. .006 
Table 2.5/ Model 1: ROC= .761, S.E. .064, Lower 
Bound .636, Upper Bound: .887, sig. .002 
	  
	  






Table 3.4/ Model 1: ROC= .798, S.E. .066, Lower 
Bound .668, Upper Bound: .927, sig. .001 
Table 4.3/ Model 1: ROC= .876, S.E. .053, Lower 
Bound .772, Upper Bound: .980, sig. .000 
  
Table 4.3/ Model 2: ROC= .826, S.E. .056, Lower 
Bound .716, Upper Bound: .936, sig. .000 
Table 4.3/ Model 3: ROC= .793, S.E. .060, Lower 
Bound .675, Upper Bound: .912, sig. .000 
  
  
Table 4.3/ Model 4: ROC= .797, S.E. .062, Lower 
Bound .676, Upper Bound: .918, sig. .000 
Table 5.3/ Model 1: ROC= .691, S.E. .076, Lower 
Bound .542, Upper Bound: .840, sig. .023 
	  
	  






Table 5.3/ Model 1a: ROC= .684, S.E. .079, Lower 
Bound .529, Upper Bound: .839, sig. .031 
Table 5.3/ Model 2: ROC= .731, S.E. .072, Lower 
Bound .590, Upper Bound: .873, sig. .006 
  
Table 5.3/ Model 2a: ROC= .707, S.E. .077, Lower 
Bound .557, Upper Bound: .858, sig. .015 
Table 5.6/ Model 1a: ROC= .704, S.E. .071, Lower 
Bound .564, Upper Bound: .844, sig. .010 
  
Table 5.6/ Model 1b: ROC= .785, S.E. .069, Lower 
Bound .651, Upper Bound: .920, sig. .001 
Table 5.6/ Model 1c: ROC= .873, S.E. .047, Lower 
Bound .781, Upper Bound: .965, sig. .000 
	  
	  






Table 5.6/ Model 1d: ROC= .789, S.E. .094, Lower 
Bound .597, Upper Bound: .963, sig. .002 
Table 2.4/ Model 1: Lack of Fit: .473, Durbin-Watson 
1.834, Shapiro-Wilk: .119 
  
  
Table 2.4/ Model 2: Lack of Fit: .403, Durbin-
Watson 1.808, Shapiro-Wilk: .542 
Table 4.4/ Model 1: Lack of Fit: .218, Durbin-Watson 
1.735, Shapiro-Wilk: .905 
  
Table 4.4/ Model 2: Lack of Fit: .357, Durbin-
Watson 1.792, Shapiro-Wilk: .979 
Table 4.4/ Model 3: Lack of Fit: .037, Durbin-
Watson 1.843, Shapiro-Wilk: .250 
	  
	  






Table 4.4/ Model 4: Lack of Fit: .341, Durbin-
Watson 1.697, Shapiro-Wilk: .862 
Table 3.4/ Model 2: Lack of Fit: .643, Durbin-
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